Explores the nature of the ideal of relational equality and how it relates to distributive ideals of justice.

Over the last twenty years, many political philosophers have rejected the idea that justice is fundamentally about distribution. Rather, justice is about social relations, and the so-called distributive paradigm should be replaced by a new relational paradigm. Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen seeks to describe, refine, and assess these thoughts and to propose a comprehensive form of egalitarianism which includes central elements from both relational and distributive paradigms. He shows why many of the challenges that luck egalitarianism faces reappear, once we try to specify relational egalitarianism more fully. His discussion advances understanding of the nature of the relational ideal, and introduces new conceptual tools for understanding it and for exploring the important question of why it is desirable in the first place to relate as equals. Even severe critics of the distributive understanding of justice will find that this book casts important new light on the ideal to which they subscribe.

Pragmatist Egalitarianism argues that a deep impasse plagues philosophical egalitarianism. It sets forth a conception of equality rooted in American pragmatist thought--specifically William James, John Dewey, and Richard Rorty--that successfully mediates that impasse.

"Why does equality matter, as a social and political value, and what does it require? Relational egalitarians argue that it does not primarily require that people receive equal distributive shares of some good, but that they relate as equals. This book develops a liberal conception of relational equality, which understands relations of non-domination and egalitarians norms of social status as stringent demands of social justice. First, it argues that expressing respect for the freedom and equality of individuals in social cooperation requires stringent protections against domination; develops a substantive, liberal conception of non-domination; and argues that non-domination is a particularly important, but not the only, concern of social justice. These features set it apart from, and provide it with crucial advantages over, neo-republican accounts of non-domination. Second, the book develops an account of the wrongness of inegalitarian norms of social status, which shows how status-induced foreclosure of important social opportunities is a social injustice in its own right, over and above the role of status inequality in enabling domination, and the threats it poses to individuals' self-respect. Finally, it works out the implications of liberal relational egalitarianism for political, economic, and health justice, showing that it demands, in practice, far-reaching forms of equality in all three domains. In so doing, the book draws on, and brings together, several different literatures: on social justice and liberalism, distributive and relational equality, the distinct value of social equality, and neo-republicanism and non-domination"--

Though the revised edition of A Theory of Justice, published in 1999, is the definitive statement of Rawls's view, so much of the extensive literature on Rawls's theory refers to the first edition. This reissue makes the first edition once again available for scholars and serious students of Rawls's work.

Over the last twenty years, many political philosophers have rejected the idea that justice is fundamentally about distribution. Rather, justice is about social relations, and the so-called distributive paradigm should be replaced by a new relational paradigm. Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen seeks to describe, refine, and assess these thoughts and to propose a comprehensive form of egalitarianism which includes central elements from both relational and distributive paradigms. He shows why many of the challenges that luck egalitarianism faces reappear, once we try to specify relational egalitarianism more fully. His discussion advances understanding of the nature of the relational ideal, and introduces new conceptual tools for understanding it and for exploring the important question of why it is desirable in the first place to relate as equals. Even severe critics of the distributive understanding of justice will find that this book casts important new light on the ideal to which they subscribe.

Major scholars assess G. A. Cohen's contribution to the debate on the nature of egalitarian justice.