The effective division of powers is critical to ensuring the promotion of good governance, democracy, and the rule of law in Africa. This book examines key issues arising during reforms of African constitutions, and focuses on the emergence of independent constitutional institutions providing checks against future abuses of powers.

In many companies, two or three executives jointly hold the responsibilities at the top-from the charismatic CEO who relies on the operational expertise of a COO, to co-CEOs who trust in inter-personal bonds to achieve professional results. Their collaboration is essential if they are to address the dilemmas of the top job and the demands of today's corporate governance. Sharing Executive Power examines the behaviour of such duos, trios and small teams, what roles their members play and how their professional and inter-personal relationships bind their work together. It answers some critical questions regarding when and how such power sharing units form and break up, how they perform and why they endure. Understanding their dynamics helps improve the design and composition of corporate power structures. The book is essential reading for academics, graduates, MBAs, and executives interested in enhancing teamwork and cooperation at the top.

The study of political institutions is among the founding pillars of political science. With the rise of the 'new institutionalism', the study of institutions has returned to its place in the sun. This volume provides a comprehensive survey of where we are in the study of political institutions, covering both the traditional concerns of political science with constitutions, federalism and bureaucracy and more recent interest in theory and the constructed nature of institutions. The Oxford Handbook of Political Institutions draws together a galaxy of distinguished contributors drawn from leading universities across the world. Authoritative reviews of the literature and assessments of future research directions will help to set the research agenda for the next decade.

Vital perspectives for the divided Trump era on what the Constitution's framers intended when they defined the extent—and limits—of presidential power One of the most vexing questions for the framers of the Constitution was how to create a vigorous and independent executive without making him king. In today's divided public square, presidential power has never been more contested. The President Who Would Not Be King cuts through the partisan rancor to reveal what the Constitution really tells us about the powers of the president. Michael McConnell provides a comprehensive account of the drafting of presidential powers. Because the framers met behind closed doors and left no records of their deliberations, close attention must be given to their successive drafts. McConnell shows how the framers worked from a mental list of the powers of the British monarch, and consciously decided which powers to strip from the presidency to avoid tyranny. He examines each of these powers in turn, explaining how they were understood at the time of the founding, and goes on to provide a framework for evaluating separation of powers claims, distinguishing between powers that are subject to congressional control and those in which the president has full discretion. Based on the Tanner Lectures at Princeton University, The President Who Would Not Be King restores the original vision of the framers, showing how the Constitution restrains the excesses of an imperial presidency while empowering the executive to govern effectively.

A defense of regulatory agencies’ efforts to combine public consultation with bureaucratic expertise to serve the interest of all citizens The statutory delegation of rule-making authority to the executive has recently become a source of controversy. There are guiding models, but none, Susan Rose-Ackerman claims, is a good fit with the needs of regulating in the public interest. Using a cross-national comparison of public policy-making in the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and Germany, she argues that public participation inside executive rule-making processes is necessary to preserve the legitimacy of regulatory policy-making.

Comparative studies examine the constitutional design and actual operation of governments in Argentina, Australia, Austria, Canada, Germany, India, Nigeria, Russia, South Africa, Switzerland, and the United States. Contributors analyze the structures and workings of legislative, executive, and judicial institutions in each sphere of government. They also explore how the federal nature of the polity affects those institutions and how the institutions in turn affect federalism. The book concludes with reflections on possible future trends.