This book examines the origins of the IS-LM model, one of the most significant innovations in the history of economic thought. It shows that the complete IS-LM model, including the equations and diagram, was produced by a group of economists who contributed their respective mathematical models of Keynes’s General Theory, including Champernowne, Reddaway, Harrod, and Meade, not to mention Hicks. Furthermore, the book discusses the implications of newly discovered archival material, including a previously overlooked document showing that John Maynard Keynes himself was the first to present the IS-LM model equations in a lecture he gave on December 4, 1933. It focuses on the implications of this material in terms of understanding the evolution of Keynes’s approach from 1933 to 1937, later interpreters of his General Theory, and the ongoing debate between Keynesians and Post-Keynesians on the nature of his system. Given the revelations it presents, this book will transform the profession’s understanding of the origins of the IS-LM model and modern macroeconomics.

This paper revisits and proposes a resolution to an empirical and theoretical controversy between Keynes and the "classics" (or monetarists). The controversy dates to Keynes's General Theory (1936)--most famously formalized in Hicks's (1937) classic Econometrica article, in which the IS-LM model is first formally stated. We first replicate empirical tests formulated in the late 1960s and '70s and show that more recent data have more statistical power and resolve the empirical debate in favor of the Keynesians, at least according to the criteria of the literature at that time. We then show, using a simple dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model, that the empirical tests suffer from the Lucas (1976) critique, as the conclusion fundamentally depends upon the assumed policy regime. Nevertheless, we argue, this new empirical result is useful: it provides evidence for the existence of a "Keynesian policy regime" according to which traditional monetary expansion loses its impact in the absence of a policy regime change, in the sense of Sargent (1982).

Various explanations have been put forward as to why the Keynesian Revolution in economics in the 1930s and 1940s took place. Some of these point to the temporal relevance of John Maynard Keynes's The General Theory of Employment, Interest, and Money (1936), appearing, as it did, just a handful of years after the onset of the Great Depression, whilst others highlight the importance of more anecdotal evidence, such as Keynes’s close relations with the Cambridge ‘Circus’, a group of able, young Cambridge economists who dissected and assisted Keynes in developing crucial ideas in the years leading up to the General Theory. However, no systematic effort has been made to bring together these and other factors to examine them from a sociology of science perspective. This book fills this gap by taking its cue from a well-established tradition of work from history of science studies devoted to identifying the intellectual, technical, institutional, psychological and financial factors which help to explain why certain research schools are successful and why others fail. This approach, it turns out, provides a coherent account of why the revolution in macroeconomics was ‘Keynesian’ and why, on a related note, Keynes was able to see off contemporary competitor theorists, notably Friedrich von Hayek and Michal Kalecki.

Various explanations have been put forward as to why the Keynesian Revolution in economics in the 1930s and 1940s took place. Some of these point to the temporal relevance of John Maynard Keynes's The General Theory of Employment, Interest, and Money (1936), appearing, as it did, just a handful of years after the onset of the Great Depression, whilst others highlight the importance of more anecdotal evidence, such as Keynes’s close relations with the Cambridge ‘Circus’, a group of able, young Cambridge economists who dissected and assisted Keynes in developing crucial ideas in the years leading up to the General Theory. However, no systematic effort has been made to bring together these and other factors to examine them from a sociology of science perspective. This book fills this gap by taking its cue from a well-established tradition of work from history of science studies devoted to identifying the intellectual, technical, institutional, psychological and financial factors which help to explain why certain research schools are successful and why others fail. This approach, it turns out, provides a coherent account of why the revolution in macroeconomics was ‘Keynesian’ and why, on a related note, Keynes was able to see off contemporary competitor theorists, notably Friedrich von Hayek and Michal Kalecki.

Contiene: Foundations: Keynes, keynesians and the post keynesians, Towards the keynesian revolution, foundations of post keynesian economics, probability, uncertainty and expectations; The operation of a monetary economy: Asset choice and acumulation of wealth, liquidity prefernce and money, owen-rates of interest and investment, the propensity to consume and the multiplier, savings, finance and founding, employment, wages and income distribution; New Perspectives: inflation, post keynesian perspectives on economic policy, conclusions.