Regulatory reform and the derivatives market: hearing before the Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry, United States Senate, One Hundred Eleventh Congress, first session, June 4, 2009.

Regulatory reform and the derivatives market: hearing before the Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry, United States Senate, One Hundred Eleventh Congress, first session, June 4, 2009.

It is now widely recognized that an uncontrolled "derivatives revolution" triggered one of the most spectacular worst-case scenarios of modern times. This book - the most cogent legal analysis of the subject yet to appear in any language - lays bare the core role played by the failure to adequately regulate derivatives in the financial crisis of recent years. The author's insistence that derivatives must be viewed not as profit-seeking investments but as risk management tools - and his well-grounded prescriptions to ensure that they are regulated in that way - sheds clear light on the best way for companies, financial institutions, and hedge funds to move forward in their use of these useful but highly hazardous instruments. This book clearly shows how such elements as the following fit into the legal analysis of derivatives, and how proper regulation will preserve their usefulness and economic value: ; derivatives allow for the most efficient and cost-effective risk fractioning, hence risk taking, techniques ever conceived; derivatives allow for all measurable and identifiable risks that may exist in modern finance; the ability to isolate risks and insure against risk exposures is the key to the very survival of modern financial markets; risk buyers effectively take on financial exposure to various types of risk while hedgers unload unwanted exposures; derivatives allow domestic investors to acquire exposure to foreign markets without the necessity of dealing with foreign laws, foreign investments, currency exchange, or foreign fiscal regimes; derivatives increase social welfare by making it easier and less expensive to carry out many types of financial transactions; derivatives allow governments to insulate, manage, hedge or concentrate risks deriving from financial, meteorological, and even geopolitical exposure; and derivatives allow radical changes to financial and risk structure to be performed silently and rapidly. To the question: how do we ensure that a company trading derivatives is regulated effectively? this work offers a clear and convincing answer. The author's detailed recommendations for regulatory and corporate governance measures are designed to prevent excessive risk taking, the emergence of rogue traders, and ultimately the emergence of another systemic disturbance caused by chains of derivatives-related losses.

The over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives market has captured the attention of regulators after the Global Financial Crisis due to the risk it poses to financial stability. Under the post-crisis regulatory reform the concentration of business, and risks, among a few major players is changed by the concentration of a large portion of transactions in the new market infrastructures, the Central Counterparties (CCPs). This book, for the first time, analyses the regulatory response of the United Kingdom and the United States, the two largest centres of OTC derivatives transactions, and highlights their shortcomings. The book uses a normative risk-based approach to regulation as a methodological lens to analyse the UK regime of CCPs in the OTC derivatives market. It specifically focuses on prudential supervision and conduct of business rules governing OTC derivatives transactions and the move towards enhancing the use of central clearing. The resulting analysis, from a normative risk based approach, suggests that the UK regime for CCPs does not fulfil what would be expected if a coherent risk based approach was taken. Our comments on the Dodd-Frank Act highlight that the incoherent adoption of risk-based approach to regulation affects the effectiveness of the US regime for CCPs. Such a regime does not follow the pace of events of ‘innovation risk’; in particular, the foreseeable changes FinTech will bring to the OTCDM and central clearing services. The second inadequacy of the US regime concerns the dual regulatory structure of the CFTC and the SEC, and the inadequate adoption of different and not well-coordinated regulatory strategies. We also analyse the cross-border implications of the US regime for non-US CCPs that provide clearing services to US market participants. Finally, we study the negative effects of the absence of a clearly defined resolution regime for CCPs.