Recent high-profile lawsuits involving cigarettes, guns, breast implants, and other products have created new frictions between litigation and regulation. Increasingly, litigation is being used as a financial lever to force companies to accept negotiated regulatory policies—policies that invariably involve less public input and accountability than those arising from government regulation. The process not only usurps the traditional governmental authority for regulation, but also shifts the locus of establishing tax policy from the legislature to the parties involved in the litigation. Citizen interests are not explicitly represented and there is no mechanism to ensure that these outcomes are in society's best interests. By focusing on case studies involving the tobacco industry, guns, lead paint, breast implants, and health maintenance organizations, the contributors to this volume collectively shed light on the likely consequences of regulation through litigation for insurance markets and society at large. They analyze the ramifications of large-scale lawsuits, mass torts, and class actions for the insurance market, and advocate increased public scrutiny of attorney reimbursement and a competitive bidding process for all lawsuits involving government entities as the plaintiffs.

The efficacy of various political institutions is the subject of intense debate between proponents of broad legislative standards enforced through litigation and those who prefer regulation by administrative agencies. This book explores the trade-offs between litigation and regulation, the circumstances in which one approach may outperform the other, and the principles that affect the choice between addressing particular economic activities with one system or the other. Combining theoretical analysis with empirical investigation in a range of industries, including public health, financial markets, medical care, and workplace safety, Regulation versus Litigation sheds light on the costs and benefits of two important instruments of economic policy.

Recent high-profile lawsuits involving cigarettes, guns, breast implants, and other products have created new frictions between litigation and regulation. Increasingly, litigation is being used as a financial lever to force companies to accept negotiated regulatory policies—policies that invariably involve less public input and accountability than those arising from government regulation. The process not only usurps the traditional governmental authority for regulation, but also shifts the locus of establishing tax policy from the legislature to the parties involved in the litigation. Citizen interests are not explicitly represented and there is no mechanism to ensure that these outcomes are in society's best interests. By focusing on case studies involving the tobacco industry, guns, lead paint, breast implants, and health maintenance organizations, the contributors to this volume collectively shed light on the likely consequences of regulation through litigation for insurance markets and society at large. They analyze the ramifications of large-scale lawsuits, mass torts, and class actions for the insurance market, and advocate increased public scrutiny of attorney reimbursement and a competitive bidding process for all lawsuits involving government entities as the plaintiffs.

Recent high-profile lawsuits involving cigarettes, guns, breast implants, and other products have created new frictions between litigation and regulation. Increasingly, litigation is being used as a financial lever to force companies to accept negotiated regulatory policies —policies that invariably involve less public input and accountability than those arising from government regulation. The process not only usurps the traditional governmental authority for regulation, but also shifts the locus of establishing tax policy from the legislature to the parties involved in the litigation. Citizen interests are not explicitly represented and there is no mechanism to ensure that these outcomes are in society's best interests. By focusing on case studies involving the tobacco industry, guns, lead paint, breast implants, and health maintenance organizations, the contributors to this volume collectively shed light on the likely consequences of regulation through litigation for insurance markets and society at large. They analyze the ramifications of large-scale lawsuits, mass torts, and class actions for the insurance market, and advocate increased public scrutiny of attorney reimbursement and a competitive bidding process for all lawsuits involving government entities as the plaintiffs.

While litigation is often considered a last resort for achieving regulatory objectives, its use can have significant impacts on the regulator and regulated entity, and a consequential impact on industry, government and the public. REGULATION, LITIGATION AND ENFORCEMENT examines the procedural aspects of litigation in the regulatory context from the perspective of theory, policy and practice. It considers litigation issues common to all regulatory schemes, such as investigation and information gathering powers, and criminal law aspects of regulatory litigation. The different regulatory regimes are considered together so that they can be compared and contrasted. REGULATION, LITIGATION AND ENFORCEMENT reviews the need for regulation, forms of regulation and techniques of regulation. Pre-litigation steps are covered; coercive investigatory powers examined; and the limitations imposed by privilege discussed.

Examines how and why private plaintiff-driven litigation has become the dominant model for enforcing federal regulation.