Organizing a century of legal principles to help the U.S. public utility industry resolve tensions created by the current legal boundaries of legal regulation and fashion new policies for the future. Its mix of case narratives and doctrine, drawn from all legal sources, is geared to lawyers and non-lawyers, veterans and novices, practitioners and decision-makers, academics and the media--anyone seeking to use the law to serve the public interest. Topics covered include market structure, pricing, and jurisdictional issues.

This book explores the important role that economic performance measurement is playing in the regulation of network utilities in many countries today. The contributors to the book - researchers from academia, regulatory agencies and consulting firms - address the use of efficiency measures in price regulation and in assessing the effects of past regulatory reforms. Industries examined include electricity supply, water supply, telecommunications and airlines, across a range of countries including the USA, UK, Norway, the Netherlands, Australia and New Zealand. Performance Measurement and Regulation of Network Utilities is unique in that, unlike many other books in this area, it is devoted to the use of performance measurement in these regulatory settings. It is a timely contribution to the literature, given that performance measurement is an integral part of the new incentive regulation methods which have been adopted by many regulatory agencies around the world. Academics specialising in regulation and performance measurement and students of regulatory economics courses, organization studies and public sector economics will all find this book of great interest. It will also appeal to regulators, regulatory consultants and regulatory sections of major utilities.

"Performance-based regulation (PBR) of utilities has emerged as an important ratemaking option in the last 25 years. It has been implemented in numerous jurisdictions across the United States and is common in many other advanced industrialized countries. PBR’s appeal lies chiefly in its ability to strengthen utility performance incentives relative to traditional cost-of-service regulation (COSR). Some forms of PBR can streamline regulation and provide utilities with greater operating flexibility. Ideally, the benefits of better performance are shared by the utility and its customers. The shortcomings of traditional COSR in providing electric utilities with incentives that are aligned with certain regulatory goals are becoming increasingly clear. In particular, COSR can provide strong incentives to increase electricity sales and utility rate base. Further, some parties express concern that traditional COSR does not provide utilities with appropriate financial incentives to address evolving industry challenges such as changing customer demands for electricity services, increased levels of distributed energy resources (DERs), and growing pressure to mitigate carbon dioxide emissions. In addition, attention to potential new regulatory models to support the 'utility of the future' has renewed interest in PBR. This report describes key elements of PBR and explains some of the advantages and disadvantages of various PBR options. We present pertinent issues from the perspectives of utilities and customers. In practice, these different perspectives are not diametrically opposed. Nonetheless, this framework is useful for illustrating how various aspects of PBR may be viewed by those key groups. Regulators have a unique perspective, in that they must balance consumer, utility, and other interests with the goal of achieving a result that is in the overall public interest"--Executive summary.

Power interruptions of the scale of the North American Blackout of 2003 are rare, but they still loom as a possibility. Will the aging infrastructure fail because deregulated monopolies have no financial incentives to upgrade? Is centralized planning becoming subordinate to market forces? Understanding Electric Utilities and De-Regulation, Second Edition provides an updated, non-technical description that sheds light on the nature of the industry and the issues involved in its transition away from a regulated environment. The book begins by broadly surveying the industry, from a regulated utility structure to the major concepts of de-regulation to the history of electricity, the technical aspects, and the business of power. Then, the authors delve into the technologies and functions on which the industry operates; the many ways that power is used; and the various means of power generation, including central generating stations, renewable energy, and single-household size generators. The authors then devote considerable attention to the details of regulation and de-regulation. To conclude, one new chapter examines aging infrastructures and reliability of service, while another explores the causes of blackouts and how they can be prevented. Based on the authors' extensive experience, Understanding Electric Utilities and De-Regulation, Second Edition offers an up-to-date perspective on the major issues impacting the daily operations as well as the long-term future of the electric utilities industry.

This book proposes a new approach to the government regulation of utilities. Arguing that traditional command-and-control regulation does not encourage efficient performance, Strasser and Kohler advocate the use of an incentive-based regulatory system and offer a practical, realistic strategy for the successful implementation of such plans within the context of utility regulation. The analysis is supported by a comprehensive survey of the relevant legal materials, an overview of the literature on organization theory and institutional economics, and a survey of the latest thinking on how incentives can most effectively be paid. Strasser and Kohler begin by identifying problems associated with current regulatory techniques, demonstrating that disincentives are often built into the regulatory system. When that system has tried incentives, the authors show they have been applied in an ad hoc manner, further exacerbating the problem. In presenting the case for incentive-based regulation, the authors review the history of comprehensive incentive plans, look at what organization theory can teach us about using incentives as a regulatory strategy, and explore the effective use of incentive compensation by nonregulated companies. Strasser and Kohler then develop a strategy for implementing incentive plans in regulated utilities, showing that, in order to work, the plans must include the installation of clearly defined bonuses and penalties, specific standards of performance, the payment of bonuses to managers rather than shareholders, and reliable and complete measures of company performance. Policymakers, economists, public utility regulators, and attorneys involved in the complex arena of utility regulation will find Regulating Utilities with Management Incentives indispensable reading.