Modem industrial society functions with the expectation that electricity will be available when required. By law, electric utilities have the obligation to provide electricity to customers in a "safe and adequate" manner. In exchange for this obligation, utilities are granted a monopoly right to provide electricity to customers within well-defmed service territories. However, utilities are not unfettered in their monopoly power; public utility commissions regulate the relationship between a utility and its customers and limit profits to a "fair rate of return on invested capital. " From its inception through the late 1970s, the electric utility industry's opera tional paradigm was to continue marketing electricity to customers and to build power plants to meet customer needs. This growth was facilitated by a U. S. energy policy predicated upon the assumption that sustained electric growth was causally linked to social welfare (Lovins, 1977). The electric utility industry is now in transition from a vertically integrated monopoly to a more competitive market. Of the three primary components (generation, transmission, and distribution) of the traditional vertically integrated monopoly, generation is leading this transformation. The desired outcome is a more efficient market for the provision of electric service, ultimately resulting in lower costs to customers. This book focuses on impediments to this transformation. In partiCUlar, it argues that information control is a form of market power that inhibits the evolution of the market. The analysis is presented within the context of the transformation of the U. S.

This volume provides a thorough review of the past, present and future of the wholesale and retail electic power industry. It includes tutorial chapters on electric utility function and structure, electricity and power, the uses of electric power, and more. The authors provide a simple but complete discussion of de-regulation and explain the structure of the de-regulated electric power industry, including the competitive wholesale and retail levels, the retail energy services sector, and more.

In the centennial year of the birth of Sir John Cockcroft, first master of my Cam bridge College, Churchill, and the first man to split the atomic nucleus by artificial means, it is indeed relevant to consider the outcome of his efforts at developing atomic power. From the earliest days of the construction of Calder Hall-the first nuclear power station in Britain-and the establishment of the British Atomic Re search Center at Harwell, and the Chalk River Nuclear Station in Canada, through the "Windscale" nuclear accident in Britain, up to the present, when some 20% of UK energy is derived from nuclear power, the Cockcroft legacy is felt. As the British historian Mark Goldie put it, in the "pure and sanguine 1950s," Cockcroft had almost absolute "faith in 'peaceful atoms' and in the boundless, almost cost free, energy that atoms would soon produce" (Goldie, 1997, p. 21). But, as the eminent economist Frank Hahn recalled, "the only failing Cockcroft had" was "that he wasn't up to much in economics. " Indeed, Hahn recalled that he "had to explain" to Cockcroft "the economic notion of optimum durability" as it related to the "interest rate" in the context of building Churchill College with "hand-made bricks. " After his explana tion, as Hahn recalled "Cockcroft smiled and proceeded to order more hand-made bricks" (Hahn, 1997, p. 27).

Regulation and Economic Analysis: A Critique Over Two Centuries argues that long experience with the practice of regulation creates a broad anti-intervention consensus among economists. This consensus is based on comparison of real intervention to real markets rather than an ideological preconception. It is shown that economic theory can support all possible positions on intervention. Much theory is too abstract to support any policy position; many arguments about how intervention might help contain qualifications expressing doubts about whether the potential can be realized; many theories illustrate the drawbacks of intervention. The vast literature on these issues concentrates either on specific cases or polemics that exaggerate both sides of the argument. Regulation and Economic Analysis seeks to show the depth of the discontent, develop interpretations of economic theory that follow from skepticism about statism and provide selected illustrations. The discussion begins with examination of general equilibrium theory and proceeds to discuss market failure with stress on monopoly and particularly what is deemed excessive concern with predatory behavior. International trade issues, transaction costs, property rights, economic theories of government, the role of special institutions such as contracts, the defects of macroeconomic and equity arguments for regulating individual markets, environmental economics and the defects of public land management policies are examined.

Regulation Under Increasing Competition brings together practitioners, regulators, and economists to examine the important policy and regulatory issues facing the telecommunications and electricity industries. This volume reviews such topics as competitive entry, stranded costs, pricing and market mechanisms. It provides a unique perspective on problems in a newly deregulated environment.

Deregulation of Electric Utilities reviews the main issues relating to the changing environment in the utility industry. Topics covered in depth include compensation for stranded costs, efficiency gains, institutional design, pricing, economics of scale, and network externalities. In addition, this book assesses early experiences in electricity deregulation in continental Europe, New Zealand, North America, and the United Kingdom.

This book is based on two seminars held at Rutgers on October 22, 1993, and May 6, 1994 entitled `Incentive Regulation for Public Utilities'. These contributions by leading scholars and practitioners represent some of the best new research in public utility economics and include topics such as the theory of incentive regulation, dynamic pricing, transfer pricing, issues in law and economics, pricing priority service, and energy utility resource planning.