This book aims to create an awareness of the potential of non-bank financial institutions (NBFIs) for developing countries, and to assist policy makers in the creation of coherent policy structures and effective regulatory systems for the development of these institutions. It considers the essential functions and characteristics of non-bank financial institutions and includes chapters on insurance companies, mutual funds and pension schemes, securities markets, and leasing and real estate companies.

This Article examines a relatively recent addition to the institutional architecture of financial regulation in the United States: the Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC). In particular, it draws attention to a flaw in the design of the Council's power to designate nonbank financial companies as “systemically important financial institutions,” commonly known as “SIFIs.” Specifically, the Article argues that the binary nature of the designation power has underappreciated costs, which make the SIFI designation system less effective and efficient than it otherwise could be.The Article makes both positive and normative claims. First, it draws attention to the ways in which a binary designation power incentivizes certain financial institution behavior, such as litigation and restructuring. A binary designation power can also influence regulatory behavior by creating an opportunity for politicized decision making. The Article highlights the social and economic costs of these behaviors, which include the potential for underinclusive supervisory scope, increased information asymmetries, and distorted business decisions. Such costs can undermine the SIFI stability agenda as well as financial institution efficiency. Second, in teasing out the normative implications of that cost analysis, the Article argues for a more marginal -- nuanced -- apparatus for regulating nonbank financial institutions. In doing so, the Article also probes the broader question of whether the entity-based paradigm is the most effective regulatory strategy for appraising and addressing systemic risk in the nonbank arena. Ultimately, by exploring how SIFI policy should be revised to reflect these normative insights, the Article develops a broader theory about post-crisis regulatory design -- that regulators have undervalued supervision, and the information it produces, as a tool for systemic risk management outside the traditional banking system.

World Bank Discussion Paper No. 362. There has been tremendous growth worldwide in the mobilization of financial resources outside traditional banking systems. Channeled mainly through capital markets, such rapid financial diversification is posing new challenges for regulators in many emerging markets. This document describes the various aspects and implications of this growth, reviews the regulatory framework adopted in some mature market economies, including the United States and the European Union, and discusses regulatory issues in emerging markets.

Over the years, the Fed. Reserve System has established margin reg¿s. to limit purpose loans by banks and nonbanks (B&N) to broker-dealers or other borrowers. Here, the author reviews these reg¿s. affecting security lending (SL) by B&N. Examines data on security loans during the 1920s and 1930s, as well as in recent years, noting that SL by banks and borrowing by broker-dealers often diverge and that during the 1920s the vol. of loans by banks to brokers may have been driven less by margin loans than by new issues of stocks and bonds by corp. Looks at the credit absorption hypothesis popular in the 1930s and finds that an increase in bank SL does not result in higher bus. loan rates relative to other short-term interest rates. Tables and figures.

The recent financial crisis demonstrated that, contrary to longstanding regulatory assumptions, nonbank financial firms -- such as investment banks and insurance companies -- can propagate systemic risk throughout the financial system. After the crisis, policymakers in the United States and abroad developed two different strategies for dealing with nonbank systemic risk. The first strategy seeks to regulate individual nonbank entities that officials designate as being potentially systemically important. The second approach targets financial activities that could create systemic risk, irrespective of the types of firms that engage in those transactions. In the last several years, domestic and international policymakers have come to view these two strategies as substitutes, largely abandoning entity-based designations in favor of activities-based approaches. This Article argues that this trend is deeply misguided because entity- and activities-based approaches are complementary tools that are each essential for effectively regulating nonbank systemic risk. Eliminating an entity-based approach to nonbank systemic risk -- either formally or through onerous procedural requirements -- would expose the financial system to the same risks that it experienced in 2008 as a result of distress at nonbanks like AIG, Bear Stearns, and Lehman Brothers. This conclusion is especially salient in the United States, where jurisdictional fragmentation undermines the capacity of financial regulators to implement an effective activities-based approach. Significant reforms to the U.S. regulatory framework are necessary, therefore, before an activities-based approach can meaningfully complement domestic entity-based systemic risk regulation.

Global Bank Regulation: Principles and Policies covers the global regulation of financial institutions. It integrates theories, history, and policy debates, thereby providing a strategic approach to understanding global policy principles and banking. The book features definitions of the policy principles of capital regularization, the main justifications for prudent regulation of banks, the characteristics of tools used regulate firms that operate across all time zones, and a discussion regarding the 2007-2009 financial crises and the generation of international standards of financial institution regulation. The first four chapters of the book offer justification for the strict regulation of banks and discuss the importance of financial safety. The next chapters describe in greater detail the main policy networks and standard setting bodies responsible for policy development. They also provide information about bank licensing requirements, leading jurisdictions, and bank ownership and affiliations. The last three chapters of the book present a thorough examination of bank capital regulation, which is one of the most important areas in international banking. The text aims to provide information to all economics students, as well as non-experts and experts interested in the history, policy development, and theory of international banking regulation. - Defines the over-arching policy principles of capital regulation - Explores main justifications for the prudent regulation of banks - Discusses the 2007-2009 financial crisis and the next generation of international standards of financial institution regulation - Examines tools for ensuring the adequate supervision of a firm that operates across all time zones