This book analyses collaboration in the Greater Mekong Subregion. It explores inter-state cooperation and the role of subnational units (provincial and local governments) and transnational actors (NGOs, firms) in building and maintaining the subregion. It also considers the relationships between actors on the three levels, their influences within the structures of decision-making in the GMS, their policy pronouncements and roles in the GMS. After exploring the historical background of cooperation in the GMS, the author discusses how far cooperation in the GMS has developed from the mere promotion of the national interest of individual states towards an institution as an independent actor able to influence relationships between its member states instead of only being influenced by them. Hensengerth scrutinises the nature of GMS cooperation and the character and capabilities of the institution of the GMS, exemplified by the bilateral relations between China and Vietnam. Here, the study will combine the analysis of subregionalism and institution-building in the GMS with an analysis of China-Vietnam relations by combining theoretical approaches to regional integration in the form of the regime approach with foreign policy analysis This book will appeal to academics within international relations, Southeast Asian regional and China or Vietnam country specialists.

This report explores Vietnam's perspective on rising U.S.-China competition by evaluating how Vietnam is responding to U.S. and Chinese influence in diplomatic and political, economic, and security and military domains.

This book examines how the interaction between political and economic factors under Doi Moi has shaped Vietnam's China policy and bilateral relations since the late 1980s. After providing a historical background, the book examines the conflicting effects that Doi Moi has generated on bilateral relations. It demonstrates that Vietnam's economic considerations following the adoption of Doi Moi contributed decidedly to the Sino-Vietnamese normalization in 1991 as well as the continuous improvements in bilateral ties ever since. At the same time, Vietnam's economic activities in the South China Sea and China's responses have intensified bilateral rivalry and put their ties under considerable strains. The book goes on to argue that Doi Moi has indeed brought Vietnam newfound opportunities to develop a multi-level omni-directional hedging strategy against China. Finally, the book concludes by looking at the prospects of democratization in both countries and assessing the future trajectory of their relations under such circumstances. As the most comprehensive and up-to-date survey of Vietnam's relations with China over the past thirty years, the book is a useful reference source for academics, policymakers, students, and anyone interested in contemporary Vietnam foreign policy in general and Vietnam-China relations in particular.

Analyses collaboration in the Greater Mekong Subregion, which is a manifestation of the so-called ‘new regionalism’ in growth triangles (GTs) in Northeast and Southeast Asia. Exploring inter-state cooperation and the role of subnational units (provincial and local governments) and transnational actors (NGOs, firms) in building and maintaining the subregion.

"Vietnam's balancing of power act, namely the policy of seeking a counterweight to the China threat, and the politics of the U.S.-Vietnam-China triangle, may have taken shape in the early years of the twenty-first century, but it was deeply rooted in the changing relations between the big powers in the 1980s and Vietnam's need to adjust its policy to these changes. A combination of factors - geographical proximity, ideological affinity, and the need for regime survival tends to make Vietnamese leaders more comfortable with China than with the United States. Only the perception of China as a bullying neighbour would push Vietnam to opt for a different orientation and adopt an antagonistic policy towards China. Meanwhile, United States-Vietnam relations in turn are affected by two factors: Vietnam's sensitivity to China's concerns and its mistrust of U.S. intentions. Bilateral relations became warmer mainly after Vietnam took steps to overcome its mistrust of the United States. China's recent assertive behaviour in the South China Sea worries Vietnam and threatens the U.S. position in the Asia-Pacific, and this has led to a convergence of strategic interests between the United States and Vietnam. In brief, the U.S.-China-Vietnam triangular relations and the South China Sea disputes may be seen as manifestations of two sets of conflicting visions. At the local level, is the vision of China dominating the South China Sea, which clashes with Vietnam's perennial dream of being a balcony looking out to the Pacific Ocean. If this clash of visions cannot be reconciled, China will always have to face the discomfort of simmering resentment and opposition from a proud nation at its border. At the global and regional level is the vision of a rising China seeking a respected place in the world, and de facto control of the sea area within its nine-dash line. This clashes with U.S. determination to remain an uncontested naval power that is able to protect freedom of navigation and overflight in the South China Sea. Unless one or both of these visions are modified, a new cold war, not a new type of big power relations, in the Asia-Pacific is inevitable. The smaller countries in Southeast Asia will be forced to take sides or be chosen in the bargaining process between the two major powers."--Provided by publisher

With its long history of internal divisiveness and its intersecting cultural and linguistic cleavages, East Asia is undoubtedly a complex area. However, the idea of East Asia as a regional entity is one that is relatively recent – a concept that gained momentum after the financial crisis that rocked the region in the 1990s. In recent years, East Asia has become considerably more interdependent, connected and cohesive. This increased cohesiveness has been driven by a dense network of trade and investments, technology sharing and communication, among many other variables and has been reflected in the increasing institutionalisation of regional mechanisms like the ASEAN. Regionalism is not, however, entirely about economic interdependence. In today’s day and age, it means not only overarching social networks and a regional identity, but also strategic thinking that recognises common security interests. This book takes into account the regional discourses of two of East Asia’s biggest players – the United States and China. While the former has been a power to reckon with, albeit “externally”, deeply entrenched in the region since the end of the Second World War, the rise of China in the 21st century and its emergence as the largest power in East Asia has brought a new perspective to East Asian regionalism. In 2010, the United States began reasserting itself in East Asia, bringing into sharp focus the ideological differences between itself and China as each vied to shape the architecture of East Asian security. There is no doubt that heightened American interest comes at a time when China’s own views of regionalism have become noticeably less cooperative. While balance of power politics is one way to look at the geopolitical tug-of-war in East Asia, there are questions that have not yet been answered. How do the two countries look at a region that is so important for them? How has that perception influenced their foreign policy within the same arena? More importantly, how do they define East Asia? This book studies American and Chinese regional discourses from the end of the Cold War to the present day in order to highlight the rationale behind the natural balance of power politics between an established power and a rising one, and its subsequent effects on security regionalism in East Asia.