Mandatory pensions are a worldwide phenomenon. However, with fixed contribution rates, monthly benefits, and retirement ages, pension systems are not consistent with three long-run trends: declining mortality, declining fertility, and earlier retirement. Many systems need reform. This book gives an extensive nontechnical explanation of the economics of pension design. The theoretical arguments have three elements: * Pension systems have multiple objectives--consumption smoothing, insurance, poverty relief, and redistribution. Good policy needs to bear them all in mind. * Good analysis should be framed in a second-best context-- simple economic models are a bad guide to policy design in a world with imperfect information and decision-making, incomplete markets and taxation. * Any choice of pension system has risk-sharing and distributional consequences, which the book recognizes explicitly. Barr and Diamond's analysis includes labor markets, capital markets, risk sharing, and gender and family, with comparison of PAYG and funded systems, recognizing that the suitable level of funding differs by country. Alongside the economic principles of good design, policy must also take account of a country's capacity to implement the system. Thus the theoretical analysis is complemented by discussion of implementation, and of experiences, both good and bad, in many countries, with particular attention to Chile and China.

This book is an abridgement of Barr and Diamond's Reforming Pensions: Principles and Policy Choices (OUP, 2008). It begins with the introduction to the earlier book, includes the concluding chapters to the sections on principles and on policy choices and the concluding policy chapter to the book. It summarizes the Chile and China chapters into a section of five pages. It presents material from some of the boxes of the longer book. While the longer book remains as a definitive and detailed analysis of pension reform, this new, shorter book conveys the message and conclusions to policy makers, journalists writing for the general public, and students being introduced to social security and other pension policy.The topic being condensed and summarized here is described at length in the earlier book. It stems from rapidly changing economic conditions and dramatic increases in life expectancy. Newspaper headlines across the globe anticipate again and again a massive rupture of social security and retirement systems. With public fears on the rise, officials in many countries under pressure to solve problems quickly are turning their backs on traditional pay-as-you-go systems in favor of privately financed retirement plans. Barr and Diamond demonstrate that in the age of globalization these problems are no longer simply domestic problems. Because trade borders are becoming increasingly open and digital transactions are hastily erasing national economic boundaries, countries are no longer able to act independently in setting pension policies. These problems are particularly exacerbated in China, a state where massive restructuring of state-owned enterprises and comparatively recent dynamic entry into global markets have already taxed a system whose enormous burden is to support the retirement of the world's largest national population. The authors address these issues comprehensively in a thorough survey of pension economic principles and application to China.

Mandatory pensions are a worldwide phenomenon. However, with fixed contribution rates, monthly benefits, and retirement ages, pension systems aren't consistent with three long-run trends: declining mortality and fertility, and earlier retirement. Many systems need reform. This book explains the economics of pension design.

This article, based on two books (Barr and Diamond 2008, forthcoming), sets out a series of principles for pension design rooted in economic theory: pension systems have multiple objectives, analysis should consider the pension system as a whole, analysis should be framed in a second-best context, different systems share risks differently, and systems have different effects by generation and by gender. That discussion is reinforced by identification of a series of widespread analytical errors: tunnel vision, improper use of first-best analysis, improper use of steady-state analysis, incomplete analysis of implicit pension debt, incomplete analysis of the impact of funding (including excessive focus on financial flows, failure to consider how funding is generated, and improper focus on the type of asset in trust funds), and ignoring distributional effects. The second part of the article considers implications for policy: there is no single best pension design; earlier retirement does little or nothing to reduce unemployment; unsustainable pension promises need to be addressed directly; a move from PAYG towards funding in a mandatory system may or may not be welfare improving; and implementation matters - policy design that exceeds a country's capacity to implement it is bad policy design. We illustrate the ranges of designs of pension systems that fit the fiscal and institutional capacity constraints typical at different levels of economic development. The potential gains from simplicity imply that a country capable of implementing an administratively demanding plan does not necessarily gain from doing so. New Zealand has a simple pension system through choice, not constraint. Keywords: Pension, social security JEL Classifications: H55.

This paper discusses the strategic building blocks of pension reform. The early sections set out the simple economics of pensions and discuss a series of myths which have proved remarkably persistent. Subsequent sections draw together the conclusions for policy design from earlier theoretical discussion, set out the prerequisites which any pension reform must respect, and discuss the range of choices facing policymakers. The main conclusions are threefold: the key variable is effective government; from an economic perspective the difference between PAYG and funding is second order; and the range of potential choice over pension design is wide.

This is an abridgement of Barr and Diamond's 'Reforming Pensions: Principles and Policy Choices' (OPU, 2008), a larger book that is intended for policy makers and as a supplement in college courses.