This work can be read as a sequel to Kripke's classic Naming and Necessity, confronting important issues left open in that work and developing a novel approach to questions concerning empty names and existence. It provides along the way novel treatments of fictional and mythological discourse, the pragmatics of definite and indefinite descriptions and the language of sense data.

This volume collects Saul Kripke's Locke Lectures, which were delivered in Oxford in 1973.

If there is such a thing as essential reading in metaphysics or in philosophy of language, this is it. Ever since the publication of its original version, Naming and Necessity has had great and increasing influence. It redirected philosophical attention to neglected questions of natural and metaphysical necessity and to the connections between these and theories of reference, in particular of naming, and of identity. From a critique of the dominant tendency to assimilate names to descriptions and more generally to treat their reference as a function of their Fregean sense, surprisingly deep and widespread consequences may be drawn. The largely discredited distinction between accidental and essential properties, both of individual things (including people) and of kinds of things, is revived. So is a consequent view of science as what seeks out the essences of natural kinds. Traditional objections to such views are dealt with by sharpening distinctions between epistemic and metaphysical necessity; in particular by the startling admission of necessary a posteriori truths. From these, in particular from identity statements using rigid designators whether of things or of kinds, further remarkable consequences are drawn for the natures of things, of people, and of kinds; strong objections follow, for example to identity versions of materialism as a theory of the mind. This seminal work, to which today's thriving essentialist metaphysics largely owes its impetus, is here published with a substantial new Preface by the author.

In a new approach to philosophical anthropology, Bruno Latour offers answers to questions raised in We Have Never Been Modern: If not modern, what have we been, and what values should we inherit? An Inquiry into Modes of Existence offers a new basis for diplomatic encounters with other societies at a time of ecological crisis.

Commercial Practice is the work done for the earning, acquisition, and ownership of existence and within existence! What one acquires, the one is said to own, resulting in the application of ownership to anything at all acquirable, including the slave; however, the slave is held in possession disowned and hence cannot be said to be owned! We cannot accurately say that one owns a slave nor that a slave has owner, when the slave is held disowned! The disowned thing has no owner. The application of ownership to the slave has brought difficulty in telling the relationship between parent and child, husband and wife, employer and employee, and citizen and state, for instance, as a person being owned sounds as the person being a slave. We have redeemed the reality of ownership. There are things one can own and things one cannot own although acquirable: therefore, there are things one has the Right to acquire and things one has no Right to acquire. If you cannot own it and you acquire it then you have stolen it, rendering you a criminal, as theft is a crime! Learn Commercial Practice: it is the legitimate method of acquiring and possessing, and ownership.

Published posthumously, the text presents Sartre's ontology of truth in terms of freedom, action, and bad faith