How should the debt of sovereign countries be restructured when countries approach default? Anne O. Krueger of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) is proposing a new approach to sovereign defaults: the Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism (SDRM). The SDRM would create a new international legal framework for sovereign defaults, similar to bankruptcy proceedings in the private sector. A new judicial group within the IMF would oversee the SDRM, and it would be implemented through international treaties. Krueger has to construct a convincing case that the SDRM would be more effective than alternative approaches to sovereign defaults. The case provides information on some major sovereign defaults (the crises in Latin America, Mexico, and Asia) and on the existing institutions and processes that creditors and debtors turn to in sovereign defaults. Students must weigh the advantages and disadvantages of different approaches to sovereign defaults.

This paper follows up on the Executive Board’s December 2002 discussion of the design of the Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism and seeks to make further progress on the formulation of a concrete proposal for a statutory sovereign debt restructuring mechanism.

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In recent years there has been extensive discussion inside and outside the IMF on the need to develop a new approach to sovereign debt restructuring. Exploring ways to improve the sovereign debt restructuring process is a key part of the international community’s efforts to strengthen the architecture of the global financial system. This pamphlet by IMF First Deputy Managing Director Anne O.Krueger draws together the latest IMF thinking on the controversial issue in a single publication.

The paper discusses key incentive-related issues of the sovereign debt restructuring mechanism recently outlined by the IMF First Deputy Managing Director. The structure of incentives in the mechanism should be consistent with the principle of favoring market-oriented, voluntary solutions to financial crises. The paper frames the mechanism in the context of involving the private sector in financial crisis resolution (PSI), and identifies the conditions for setting up an appropriate incentive structure. The paper explores issues relating to the functioning of the mechanism, including access policy on IMF resources; the power to activate the mechanism; its relation with intermediate PSI instruments; and its impact on investment in emerging markets.

The Eurozone crisis which started in spring 2010 as a Greek budget crisis has alerted Europeans that the issue of defaulting sovereigns is not one reserved just for the poor and poorest countries on this globe. The crisis painfully amplified that developed countries, too, might be hit by this phenomenon. To be sure, this insight is far from novel - the history of defaulting states reaches back into history for at least two millennia. And yet, lawyers have surprisingly abstained more or less completely from discussing this subject and developing possible solutions. Beginning with the Argentina crisis in 2001, this neglect began to vanish to a certain degree and this movement got some momentum in 2010 by the Eurozone crisis. The present book collects contributions from authors most of whom have participated in a conference on this issue in January 2012 at the Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin. The presentations, thus, provide a unique overview of the present discussion both from an economic and legal perspective.