This publication is the second in a series of lessons learned reports which examine how the U.S. government and Departments of Defense, State, and Justice carried out reconstruction programs in Afghanistan. In particular, the report analyzes security sector assistance (SSA) programs to create, train and advise the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF) between 2002 and 2016. This publication concludes that the effort to train the ANDSF needs to continue, and provides recommendations for the SSA programs to be improved, based on lessons learned from careful analysis of real reconstruction situations in Afghanistan. The publication states that the United States was never prepared to help create Afghan police and military forces capable of protecting that country from internal and external threats. It is the hope of the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR), John F. Sopko, that this publication, and other SIGAR reports will create a body of work that can help provide reasonable solutions to help United States agencies and military forces improve reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan. Related items: Counterterrorism publications can be found here: https://bookstore.gpo.gov/catalog/counterterrorism Counterinsurgency publications can be found here: https://bookstore.gpo.gov/catalog/counterinsurgency Warfare & Military Strategy publications can be found here: https://bookstore.gpo.gov/catalog/warfare-military-strategy Afghanistan War publications can be found here: https://bookstore.gpo.gov/catalog/afghanistan-war

Since 2002, the United States has allocated nearly $90 billion in security sector assistance to the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF), with the goal of developing an independent, self-sustaining force capable of combating both internal and external threats. Yet, in August 2021, the ANDSF collapsed, paving the way for the Taliban to re-establish control of Afghanistan. The objectives of this interim evaluation were to (1) determine the factors that contributed to the ANDSF's collapse in August 2021; (2) assess any underlying factors over the 20-year security assistance mission that contributed to the underdevelopment of ANDSF capabilities and readiness; and (3) account for all U.S.- provided ANDSF equipment and U.S.-trained ANDSF personnel, where possible.

Since 2002, the U.S. has worked to develop the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF). The U.S. Dept. of Defense, through its Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan, directs U.S. efforts to develop the Afghan National Army (ANA) and, in conjunction with the Dept. of State, the Afghan National Police (ANP). To follow up on recommendations from a 2005 report on the ANSF, this report analyzed the extent to which U.S. plans for the ANSF contain criteria that was previously recommended. The author also examined progress made and challenges faced in developing the ANA and ANP. Includes recommendations. Charts and tables.

We were made aware of concerns by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) staff overseeing three operations and maintenance contracts serving Afghan National Defense Security Forces (ANDSF) facilities in Afghanistan regarding the theft of contractor-owned property and abuses to contract staff. Two contracts ended in 2015 and one O&M contract is currently on-going and set to end in March 2019. This report addresses those concerns. The objectives of this review were to determine the extent to which: (1) contractor- owned property and equipment was confiscated by ANDSF personnel; (2) ANDSF personnel mistreated and threatened contractor personnel at O&M work sites; and (3) USACE and CSTC-A took action to address property confiscation and contractor mistreatment.

After 17 years of U.S. involvement in Afghanistan and security-related U.S. appropriations totaling $83.3 billion (approximately 63 percent of the nearly $133 billion of U.S. reconstruction funding), there is not one person, agency, country, or military service that has had sole responsibility for overseeing security sector assistance (SSA).1 Instead, the responsibility for security sector assistance was divided among multiple U.S. and international entities. This report examines how these divides had unintended consequences and created challenges to the effectiveness of the mission, as well as some benefits.While the dual-hatted U.S.-NATO commander is largely responsible for reconstructing the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF), the Ministry of Defense (MOD), and the Ministry of Interior (MOI), the commander has no direct authority over civilian actors operating within embassies, the European Union, and other international organizations. Moreover, the commander does not have absolute authority to dictate the exact methods and activities NATO countries use to train and advise the ANDSF in different parts of Afghanistan. Rather the commander provides overarching guidance and coordinates the countries' various activities. This has created asymmetries in ANDSF development and has impeded the standardization of security sector assistance programs.This report also highlights how the unity of command and effort was strained because no U.S. executive branch department or military service had full ownership of key components of the mission, responsibility for assessing progress toward meeting U.S. strategic objectives, or accountability for vetting and deploying experts to accomplish mission tasks. Within the NATO-led coalition, the United States implemented a patchwork of SSA activities and programs involving dozens of U.S. government entities and international partner nations.