Despite revisions to bank capital standards, fundamental shortcomings remain: the rules for setting capital requirements need to be simpler, and resolution should be an essential part of the capital requirement framework.We propose a new system of capital regulation that addresses these needs by making changes to all three pillars of bank regulation: only common equity should be recognized as capital for regulatory purposes, and risk weighting of assets should be abandoned; capital requirements should be assigned on an institution-by-institution basis according to a regulatory (s,S) approach developed in the paper; a standard for prompt, corrective action is incorporated into the (s,S) approach.

Despite revisions to bank capital standards, fundamental shortcomings remain: the rules for setting capital requirements need to be simpler, and resolution should be an essential part of the capital requirement framework.We propose a new system of capital regulation that addresses these needs by making changes to all three pillars of bank regulation: only common equity should be recognized as capital for regulatory purposes, and risk weighting of assets should be abandoned; capital requirements should be assigned on an institution-by-institution basis according to a regulatory (s,S) approach developed in the paper; a standard for prompt, corrective action is incorporated into the (s,S) approach.

The paper seeks to identify strategies of commercial banks in response to higher capital requirements of Basel III reform and its phase-in. It focuses on a sample of nine EU emerging market countries and picks up 5 largest banks in each country assessing their response. The paper finds that all banking sectors raised CAR ratios mainly through retained earnings. In countries where the banking sector struggled with profitability, banks have resorted to issuance of new equity or shrunk the size of their balance sheets to meet the higher capital-adequacy requirements. Worries echoed at the early stage of Basel III compilation, namely that commercial banks would shrink their balance sheet by reducing their lending to meet stricter capital requirements, did materialize only in banks struggling with profitability.

This global handbook provides an up-to-date and comprehensive overview of shadow banking, or market-based finance as it has been recently coined. Engaging in financial intermediary services outside of normal regulatory parameters, the shadow banking sector was arguably a critical factor in causing the 2007-2009 financial crisis. This second volume explores three particular domains of shadow banking. The first domain deals with the macro-economic fundamentals of the respective shadow banking segments: Why do they exist, what problems do they solve and why are some of their embedded risks so persistent? The second domain captures the global dimensions of shadow banking markets, reviewing the particularities and specifics of various shadow banking systems around the world. Volume II concludes with an extensive overview of how the sector has changed since the financial crisis, focusing on regulatory arbitrage, contract imperfection and governance. Closing on unresolved issues and open-ended questions that will no doubt remain prominent in the shadow banking sector for years to come, this handbook is a must-read for professionals and policy-makers within the banking sector, as well as those researching economics and finance.

Analyses banking regulation and recent international developments, including Basel IV, bank resolution and Brexit, and their impact on bank governance.

The paper provides an overview of the profound and rapid changes in banking brought about by technology and deregulation, and discusses the hurdles that will have to be negotiated for putting in place the three pillars-capital adequacy rules, supervision, and market discipline-of the bank regulatory framework envisioned by the New Basel Accord (Basel II). It argues that, especially for developing countries, finding the right balance between regulation, supervision, and market discipline is likely to be difficult. Considerable technical expertise as well as political discipline-which can be viewed as a fourth pillar-will be required to implement Basel II.