A new security concept emerged on the American defense-planning scene several years ago. Asymmetric warfare was worked into the 1997 National Security Strategy. Analysts and major defense documents have since described the more vexing and menacing security challenges as asymmetric. The term is used in connection with threats, strategies, and warfare. Asymmetry typically describes an enemy that thinks or acts differently from America, especially when faced with conventionally superior U.S. forces. Asymmetric threats are most often associated with nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and unfamiliar capabilities such as those displayed in the attacks of September 11, 2001. Such weapons leverage vulnerabilities we either overlook or tolerate. And these asymmetric approaches can generate dramatic outcomes for a weaker power. Yet this concept has lost its usefulness in part because it means different things to different people. Moreover, when joined with warfare or threats, the term asymmetric adds little to the strategic thinking of ages past. Observations that weak and clever enemies can bring a stronger power to its knees by exploiting vulnerabilities or can brazenly challenge muscle-bound modern militaries with a surprise use of frightening weapons or unfamiliar maneuvering simply restate the obvious: strategy matters. So what does the concept of asymmetry add to an understanding of warfare and the threat? Is it a useful defense planning or policy analysis tool in this post-Cold War, post-9/11 world?

In 1950, when he commissioned the first edition of The Armed Forces Officer, Secretary of Defense George C. Marshall told its author, S.L.A. Marshall, that "American military officers, of whatever service, should share common ground ethically and morally." In this new edition, the authors methodically explore that common ground, reflecting on the basics of the Profession of Arms, and the officer's special place and distinctive obligations within that profession and especially to the Constitution.

This collection of articles by the Hon. Ike Skelton represents the author's commitment to the Armed Forces of the U.S. As the ranking Democrat on the House Armed Serv. Comm., he has been a leader in defense affairs. Articles: Joint Professional Mil. Ed.; Joint & Combined Oper. in the Post-Cold War Era; Taking Stock of the New Joint Era; Inspiring Soldiers to Do Better Than Their Best; The Constitutional Role of Congress: Lessons in Unpreparedness; Intelligence Support of Mil. Oper.; International Engagement; The Importance of History to the Mil. Professional; Joint Oper.; Mil. Lessons from Desert One to the Balkans; America's Frontier Wars: Lessons for Asymmetric Conflict; You're Not From Around Here, Are You?; & Recomm. Reading.

The Noncommissioned Officer and Petty Officer BACKBONE of the Armed Forces. Introduction The Backbone of the Armed Forces To be a member of the United States Armed Forces--to wear the uniform of the Nation and the stripes, chevrons, or anchors of the military Services--is to continue a legacy of service, honor, and patriotism that transcends generations. Answering the call to serve is to join the long line of selfless patriots who make up the Profession of Arms. This profession does not belong solely to the United States. It stretches across borders and time to encompass a culture of service, expertise, and, in most cases, patriotism. Today, the Nation's young men and women voluntarily take an oath to support and defend the Constitution of the United States and fall into formation with other proud and determined individuals who have answered the call to defend freedom. This splendid legacy, forged in crisis and enriched during times of peace, is deeply rooted in a time-tested warrior ethos. It is inspired by the notion of contributing to something larger, deeper, and more profound than one's own self. Notice: This is a printed Paperback version of the "The Noncommissioned Officer and Petty Officer BACKBONE of the Armed Forces". Full version, All Chapters included. This publication is available (Electronic version) in the official website of the National Defense University (NDU). This document is properly formatted and printed as a perfect sized copy 6x9".

Coercion is persuasion supported by the threat or use of force. Just as warfare is often "diplomacy carried out by other means," coercion--the threat of combat or the threat of an escalation in the intensity of combat--is a more subtle method of dispute that shades the spectrum between diplomacy and warfare. Understanding of coercive military strategy is a prerequisite to the successful making of either policy or war. In "Coercive Military Strategy, " Stephen J. Cimbala shows that coercive military strategy is a necessary part of any diplomatic-strategic recipe for success. Few wars are total wars, fought to annihilation, and military power is inherently political, employed for political purpose, in order to advance the public agenda of a state, so in any war there comes a time when a diplomatic resolution may be possible. To that end, coercive strategy should be flexible, for there are as many variations to it as there are variations in wars and warfare. Cimbala observes several cases of applying coercive strategy in the twentieth century: the U.S. strategy of limited war during the Cold War; the Cuban Missile Crisis, in which both the United States and the Soviet Union applied coercive strategy; Desert Storm, in which the Coalition Forces could practice coercion without restraint; and the Vietnam War, in which U.S. coercive strategy was ultimately a failure. Additionally, Cimbala examines coercion and the theory of collective security, which implies a willingness on the part of individual states, such as the NATO nations, to combine against any aspiring aggressor. With his examples, and the arguments they illustrate, Cimbala shows that although coercive strategy is a remedy for neither the ailments of U.S. national security nor world conflict, it will become more important in peace, crisis, and even war in the next century, when winning with the minimum of force or without force will become more important than winning by means of maximum firepower.

University level text. Some complex problems simply do not have "solutions." The key to being an effective leader is being able to recognize and manage such problems. Polarity Management presents a unique model and set of principles that will challenge you to look at situations in new ways. Also included are exercises to strengthen your skills, and case studies to help you begin applying the model to your own unsolvable problems.