Introduction by Dr Jacques Oliver Boudin. Armand de Caulaincourt was one of the highest officials in the French Empire, riding constantly at Napoleon's side.

Recognized as the most important Napoleonic source discovered in the last hundred years, the three volume memoirs of Napoleon’s Master of Horse are also exceptionally well written, and vividly portray Napoleon during his disastrous last years of power. The memoirs of one Napoleon’s most senior ministers and closest advisors, with whom he was often very candid, remained unpublished for over a century since they were left by Armand de Caulaincourt, unearthed with by Jean Hanoteau who was eminently familiar with the period, and on part of the French ministry of War’s historical section. The notes and annotations of Capitaine Hanoteau illuminate the text for both the enthusiast of the period and the general reader. The title of “Master of Horse’ perhaps in modern light does not quite reflect the position that Caulaincourt held within Napoleon’s inner circle. He was responsible for all of the transportation for Napoleon’s headquarters, the messengers that provided the eyes and ears of the campaign and furthermore he was ambassador to Russia for a number of years before hostilities commenced. A highly decorated cavalry officer before his tenure as ambassador, his advice should have been invaluable to the Emperor in assessing the huge undertaking of attacking the Russian empire, and Caulaincourt along with many others were ignored as Napoleon embarked his last invasion. Caulaincourt had much reason to be bitter as the Emperor was quite cruel to him personally, but his narrative maintains balance and although critical of Napoleon’s decisions he does not descend into recriminations. The first volume of the memoirs includes an excellent introduction to Caulaincourt and his history outside of the time-frame of the memoirs; it covers the period 1811-1812 to the point of the Grand Armée’s retreat from Moscow. Sketches of many of Napoleon’s entourage including Berthier, Duroc, Murat et. al. feature, as do the battle for Smolensk, Borodino and the great fire of Moscow. Not to be confused with the Charlotte de Sor penned “Recollections of Caulaincourt”, which are apocryphal and according to Tulard of little or no value. This edition is superior to the translated and heavily editted Libraire edition. Author – Armand Augustin Louis, marquis de Caulaincourt, Duc de Vincence (9th December 1773– 19th February 1827) Translator – Hamish Miles (????- 27th December 1937) Editor – Jean Hanoteau (17th December 1869 - 24th December 1939)

This is the book on war that Napoleon never had the time or the will to complete. In exile on the island of Saint-Helena, the deposed Emperor of the French mused about a great treatise on the art of war, but in the end changed his mind and ordered the destruction of the materials he had collected for the volume. Thus was lost what would have been one of the most interesting and important books on the art of war ever written, by one of the most famous and successful military leaders of all time. In the two centuries since, several attempts have been made to gather together some of Napoleon's 'military maxims', with varying degrees of success. But not until now has there been a systematic attempt to put Napoleon's thinking on war and strategy into a single authoritative volume, reflecting both the full spectrum of his thinking on these matters as well as the almost unparalleled range of his military experience, from heavy cavalry charges in the plains of Russia or Saxony to counter-insurgency operations in Egypt or Spain. To gather the material for this book, military historian Bruno Colson spent years researching Napoleon's correspondence and other writings, including a painstaking examination of perhaps the single most interesting source for his thinking about war: the copy-book of General Bertrand, the Emperor's most trusted companion on Saint-Helena, in which he unearthed a Napoleonic definition of strategy which is published here for the first time. The huge amount of material brought together for this ground-breaking volume has been carefully organized to follow the framework of Carl von Clausewitz's classic On War, allowing a fascinating comparison between Napoleon's ideas and those of his great Prussian interpreter and adversary, and highlighting the intriguing similarities between these two founders of modern strategic thinking.