Central banks may operate perfectly well without capital as conventionally defined. A large negative net worth, however, is likely to compromise central bank independence and interfere with its ability to attain policy objectives. If society values an independent central bank capable of effectively implementing monetary policy, recapitalization may become essential. Proper accounting practice in determining central bank profit or loss and rules governing the transfer of the central bank’s operating result to the treasury are also important. A variety of country-specific central bank practices are reviewed to support the argument.

Recapitalizing banks in a systemic crisis is a complex medium-term process that requires significant government intervention and careful management at both the strategic and individual bank levels. This paper highlights the range of operational and strategic issues to be addressed and the institutional arrangements needed to foster an effective banking system restructuring and maximize the returns on government investment. The approaches to recapitalization have varied, with countries choosing different mixes of direct capital injections and asset purchase and rehabilitation. The choice of an appropriate mix is critical, to minimize the expected present value of government outlays net of recoveries.

An IMF paper reviewing the policy responses of Indonesia, Korea and Thailand to the 1997 Asian crisis, comparing the actions of these three countries with those of Malaysia and the Philippines. Although all judgements are still tentative, important lessons can be learned from the experiences of the last two years.

This toolkit is designed for policy makers and stakeholders who are considering the establishment of a publicly funded asset management company (AMC). An AMC is a statutory body or corporation, fully or partially owned by the government, usually established in times of financial sector stress, to assume the management of distressed assets and recoup the public cost of resolving the crisis. AMCs were first used in the early 1990s in Sweden (Securum) and the United States (the RTC), and again during the Asian crisis (for instance, Danaharta in Malaysia, KAMCO in the Republic of Korea). The 2008 financial crisis marked a renewal of the use of this tool to support the resolution of financial crises (for instance, NAMA in Ireland, SAREB in Spain). The toolkit does not address broader bank resolution issues. It has a narrow focus on the specific tool of a public AMC established to support bank resolution, and with the objective of providing insight on the design and operational issues surrounding the creation of such AMCs. It seeks to inform policy makers on issues to consider if and when planning to establish a public AMC through: · An analysis of recent public AMCs established as a result of the global financial crisis · Detailed case studies in developed and emerging markets over three generations · A toolkit approach with questions and answers, including questions on design and operations that are critical for authorities confronted with the issue of whether to establish an AMC · An emphasis on “how to†? that is, a practical versus a principled approach. The toolkit is structured as followed: Part I summarizes the findings on the preconditions, the design, and the operationalization of public AMCs. Part II provides case studies on three generations of AMCs, whose lessons are embedded in Part I. The case studies cover emerging and developed markets, and have been selected based on the lessons they offer.

After a banking crisis, when authorities have decided to use budgetary funds to help restructure a large failed bank or banking system, apparent conflicts between various goals (involving incentives for the new bank management, for the government's budget, and for monetary stability) can be resolved by suitably designing financial instruments and appropriately allocating responsibility between different arms of government.

In most recent banking crises bank regulators have been caught off their guard and have been forced to respond to the crisis in a hurry without the support of an institutional or legal framework designed to deal with bank failures. This is in sharp contrast with the non-financial sector, where a detailed and elaborate bankruptcy law governs the process of liquidation or reorganisation of financially distressed firms. In this paper we address the question of how to design a bankruptcy institution for banks that would serve a similar purpose as existing bankruptcy laws for non-financial firms.

This book tells the inside story of those who played key roles in setting up the organisations and combatting the crisis. In exclusive interviews, global financial leaders and ESM insiders provide a rich stock of perspectives and anecdotes that bring to life the urgency of the crisis as well as the innovative solutions found to resolve it. The European Stability Mechanism and its temporary predecessor the EFSF provided billions of euros in loans to five hard-hit euro area countries during the European financial and sovereign debt crisis of the early 2000s, helping to safeguard the stability of those countries and the euro area as a whole. Initially, the crisis-torn euro area was ill-equipped institutionally, but the rapid establishment of the firewalls, the assistance programmes, deep‐seated country reforms, the strengthening of European institutions, and extraordinary European Central Bank measures shielded Europe from a euro area break-up. With the EFSF/ESM set-up, its managers aspired to create a new, more entrepreneurial international financial institution, one that is agile enough to respond quickly to new challenges, while still ensuring the strict governance befitting an organisation pursuing a public mission. The euro area has emerged from near disaster in more robust shape. As Europe strives to further strengthen its architecture in preparation for any possible future crises, it is important to reflect upon how the euro area reinvigorated its fortunes and draw the relevant lessons for future crisis management in Europe and beyond.