When President George W. Bush stood on the decks of the U.S.S. Lincoln in May 2003 and announced the victorious end to major combat operations in Iraq, he did so in front of a huge banner that proclaimed "Mission Accomplished." American forces had successfully removed the regime of Saddam Hussein with "rapid decisive operations"-and yet the United States was unprepared to effectively replace that regime. Gordon Rudd's excellent history reveals why in stark detail. Between the invasion of Iraq in March 2003 and the creation of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) that May, the Allied forces struggled to plug the governance gap created by the removal of Saddam Hussein's regime. Plugging that gap became the job of the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance. Cobbled together with staff from diverse federal agencies and military branches, ORHA was led by Jay Garner, a key figure in assisting Kurdish refugees following Operation Desert Storm in 1991. Garner and ORHA were given mere weeks to stabilize a nation that had come completely apart at the seams. Iraq's infrastructure was in such a shambles-thanks to years of poor maintenance, international sanctions, and massive looting-that the mission was doomed to fail from the start. Rudd, field historian for ORHA and CPA, offers a critical look at this impossible effort. He shows that, while military planning for the invasion of Iraq had been conducted for over a decade, planning for regime replacement was haphazard at best. The result was an unnecessarily large loss of lives, treasure, time, and American prestige, despite the inspired efforts of Garner and his staff. Based on nearly 300 interviews and time on the ground in Iraq, Rudd's account also provides an unsettling look at the awkward transition from ORHA to CPA, revealing how Ambassador Paul Bremer managed to make things even worse. Garner here emerges as both heroic and tragic, a charismatic leader of great enthusiasm who took on a task of grand proportions but was poorly served by those who chose him for the mission. As Rudd makes clear, the key lesson of this experience is that regime removal solves nothing without effective regime replacement. That lesson, learned the hard way, serves as a cautionary tale for our engagement in future foreign conflicts.

Beginning in 2003, diverse and significant actors, both domestic and international, engaged in reconstruction activities in Iraq. The total budget committed to Iraq's reconstruction was unprecedented among postconflict operations mobilized by the international community. Despite the vast sums of money spent, and the implementation of its many projects and programs, the donors and the Iraqi people view the reconstruction efforts in Iraq in a negative light. The Reconstruction of Iraq after 2003: Learning from Its Successes and Failures focuses on the period between 2003 and 2014--that is, after the United States+"led invasion and overthrow of the Saddam Hussein regime, and before the sudden rise of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), also known as Daesh. This book assesses several dimensions of Iraq's reconstruction. First, it considers the response of key international actors, such as the United Nations, the World Bank, the United States, and other bilateral donors--specifically, the European Union, Japan, and the United Kingdom--as well as nongovernmental organizations. Second, it analyzes the process and results of the reconstruction of key sectors (electricity, oil, education, and health), and the interventions geared to institution building and governance reform. Pursuing effective reconstruction within the context of conflict and fragility is a formidable challenge because of the uncertain, fluid, and complex environment. Based on the experience in Iraq, how can the international community support the effectiveness and durability of reconstruction? This book identifies lessons in seven areas and offers four recommendations for international and domestic actors and citizens engaged in reconstruction activities. The Reconstruction of Iraq after 2003 is important reading for development practitioners and policy makers who are or will be engaged in reconstruction efforts in fragile and conflict-affected environments.

The U.S. is spending billions of dollars to reconstruct Iraq while combating an insurgency that has targeted military & contractor personnel & the Iraqi people. This environment created a need for those rebuilding Iraq to obtain security services. This report evaluated the extent to which: (1) U.S. agencies & contractors acquired security services from private providers; (2) the U.S. military & private security providers developed a working relationship; & (3) U.S. agencies assessed the costs of using private security providers on reconstruction contracts. Includes recommendations to the Secretaries of Defense & State & the Admin., U.S. Agency for International Development. (USAID). Charts & tables.

Nemir Kirdar has lived Iraq's history. From the country of his youth - a stable and vibrant land of great promise, to the 1958 coup that plunged Iraq into a period of terror and destruction, foreign occupation, and the fall of Saddam Hussein, he's been uniquely placed to comment on events and propose solutions. Now Kirdar shares his vision for tomorrow's Iraq, providing a blueprint for political, economic and social renewal. Calling for Iraqis to rise up and unlock their nation's potential, Kirdar affirms that Iraq can again be unified. SAVING IRAQ is a personal account but also a book of global significance, offering steps towards resolution in a shattered country.

Since 2003, the U.S. has provided $49 billion to help rebuild Iraq. To build the capacity of Iraq's central and provincial governments to sustain this effort, the U.S. is implementing programs including Dept. of State's Provincial Reconstruction Development Comm. (PRDC) and the U.S. Agency for Internat. Develop. (USAID) Nat. Capacity Develop. (NCD). The use of key mgmt. controls, such as appropriate organizational structure and program monitoring, helps ensure programs achieve their objectives. Through field visits in Iraq, interviews with program officials, analyses of official reports, and examination of a sample of projects, Kristoff assessed whether the PRDC and NCD's mgmt. controls support the objectives of building the capacity of Iraq's gov¿t. Illus.

While billions have been provided to rebuild Iraq's oil and electricity sectors, Iraq's future needs are significant and sources of funding uncertain. For fiscal years 2003 through 2006, the United States made available about $7.4 billion and spent about $5.1 billion to rebuild the oil and electricity sectors. The United States spent an additional $3.8 billion in Iraqi funds on the two sectors, primarily on oil and electricity sector contracts administered by U.S. agencies. However, according to various estimates and officials, Iraq will need billions of additional dollars to rebuild, maintain, and secure Iraq's oil and electricity sectors. The Ministry of Electricity estimates that about $27 billion will be needed to meet the sector's future rebuilding requirements; a comparable estimate has not been developed by the Ministry of Oil. Since the majority (about 70 percent) of U.S. funds has been spent, the Iraqi government and the international donor community represent important sources of potential funding. However, prospects of such funding are uncertain. First, the Oil and Electricity Ministries have encountered difficulties spending capital improvement budgets because of weaknesses in budgeting, procurement, and financial management. As of November 2006, the Ministry of Oil had spent less than 3 percent of its $3.5 billion 2006 capital budget to improve Iraq's oil facilities. Second, Iraq has not made full use of potential international contributions and it is unclear what additional financial commitments, if any, will be provided to Iraq's oil and electricity sectors as part of a new international compact (agreement), according to U.S. officials. As of March 2007, donors had committed $580 million in grants for the electricity sector and had offered loans for oil and electricity projects; however, Iraq has not accessed these loans in part due to concerns about its high debt burden.