How do rebel groups decide how to recruit members? To answer this question, Obayashi classifies recruitment techniques of rebel groups into two types, coercion and inducement, and develops a theory of rebel recruitment that simultaneously addresses agency problems inside rebel groups and the rebel-state contest over information. Important themes such as desertion, counterinsurgency strategies including amnesties and civil war termination are also examined to further understand the dynamics of rebellion and violent disorder. The theory is applied to examine the changes in conflicts involving the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam in Sri Lanka and the Lord’s Resistance Army in Uganda.

Some rebel groups abuse noncombatant populations, while others exhibit restraint. Insurgent leaders in some countries transform local structures of government, while others simply extract resources for their own benefit. In some contexts, groups kill their victims selectively, while in other environments violence appears indiscriminate, even random. This book presents a theory that accounts for the different strategies pursued by rebel groups in civil war, explaining why patterns of insurgent violence vary so much across conflicts. It does so by examining the membership, structure, and behavior of four insurgent movements in Uganda, Mozambique, and Peru. Drawing on interviews with nearly two hundred combatants and civilians who experienced violence firsthand, it shows that rebels' strategies depend in important ways on how difficult it is to launch a rebellion. The book thus demonstrates how characteristics of the environment in which rebellions emerge constrain rebel organization and shape the patterns of violence that civilians experience.

Why do only some incipient rebel groups become viable challengers to governments? Only those that control local rumor networks survive.

This book analyzes civil wars over the past twenty years and examines what motivates some rebel groups to abide by international law.

This is the first book to examine and compare how rebels govern civilians during civil wars in Latin America, Africa, Asia, and Europe. Drawing from a variety of disciplinary traditions, including political science, sociology, and anthropology, the book provides in-depth case studies of specific conflicts as well as comparative studies of multiple conflicts. Among other themes, the book examines why and how some rebels establish both structures and practices of rule, the role of ideology, cultural, and material factors affecting rebel governance strategies, the impact of governance on the rebel/civilian relationship, civilian responses to rebel rule, the comparison between modes of state and non-state governance to rebel attempts to establish political order, the political economy of rebel governance, and the decline and demise of rebel governance attempts.

This open access book brings together a set of original studies that use cutting-edge computational methods to investigate conflict at various geographic scales and degrees of intensity and violence. Methodologically, this book covers a variety of computational approaches from text mining and machine learning to agent-based modelling and social network analysis. Empirical cases range from migration policy framing in North America and street protests in Iran to violence against civilians in Congo and food riots world-wide. Supplementary materials in the book include a comprehensive list of the datasets on conflict and dissent, as well as resources to online repositories where the annotated code and data of individual chapters can be found and where (agent-based) models can be re-produced and altered. These materials are a valuable resource for those wishing to retrace and learn from the analyses described in this volume and adapt and apply them to their own research interests. By bringing together novel research through an international team of scholars from a range of disciplines, Computational Conflict Research pioneers and maps this emerging field. The book will appeal to students, scholars, and anyone interested in the prospects of using computational social sciences to advance our understanding of conflict dynamics.

Institutions and Economic Performance explores the question of why income per capita varies so greatly across countries. Even taking into account disparities in resources, including physical and human capital, large economic discrepancies remain across countries. Why are some societies but not others able to encourage investments in places, people, and productivity? The answer, the book argues, lies to a large extent in institutional differences across societies. Such institutions are wide-ranging and include formal constitutional arrangements, the role of economic and political elites, informal institutions that promote investment and knowledge transfer, and others. Two core themes run through the contributors’ essays. First, what constraints do institutions place on the power of the executive to prevent it from extorting the investments and effort of other people and institutions? Second, when are productive institutions self-enforcing? Institutions and Economic Performance is unique in its melding of economics, political science, history, and sociology to address its central question.