In 2015, Congress tasked the Department of Defense to commission an independent assessment of U.S. military strategy and force posture in the Asia-Pacific, as well as that of U.S. allies and partners, over the next decade. This CSIS study fulfills that congressional requirement. The authors assess U.S. progress to date and recommend initiatives necessary to protect U.S. interests in the Pacific Command area of responsibility through 2025. Four lines of effort are highlighted: (1) Washington needs to continue aligning Asia strategy within the U.S. government and with allies and partners; (2) U.S. leaders should accelerate efforts to strengthen ally and partner capability, capacity, resilience, and interoperability; (3) the United States should sustain and expand U.S. military presence in the Asia-Pacific region; and (4) the United States should accelerate development of innovative capabilities and concepts for U.S. forces.

Soon after the American Revolution, ?certain of the founders began to recognize the strategic significance of Asia and the Pacific and the vast material and cultural resources at stake there. Over the coming generations, the United States continued to ask how best to expand trade with the region and whether to partner with China, at the center of the continent, or Japan, looking toward the Pacific. Where should the United States draw its defensive line, and how should it export democratic principles? In a history that spans the eighteenth century to the present, Michael J. Green follows the development of U.S. strategic thinking toward East Asia, identifying recurring themes in American statecraft that reflect the nation's political philosophy and material realities. Drawing on archives, interviews, and his own experience in the Pentagon and White House, Green finds one overarching concern driving U.S. policy toward East Asia: a fear that a rival power might use the Pacific to isolate and threaten the United States and prevent the ocean from becoming a conduit for the westward free flow of trade, values, and forward defense. By More Than Providence works through these problems from the perspective of history's major strategists and statesmen, from Thomas Jefferson to Alfred Thayer Mahan and Henry Kissinger. It records the fate of their ideas as they collided with the realities of the Far East and adds clarity to America's stakes in the region, especially when compared with those of Europe and the Middle East.

Over the last two decades the relations between the countries of the Gulf and Asia have expanded beyond the economic domain to include political and even security arrangements. While oil and non-oil trade are still the fulcrum of their association, 'strategic' partnerships are fast becoming the norm. The contributors of this book argue that, along with economic diversification, the Gulf countries have also diversified their foreign policies, especially with China, India, Japan and South Korea, among others. Together with Russia, this could eventually alter the current US-centric security paradigm. This opens up the prospect for a 'collective' security architecture in the Gulf, which is key to regional and global stability.

Providing a coherent and current account of how the U.S. manages to 'pivot to Asia' amid a rising China, this book provides an insightful glimpse into China-US relations, and the complexities of the two nations' economic and defense issues as China asserts is financial and military might in Asia and beyond.

The geographic constructs and the geo-political imaginations have dictated the formation of informal dialogue mechanisms and multilateral structures. During Cold War, the power bloc politics have subsumed these geographical definitions and have transcended national sovereign boundaries. In the contemporary discourse, new formulations like Asia-Pacific, East Asia and Indian Ocean have defined new politico-security thinking. The concept of Indo-Pacific is an over-arching geopolitical imagination which addresses new challenges in political, economic and maritime domains. This book addresses this new concept and debates its viability.

This book examines the origins of the US Navy’s 2007 Maritime Strategy, the formation of the US government’s “Pivot to Asia” strategy, and the most recent revisions to this strategy that focus more specifically on China. Besides examining the details of this strategy formulation, the book explores the internal and external repercussions on the US Navy of the Pivot to Asia. It discusses the “Fat Leonard” scandal, which involved bribery and corruption in contracts for the maintenance of the US fleets in the region, and considers the sharp decrease in training and readiness of the Pacific fleet to support the pivot, which in turn led to serious maritime collisions. It also assesses the impact of the pivot on other countries in the region, engaging in the debate as to whether the pivot was necessary in order to convince the countries of the region that the United States had not lost its staying power, or whether the pivot managed to make tensions in the Asia-Pacific worse even while allowing the strategic situation in the Middle East and Europe to worsen as a result of neglect.