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This book presents Robert S. Hartman’s formal theory of value and critically examines many other twentieth century value theorists in its light, including A.J. Ayer, Kurt Baier, Brand Blanshard, Paul Edwards, Albert Einstein, William K. Frankena, R.M. Hare, Nicolai Hartmann, Martin Heidegger, G.E. Moore, P.H. Nowell-Smith, Jose Ortega y Gasset, Charles Stevenson, Paul W. Taylor, Stephen E. Toulmin, and J.O. Urmson. Open Access funding for this volume has been provided by the Robert S. Hartman Institute.

The germs of the ideas in this book became implanted in me during my experience as a resident in clinical pathology at Boston University Medical Center. At the time, I had inklings that the test results churned out by our laboratories were more than scientific facts. As a philosophically unsophisticated young physician, however, I had no language or framework to analyze what I saw as a deep philosophical problem, a problem largely unrecognized by most physicians. The test results provided by our laboratories were accurate and of great practical importance for patient care. However, most of the physicians who relied on our test results to diagnose and treat their patients either did not have the time or interest to consider the philosophical issues inherent in diagnosis, or, like me, had inadequate means to further analyze them. It was more than ten years later that I began doctoral studies in philosophy, and I was fortunate to find a faculty that was supportive of my efforts to address the problem. This book began as my doctoral dissertation in the Department of Philosophy at Georgetown University. I would like to acknowledge the assistance of my mentor, Robert Veatch, Ph. D. Our conversations during my Georgetown years led me in new and often fascinating directions. I would also like to acknowledge the help of Kenneth Schaffner, M. D. , Ph. D.

Recipient of the Jo Anne Stolaroff Cotsen Prize Scholars from Aristotle to Marx and beyond have been fascinated by the question of what constitutes value. The Construction of Value in the Ancient World makes a significant contribution to this ongoing inquiry, bringing together in one comprehensive volume the perspectives of leading anthropologists, archaeologists, historians, linguists, philologists, and sociologists on how value was created, defined, and expressed in a number of ancient societies around the world. Based on the basic premise that value is a social construct defined by the cultural context in which it is situated, the volume explores four overarching but closely interrelated themes: place value, body value, object value, and number value. The questions raised and addressed are of central importance to archaeologists studying ancient civilizations: How can we understand the value that might have been accorded to materials, objects, people, places, and patterns of action by those who produced or used the things that compose the human material record? Taken as a whole, the contributions to this volume demonstrate how the concept of value lies at the intersection of individual and collective tastes, desires, sentiments, and attitudes that inform the ways people select, or give priority to, one thing over another.

Given that we meet evils in every quarter of the world, could it be governed by an all-good and all-powerful deity? Whilst some philosophers argue that the problem of evil is strong evidence for atheism, others claim that all of the evils in our world can be explained as requirements for deeper goods. On the other hand, skeptical theists believe in God, but struggle with the task of explaining the role of evils in our world. Skeptical theism tackles the problem of evil by proposing a limited skepticism about the purposes of God, and our abilities to determine whether any given instance is truly an example of gratuitous evil. This collection of 22 original essays presents cutting-edge work on skeptical theistic responses to the problem of evil and the persistent objections that such responses invite. Divided into four sections, the volume discusses the epistemology of sceptical theism, conditions of reasonable epistemic access, the implications for theism, and the implications for morality.