What is the place of realism in Asian art histories? What is the ‘real’? How do reality and realism relate and differ? The six essays in the present volume explore the manifestations of realism in Asian art, relating this art of description to issues of colonialism, world and civil wars, nation building, religion and contemporary culture in Asia.

America has finally recognized China’s bid for world dominance—but we’re still losing ground. Domination of the next generation of mobile broadband is just the tip of the spear. Like the Borg in Star Trek, China will assimilate you into a virtual empire controlled by Chinese technology. China is taking control of the Fourth Industrial Revolution—the economy of artificial intelligence and quantum computing—just as America dominated the Third Industrial Revolution driven by the computer. Long in planning, China’s scheme erupted into public awareness when it emerged as the world leader in 5G internet. America is on track to become poor, dependent, and vulnerable—unless we revive the American genius for innovation. Trade wars and tech boycotts have failed to slow China’s plans. David P. Goldman watched China unfold its imperial plan from the inside, as an investment banker in China and strategic consultant, and as a principal of a great Asian news organization, the Asia Times. This is an eyewitness, firsthand account of the biggest turning point in world affairs since the Second World War, with a clear explanation of what it means for America and for you—and what America can do to remain the world’s leading superpower.

In Japan's Reluctant Realism , Michael J. Green examines the adjustments of Japanese foreign policy in the decade since the end of the Cold War. Green presents case studies of China, the Korean peninsula, Russia and Central Asia, Southeast Asia, the international financial institutions, and multilateral forums (the United Nations, APEC, and the ARF). In each of these studies, Green considers Japanese objectives; the effectiveness of Japanese diplomacy in achieving those objectives; the domestic and exogenous pressures on policy-making; the degree of convergence or divergence with the United States in both strategy and implementation; and lessons for more effective US - Japan diplomatic cooperation in the future. As Green notes, its bilateral relationship with the United States is at the heart of Japan's foreign policy initiatives, and Japan therefore conducts foreign policy with one eye carefully on Washington. However, Green argues, it is time to recognize Japan as an independent actor in Northeast Asia, and to assess Japanese foreign policy in its own terms.

Singapore’s existence and success derive in part from its achievements in the domestic political arena and in part from the skilful management of a well-defined foreign policy with clearly identifiable goals and issues. A visible core of realist self-reliance is layered with the demands of a competitive trading state that requires a liberal international trading regime. Hence, both competitive and cooperative philosophies support Singapore’s foreign policy. This text charts the philosophical underpinning of Singapore’s foreign policy output and the institutions responsible for it and examines the importance of economic and defence diplomacy that are central to Singapore’s foreign policy output. It gives particular attention to the two most important regional bilateral relationships -- with Indonesia and Malaysia -- and how relations with its adjacent neighbours have influenced Singapore’s foreign policy. Combining first-hand research with excellent analysis, this volume provides a much-needed report on the survival of a small state in the globalizing world.

Introduces non-Western IR traditions to a Western IR audience, and challenges the dominance of Western theory. This book challenges criticisms that IR theory is Western-focused and therefore misrepresents much of world history by introducing the reader to non-Western traditions, literature and histories relevant to how IR is conceptualised.

Why does North Korea behave erratically in pursuing its nuclear weapons program? Why did the United States prefer bilateral alliances to multilateral ones in Asia after World War II? Why did China become "nice"—no more military coercion—in dealing with the pro-independence Taiwan President Chen Shuibian after 2000? Why did China compromise in the negotiation of the Chunxiao gas exploration in 2008 while Japan became provocative later in the Sino-Japanese disputes in the East China Sea? North Korea’s nuclear behavior, U.S. alliance strategy, China’s Taiwan policy, and Sino-Japanese territorial disputes are all important examples of seemingly irrational foreign policy decisions that have determined regional stability and Asian security. By examining major events in Asian security, this book investigates why and how leaders make risky and seemingly irrational decisions in international politics. The authors take the innovative step of integrating the neoclassical realist framework in political science and prospect theory in psychology. Their analysis suggests that political leaders are more likely to take risky actions when their vital interests and political legitimacy are seriously threatened. For each case, the authors first discuss the weaknesses of some of the prevailing arguments, mainly from rationalist and constructivist theorizing, and then offer an alternative explanation based on their political legitimacy-prospect theory model. This pioneering book tests and expands prospect theory to the study of Asian security and challenges traditional, expected-utility-based, rationalist theories of foreign policy behavior.

Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the international system has been unipolar, centered on the United States. But the rise of China foreshadows a change in the distribution of power. Øystein Tunsjø shows that the international system is moving toward a U.S.-China standoff, bringing us back to bipolarity—a system in which no third power can challenge the top two. The Return of Bipolarity in World Politics surveys the new era of superpowers to argue that the combined effects of the narrowing power gap between China and the United States and the widening power gap between China and any third-ranking power portend a new bipolar system that will differ in crucial ways from that of the last century. Tunsjø expands Kenneth N. Waltz’s structural-realist theory to examine the new bipolarity within the context of geopolitics, which he calls “geostructural realism.” He considers how a new bipolar system will affect balancing and stability in U.S.-China relations, predicting that the new bipolarity will not be as prone to arms races as the previous era’s; that the risk of limited war between the two superpowers is likely to be higher in the coming bipolarity, especially since the two powers are primarily rivals at sea rather than on land; and that the superpowers are likely to be preoccupied with rivalry and conflict in East Asia instead of globally. Tunsjø presents a major challenge to how international relations understands superpowers in the twenty-first century.