Anglican eucharistic theology varies between the different philosophical assumptions of realism and nominalism. Whereas realism links the signs of the Eucharist with what they signify in a real way, nominalism sees these signs as reminders only of past and completed transaction. This book begins by discussing the multifomity of the philosophical assumptions underlying Anglican eucharistic theology and goes on to present extensive case study material which exemplify these different assumptions from the Reformation to the Nineteenth century. By examining the multiformity of philosophical assumptions this book avoids the hermeneutic idealism of particular church parties and looks instead at the Anglican eucharistic tradition in a more critical manner.

In attempting to understand and explain various behaviour, events, and phenomena in their field, psychologists have developed and enunciated an enormous number of 'best guesses' or theories concerning the phenomenon in question. Such theories involve speculations and statements that range on a potency continuum from 'strong' to 'weak'. The term theory, itself, has been conceived of in various ways in the psychological literature. In the present dictionary, the strategy of lumping together all the various traditional descriptive labels regarding psychologists 'best guesses' under the single descriptive term theory has been adopted. The descriptive labels of principle, law, theory, model, paradigm, effect, hypothesis and doctrine are attached to many of the entries, and all such descriptive labels are subsumed under the umbrella term theory.The title of this dictionary emphasizes the term theory (implying both strong and weak best guesses) and is a way of indication, overall, the contents of this comprehensive dictionary in a parsimonious and felicitous fashion.The dictionary will contain approximately 2,000 terms covering the origination, development, and evolution of various psychological concepts, as well as the historical definition, analysis, and criticisms of psychological concepts. Terms and definitions are in English.*Contains over 2,000 terms covering the origination, development and evolution of various psychological concepts*Covers a wide span of theories, from auditory, cognitive tactile and visual to humor and imagery*An essential resource for psychologists needing a single-source quick reference

The book is a research monograph on the notions of truth and assertibility as they relate to the foundations of mathematics. It is aimed at a general mathematical and philosophical audience. The central novelty is an axiomatic treatment of the concept of assertibility. This provides us with a device that can be used to handle difficulties that have plagued philosophical logic for over a century. Two examples relate to Frege's formulation of second-order logic and Tarski's characterization of truth predicates for formal languages. Both are widely recognized as fundamental advances, but both are also seen as being seriously flawed: Frege's system, as Russell showed, is inconsistent, and Tarski's definition fails to capture the compositionality of truth. A formal assertibility predicate can be used to repair both problems. The repairs are technically interesting and conceptually compelling. The approach in this book will be of interest not only for the uses the author has put it to, but also as a flexible tool that may have many more applications in logic and the foundations of mathematics.

This Element defends mathematical anti-realism against an underappreciated problem with that view-a problem having to do with modal truthmaking. Part I develops mathematical anti-realism, it defends that view against a number of well-known objections, and it raises a less widely discussed objection to anti-realism-an objection based on the fact that (a) mathematical anti-realists need to commit to the truth of certain kinds of modal claims, and (b) it's not clear that the truth of these modal claims is compatible with mathematical anti-realism. Part II considers various strategies that anti-realists might pursue in trying to solve this modal-truth problem with their view, it argues that there's only one viable view that anti-realists can endorse in order to solve the modal-truth problem, and it argues that the view in question-which is here called modal nothingism-is true.

The character of this work is perhaps sufficently indicated by its title. However it must be noted that the term "philosophy" is not used so strictly as to exclude material from other disciplines connected with philosophy or helpful to it and to an unders