Readings in Applied Microeconomic Theory: Market Forces and Solutions presents both classic articles fundamental to microeconomic analysis as well as modern treatments of frontier issues in applied theory. Complementary to standard textbook treatments, the readings and their bibliographies offer further coverage of new fields such as game theory, decision-making under uncertainty theory, and auction theory.

This reader encourages students to appreciate the power of the market, including specific examples and addressing questions on whether markets actually work well and offering evidence that market failures are not as serious or as common as claimed.

A central concern of economics is how society allocates its resources. Modern economies rely on two institutions to allocate: markets and governments. But how much of the allocating should be performed by markets and how much by governments? This collection of readings will help students appreciate the power of the market. It supplements theoretical explanations of how markets work with concrete examples, addresses questions about whether markets actually work well and offers evidence that supposed "market failures" are not as serious as claimed. Featuring readings from Hayek, William Baumol, Harold Demsetz, Daniel Fischel and Edward Lazear, Benjamin Klein and Keith B. Leffler, Stanley J. Liebowitz and Stephen E. Margolis, and John R. Lott, Jr., this book covers key topics such as: • Why markets are efficient allocators • How markets foster economic growth • Property rights • How markets choose standards • Asymmetric Information • Whether firms abuse their power • Non-excludable goods • Monopolies The selections should be comprehended by undergraduate students who have had an introductory course in economics. This reader can also be used as a supplement for courses in intermediate microeconomics, industrial organization, business and government, law and economics, and public policy.

The author's most important papers in a number of areas of applied microeconomic theory, many previously presented as articles in various journals during the 1970s-1990s, are collected here under categories of strategic behavior, efficiency wages, and applied price theory. Specific subjects include the durability of capital as a barrier to entry, agent compensation and the limits of bonding, and supporting collusion by choice of inferior technologies. Other topics covered are the economy of high wages, technology-trading coalitions in supergames, and the geometry of supply, demand, and competitive market structure with economies of scope. Eaton teaches economics at the University of Calgary, Canada. This work lacks a subject index. Annotation copyrighted by Book News, Inc., Portland, OR