Rational Risk Policy is based on Viscusi's Arne Ryde Memorial Lectures, delivered at Lund University in 1996. The organizing principle of these lectures is that the irrationality of individual decisions is often embodied in government regulations. Rather than overcoming the inadequacies in individual risk beliefs and behaviour, governmental regulations often institutionalize them. Viscusi examines how consumers and workers perceive risk and the implications of these risk beliefs and behavioural responses to risk for government policy. Hazard warnings efforts, direct regulation, and liability are among the alternative modes of intervention. The role of risk tradeoffs with respect to the value of life as well as the consequences of wasteful regulatory expenditures are considered in a discussion of riskrisk analysis. Rational Risk Policy also includes a critique of the risk analysis practices used by government agencies as well as a consideration of how liability and social insurance should be integrated into a rational risk management strategy.

This title is part of UC Press's Voices Revived program, which commemorates University of California Press’s mission to seek out and cultivate the brightest minds and give them voice, reach, and impact. Drawing on a backlist dating to 1893, Voices Revived makes high-quality, peer-reviewed scholarship accessible once again using print-on-demand technology. This title was originally published in 1985.

This book provides a comprehensive and accessible synthesis of Viscusi's 1996 Arne Ryde Memorial lectures on risk policy. In this volume, Viscusi explores the various forms of irrationality exemplified in individual risk behavior and the role government policy has played in institutionalizing these biases. He examines the implications for government policy of consumers and workers' risk beliefs and behavioral responses to risk. In addition to a critique of current risk analysis practices, he suggests strategies for rational risk management, including hazard warnings efforts, direct regulation, and liability as alternative modes of intervention.

Risk as we now know it is a wholly new phenomenon, the by-product of our ever more complex and powerful technologies. In business, policy making, and in everyday life, it demands a new way of looking at technological and environmental uncertainty. In this definitive volume, four of the world's leading risk researchers present a fundamental critique of the prevailing approaches to understanding and managing risk - the 'rational actor paradigm'. They show how risk studies must incorporate the competing interests, values, and rationalities of those involved and find a balance of trust and acceptable risk. Their work points to a comprehensive and significant new theory of risk and uncertainty and of the decision making process they require. The implications for social, political, and environmental theory and practice are enormous. Winner of the 2000-2002 Outstanding Publication Award of the Section on Environment and Technology of the American Sociological Association

Two different applications have been considered, automobile claims from Massachusetts and health expenses from the Netherlands. We have fit 11 different distributions to these data. The distributions are conveniently nested within a single four parameter distribution, the generalized beta of the second type. This relationship facilitates analysis and comparisons. In both cases the GB2 provided the best fit and the Burr 3 is the best three parameter model. In the case of automobile claims, the flexibility of the GB2 provides a statistically siE;nificant improvement in fit over all other models. In the case of Dutch health expenses the improvement of the GB2 relative to several alternatives was not statistically significant. * The author appreciates the research assistance of Mark Bean, Young Yong Kim and Steve White. The data used were provided by Richard Derrig of The Massachusetts Automobile Rating and Accident Prevention Bureau and by Bob Van der Laan and The Silver Cross Foundation for the medical insurance claim data. 2~ REFERENCES Arnold, B. C. 1983. Pareto Distributions. Bartonsville: International Cooperative Publishing House. Cummins, J. D. and L. R. Freifelder. 1978. A comparative analysis of alternative maximum probable yearly aggregate loss estimators. Journal of Risk and Insurance 45:27-52. *Cummins, J. D., G. Dionne, and L. Maistre. 1987. Application of the GB2 family of distributions in collective risk theory. University of Pennsylvania: Mimeographed manuscript. Hogg, R. V. and S. A. Klugman. 1983. On the estimation of long tailed skewed distributions with actuarial applications.

Good decisions account for risks. For example, the risk of an accident while driving in the rain makes a reasonable driver decide to slow down. While risk is a large topic in theoretical disciplines such as economics and psychology, as well as in practical disciplines such as medicine and finance, philosophy has a unique contribution to make in developing a normative theory of risk that states what risk is, and to what extent our responses to it are rational. Weirich here develops a philosophical theory of the rationality of responses to risk. He first distinguishes two types of risk: first, a chance of a bad event, and second, an act's risk in relation to its possible outcomes. He argues that this distinction has normative significance in the sense that one's attitudes towards these types of risks - and how one acts on them - are governed by different general principles of rationality. Consequently, a comprehensive account of risk must not only characterize rational responses to risk but also explain why these responses are rational. Weirich explains how, for a rational ideal agent, the expected utilities of the acts available in a decision problem explain the agent's preferences among the acts. As a result, maximizing expected utility is just following preferences among the acts. His view takes an act's expected utility, not just as a feature of a representation of preferences among acts, but also as a factor in the explanation of preferences among acts. The book's precise formulation of general standards of rationality for attitudes and for acts, and its rigorous argumentation for these standards, make it philosophical; but while mainly of interest to philosophers, its broader arguments will contribute to the conceptual foundations of studies of risk in all disciplines that study it.

In this book, Paul Anand examines the normative interpretation of Subjective Expected Utility (SEU). He tests the philosophical and logical basis for associating SEU with rational choice. Decision theorists have increasingly come to accept the experimental evidence that subjects systematicallyviolate the axiomatic assumptions of SEU, and as a result the past decade has witnessed an explosion of mathematical models that seek to capture this behaviour. A current issue is whether axioms of SEU really are canons of rationality. Anand discusses whether the new decision-theoretic models aremore than just accounts of irrational behaviour. The main themes of the book are that, empirically, SEU is false, and that normatively it imposes unnecessary constraints on rational agency. Problems with Bayesianism are introduced and it is shown that useful distinctions between risk and uncertainty (in a Keynesian sense) can be made. Some of theradical methodological changes in economics that underpin theoretical developments in decision theory and economics are also discussed.