"This book is refreshing, innovative and important for several reasons. Perhaps most importantly, it attempts to reconcile game theory with one-person decision theory by viewing a game as a collection of one-person decision problems. As natural as this approach may seem, it is hard to find game theory books that really implement this view. This book is a wonderful exception, in which the transition between decision theory and game theory is both smooth and natural. It shows that decision theory and game theory can go—and, in fact, must go—hand in hand. The careful exposition, the many illustrative examples, the critical assessment of traditional game theory concepts, and the enlightening comparison with the subjectivistic approach advocated in this book, make it a pleasure to read and a must have for anyone interested in the foundations of decision theory and game theory." Andrés Perea (Maastricht University) "Gabriel Frahm's relatively nontechnical book is a bold synthesis of decision theory and game theory from a Bayesian or subjectivist perspective. It distinguishes between decisions, or one-person games, and games with two or more players, but Frahm argues that this distinction is not always necessary—the two kinds of games can be analyzed within a common theoretical framework. He models the dynamics of choice in several different settings (e.g., information may be complete or incomplete as well as perfect or imperfect), including one in which players look ahead and make farsighted calculations on which they base their choices. His book contains many provocative examples that illustrate the advantages of a unified theory of rational decision-making." Steven J. Brams (New York University)

Analyzes the nature of international disagreements and conflict resolution in terms of game theory and non-zero-sum games.

This book analyses conflict theory through one type of conflict in particular: manhunting, or predation.

Game theory could be formally defined as a theory of rational decision in conflict situations. Models of such situations, as they are conceived in game theory, involve (1) a set of decision makers, called players; (2) a set of strategies available to each player; (3) a set of outcomes, each of which is a result of particular choices of strategies made by the players on a given play of the game; and (4) a set of payoffs accorded to each player in each of the possible outcomes. It is assumed that each player is 'individually rational', in the sense that his preference ordering of the outcomes is determined by the order of magnitudes of his (and only his) associated payoffs. Further, a player is rational in the sense that he assumes that every other player is rational in the above sense. The rational player utilizes knowledge of the other players' payoffs in guiding his choice of strategy, because it gives him information about how the other players' choices are guided. Since, in general, the orders of magnitude of the payoffs that accrue to the several players in the several outcomes do not coincide, a game of strategy is a model of a situation involving conflicts of interests.

This book covers the problems of rational decision-making in conflict situations.

This series brings together a carefully edited selection of the most influential and enduring articles on central topics in social and political theory. Each volume contains ten to twelve articles and an introductory essay by the editor.

A series of closely interrelated essays on game theory, this book deals with an area in which progress has been least satisfactory—the situations where there is a common interest as well as conflict between adversaries: negotiations, war and threats of war, criminal deterrence, extortion, tacit bargaining. It proposes enlightening similarities between, for instance, maneuvering in limited war and in a traffic jam; deterring the Russians and one’s own children; the modern strategy of terror and the ancient institution of hostages.