President Camille Chamoun of Lebanon made an urgent plea on 14 July 1958 to the governments of France, Great Britain, and the United States to deploy military forces to Lebanon. Received in Washington at 0600 on 14 July, this message became the first test of the Eisenhower Doctrine, which had been announced in January 1957. The JCS activated a Specified Command, Middle East (SPECOMME), and designated Adm. James L. Holloway, Commander in Chief, North Atlantic and Mediterranean, as the Commander in Chief, SPECOMME (CINCSPECOMME). According to a JCS memorandum, These actions marked the beginning of operation 'Blue Bat, ' the first United States airborne-amphibious operation to occur in peacetime. Contents: Doctrine, Planning, Background, Problems, Deployment, Organization, Resupply, Procurement, Civil affairs, Medical support, Security, Plans, Task force 201, On-hand supplies, 31 August 1958.

This book offers a strategic, organizational, and logistical analysis in a historical context of the planning of conventional forces to meet a limited contingency. The central question is: Why, from 1960 to 1982, did the U.S. fail to construct a coherent limited contingency force? Analysis of a series of comparative case studies reveals that the strategic concept to the "half war," or limited contingency, was never articulated adequately enough to support specific force planning. Organizations designed to oversee and command limited contingency forces, fragmented by interservice rivalries and the absence of joint doctrine, lacked multiservice composition and a unified command structure. A search for economy in limited contingency forces seemed justified by illusions about their capabilities. Low budgetary priority and Congressional perceptions that enhanced U.S. rapid deployment capabilities would encourage U.S. global intervention contributed to the lack of logistical and mobility systems dedicated to them. The wider intent of this study is to shed light on the general purpose force planning process and to suggest policy guidance as the United States once again embarks on a major conventional force planning initiative. Rather than being trapped by the past, new efforts to meet vital U.S. military interests below the nuclear threshold must identify "half war" planning contingencies, structure unified commands capable of directing tailored conventional forces in specific theaters, and provide adequate strategic mobility systems.