Contents: the defense counter-proliferation initiative; the spread of weapons of mass destruction; responding to radical proliferators; history's lessons for preemptive counter-proliferation decisions (preventing Nazi A-Bombs; bombardment of Tokyo's nuclear reactor; Israel's Osirak attack; India thwarts Israeli destruction of Pakistan's Islamic BombÓ; Iraq destroys Iran's Bushehr Reactor; lessons of the Gulf War; the missile crisis: an air strike deferred); dealing with a potential Nuclear HitlerÓ; the proliferation challenge of North Korea.

On December 7, 1993, Secretary of Defense Les Aspin announced that the United States was adding a military dimension to its fight to prevent the spread of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). The new program, called the Counter-Proliferation Initiative (CPI), provides funding to prepare for combating foes with nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) and missile weapons on future battlefields, improves monitoring for locating rival NBC/missile programs, improves theater defenses, and develops weapons capable of penetrating and destroying underground facilities. US efforts will include a diplomatic offensive to persuade US allies to take similar counter-proliferation steps. The central thrust of the CPI is to prepare US and allied forces for dealing with future enemies on the battlefield who are armed with weapons of mass destruction. An important secondary thrust of the CPI is to provide the Commander-in-Chief with the tools to disarm an adversary unilaterally if necessary, before the adversary can initiate the use of WMD in situations where we are on a collision course with such an enemy and no alternative course seems feasible. Numerous preemptive counter-proliferation strikes have taken place since 1940. Allied air forces and special operations forces destroyed German nuclear facilities and heavy water supplies that were an integral part of the Nazi A-bomb research effort. US bombers also destroyed the most important Japanese nuclear research laboratory in Tokyo at the end of WWII. Other raids include: Iran versus Iraq in 1980, Israel versus Iraq in 1981, Iraq versus Iran with seven raids from 1984 to 9188, and the US-led coalition versus Iraq in 1991. When deciding whether or not to use military action to remove a WMD capacity from a rival state, it is important that decision makers address a number of key questions, and ensure that answers to each are positive, before making PCP decisions: is the enemy undeterrable, violent, and a risk taker? Is the enemy on the WMD threshold or beyond it? Are vital US interest threatened? Are key enemy targets precisely located and vulnerable? Is surprise achievable? Does the US have a first strike capability? Is the US homeland safe from enemy WMD? Would the US and its allies be safe from retaliation from the WMD of third parties? Have all non-military options been exhausted before considering preemption? Does the US have clear objectives achievable by appropriate means? Is the US committing enough resources and is it taking all necessary steps to insure victory? Finally, a note of caution, PCP strikes against states armed with WMD had better work completely or they could spell disaster for the initiator.

As counter-profileration is expected to become the central element in the new national security policy of the US, such actions will constitute a central element of every major international conflict in the first decades of the 21st century. One of the most important geostrategic phenomena of the past decade has been the extraordinary diffusion of war-making capabilities from the developed North to the developing South. In the eyes of some proliferant states, possessing nuclear, biological and chemical (NBC) weapons would not only add to their regional stature, but would also offer an asymmetrical counter to the West’s massive superiority in conventional forces. In the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East, a number of countries are assumed to possess varying levels of NBC-weapons capabilities. Reasons for concern include the fact that such weapons have been used in the past; the region’s geographic proximity to Europe and the vital interests of the West (which is prepared, under certain circumstances, to use force to protect them); the multiplicity of conflicts and other security problems; and the general instability in the region (including the spread of religious extremism). This important and timely book assesses, in detail, the accuracy of predictions, and perceptions, about a possible military threat from the Southern Mediterranean (Muslim) world; and their impact on NATO’s political and military posture. Thanos P. Doxos presents an assessment of the Alliance’s options for dealing with the problem. This book represents an invaluable, topical resource for researchers and policy makers.

Examining counterproliferation as a global phenomenon, the authors use an in-depth analysis of the Counterproliferation Initiative to develop a theoretical model of counterproliferation for the 21st century. Arguing that existing counterproliferation policy is the product of bureaucratic competition, the authors propose several modifications of existing policy. In the second half of the book, they use four case studies (Cuban Missile Crisis, Persian Gulf War, Osirak Reactor Raid, and Sudan) to identify factors that might contribute to an effective counterproliferation strategy. More specifically, the authors explore the relationship between the strength of an intelligence-gathering apparatus and the successful or unsuccessful elimination of weapons of mass destruction. The study concludes with observations and limited predictions regarding the future of counterproliferation.

In this book strategic analyst Avigdor Haselkorn provides an important reassessment of the 1991 Gulf War. Haselkorn's step-by-step narrative - in which he reviews the events of the war with Iraq, examines intelligence and planning during the war, discusses why President Bush abruptly terminated it, and analyzes the strategic consequences - is absorbing and frightening. He reveals that the war was not the splendid high-tech victory that many Americans perceive, but a nearly catastrophic event. The threatened use of weapons of mass destruction during the Gulf War has redefined the meaning of deterrence, Haselkorn contends, and has set in motion trends that portend great danger to world peace. This book focuses on the role played by biological and chemical weapons in the Gulf War and scrutinizes the dynamics of deterrence. It supplies the grim facts about anthrax, botulinum toxin, and poison gases and traces the terror of their use. Haselkorn shows that President Bush had little choice about ending the war when he did, given the failure of U.S. intelligence and severe flaws in strategic planning. Indeed, leaders on both sides of the conflict either were dangerously uninformed or did not fully understand the information they had. This book provides a key to the continuing stalemate with Iraq, and it offers new insights into how the spread of weapons of mass destruction will affect world politics and future battlefields.