This paper presents case studies of central bank crisis interventions during the Covid-19 and the Global Financial Crises in four jurisdictions (Canada, Chile, the United Kingdom, and the United States). The paper serves as an Annex to the main IMF Working Paper WP/23/114 ‘Quasi-Fiscal Implications of Central Bank Crisis Interventions.’

We develop a stylized balance sheet framework to help identify ‘quasi-fiscal’ components of central bank crisis interventions and show how sources of fiscal risk are created from both the new claims and how they are funded. Combining central bank balance sheet data with survey evidence from intervention announcements, we document the risks to the public sector balance sheet from central banks’ interventions in response to the Covid-19 crisis, including non-conventional lending to the financial and non-financial sectors and large-scale purchases of government securities. Case study analysis indicates that management of fiscal risks from central bank crisis interventions varies greatly across countries, although several good practices can be identified.

The accumulation of large foreign asset positions by many central banks through sustained foreign exchange (FX) intervention has raised questions about its associated fiscal costs. This paper clarifies conceptual issues regarding how to measure these costs both from an ex-post and an ex-ante (relevant for decision making) perspective, and estimates both marginal and total costs for 73 countries over the period 2002-13. We find ex-ante marginal costs for the median emerging market economy (EME) in the inter-quartile range of 2-5.5 percent per year; while ex-ante total costs (of sustaining FX positions) in the range of 0.2-0.7 percent of GDP per year for light interveners and 0.3-1.2 percent of GDP per year for heavy interveners. These estimates indicate that fiscal costs of sustained FX intervention (via expanding central bank balance sheets) are not negligible.

This paper reviews the literature on financial crises focusing on three specific aspects. First, what are the main factors explaining financial crises? Since many theories on the sources of financial crises highlight the importance of sharp fluctuations in asset and credit markets, the paper briefly reviews theoretical and empirical studies on developments in these markets around financial crises. Second, what are the major types of financial crises? The paper focuses on the main theoretical and empirical explanations of four types of financial crises—currency crises, sudden stops, debt crises, and banking crises—and presents a survey of the literature that attempts to identify these episodes. Third, what are the real and financial sector implications of crises? The paper briefly reviews the short- and medium-run implications of crises for the real economy and financial sector. It concludes with a summary of the main lessons from the literature and future research directions.

An IMF paper reviewing the policy responses of Indonesia, Korea and Thailand to the 1997 Asian crisis, comparing the actions of these three countries with those of Malaysia and the Philippines. Although all judgements are still tentative, important lessons can be learned from the experiences of the last two years.

Unconventional central bank measures are playing a key policy role for many advanced economies in the 2007-09 global crisis. Are they playing a similar role for emerging economies? Emerging economies have widely used unconventional foreign exchange and domestic short-term liquidity easing measures. Their use of credit easing and quantitative easing measures has been much more limited. Thus, unconventional measures are much less important for emerging economies compared to advanced economies in achieving broader macroeconomic objectives. The difference can be attributed to the relatively limited financial stress in emerging economies, their external vulnerabilities and their limited scope for quasifiscal activities.