The International Court of Justice at The Hague is the principal judicial organ of the UN, and the successor of the Permanent Court of International Justice (1923–1946), which was the first real permanent court of justice at the international level. This 2005 book analyses the groundbreaking contribution of the Permanent Court to international law, both in terms of judicial technique and the development of legal principle. The book draws on archival material left by judges and other persons involved in the work of the Permanent Court, giving fascinating insights into many of its most important decisions and the individuals who made them (Huber, Anzilotti, Moore, Hammerskjöld and others). At the same time it examines international legal argument in the Permanent Court, basing its approach on a developed model of international legal argument that stresses the intimate relationships between international and national lawyers and between international and national law.

'Legacies of the Permanent Court of International Justice' assesses the continuing relevance of the first 'world court' and shows how, for better or worse, it has shaped our thinking about binding legal dispute resolution.

The International Court of Justice is the principal judicial organ of the United Nations, and epitomizes the very notion of international judicial institution. Yet, it decides inter-State disputes only with the parties’ consent. This makes it more similar to international arbitral tribunals than other international courts. However, the permanent nature of the Court, the predetermination of procedural rules by the Statute and the Rules of Court, the public character of proceedings, the opportunity for third States to intervene in a case under Articles 62 and 63 of the Statute and the Court's role as the principal judicial organ of the United Nations mark a structural difference between the ICJ and non-institutionalized international arbitral tribunals. This book analyses if and to what extent these features have influenced the approach of the ICJ (and of the PCIJ before it) to its own judicial function and have led it to depart from the principles established in international arbitration.

An in-depth analysis of the remedies of international law used by the International Court of Justice to resolve inter-state disputes.

International courts and tribunals are key actors in international law, both because of their primary dispute resolution function and for their role in developing international law in a more general sense. Their growing number and complexity makes a detailed study of their practice particularly relevant. The Rules, Practice, and Jurisprudence of International Courts and Tribunals examines existing international dispute resolution institutions, including those of general jurisdiction (ICJ, PCA), specialised jurisdiction (ITLOS, ICSID, WTO), as well as human rights courts, international criminal courts and tribunals, courts of regional integration agreements, claims commissions and tribunals, and administrative tribunals of international organizations. Uniquely, it assesses both procedural rules and essential case-law, making it relevant for both academics and practitioners in international law.

Litigation at the International Court of Justice provides a systematic guide to questions of procedure arising when States come before the International Court of Justice to take part in contentious litigation. Quintana's approach is primarily empirical and emphasis is put on examples derived from actual practice. This book is mainly intended to help practitioners and advisors to governments engaged in actual cases and deliberately avoids theoretical discussions, favoring a pragmatic stance that is focused not so much on what authors have to say on any given topic concerning procedure, but rather on presenting, directly “from the Court’s mouth,” as it were, what ICJ judges actually have done and said over the last ninety years concerning such questions.