Public sector management components of structural adjustment loans (SALs) progressed unevenly, and the outcomes varied with different political, administrative and economic conditions. Change was often incremental and sometimes unsustainable. Reforms linked to specific, actionable steps were more successfully implemented.

Our Continent, Our Future presents the emerging African perspective on this complex issue. The authors use as background their own extensive experience and a collection of 30 individual studies, 25 of which were from African economists, to summarize this African perspective and articulate a path for the future. They underscore the need to be sensitive to each country's unique history and current condition. They argue for a broader policy agenda and for a much more active role for the state within what is largely a market economy. Finally, they stress that Africa must, and can, compete in an increasingly globalized world and, perhaps most importantly, that Africans must assume the leading role in defining the continent's development agenda.

This study compares the various instruments and approaches used by the World Bank, the European Commission, the International Monetary Fund, the Strategic Partnership for Africa and several bilateral donor agencies to assess and reform public expenditure management systems in developing and transitional countries. It identifies weaknesses in the current system and recommends a new medium-term, country-led, multidonor approach which is focused on better budgetary management supplemented by donor aid funds, as a key mechanism to reduce poverty and attain other policy goals.

This paper highlights that the first quarter of 1981 was marked by a number of notable accomplishments in meeting the challenges currently facing the IMF. In addition to the completion of the final loan disbursements from the Trust Fund, the simplification of the SDR basket, and the decision to continue enlarged access to the IMF’s resources, the IMF reached agreement in principle with Saudi Arabia on a quota increase and on an arrangement to borrow resources to permit the IMF to continue its lending operations without interruption and for the smooth functioning of the recycling process.

Developing countries commonly adopt reforms to improve their governments yet they usually fail to produce more functional and effective governments. Andrews argues that reforms often fail to make governments better because they are introduced as signals to gain short-term support. These signals introduce unrealistic best practices that do not fit developing country contexts and are not considered relevant by implementing agents. The result is a set of new forms that do not function. However, there are realistic solutions emerging from institutional reforms in some developing countries. Lessons from these experiences suggest that reform limits, although challenging to adopt, can be overcome by focusing change on problem solving through an incremental process that involves multiple agents.