In this volume, based on a week-long symposium at the University of Munich's Center for Economic Studies, two leading scholars of governmental economics debate their divergent perspectives on the role of government and its fiscal functions. James M. Buchanan, who was influential in developing the research program in public choice, concentrates on the imperfections of the political process and stresses the need for rules to restrain governmental interference. Richard A. Musgrave, a founder of modern public finance, points to market failures and inequities that call for corrective public policies. They apply their differing economic and political philosophies to a variety of key issues. Each presentation is followed by a response and general discussion.

Discusses voting, tax policy, government regulation, redistribution of wealth, and international negotiation in a new approach to government

When market forces fail us, what are we to do? Who will step in to protect the public interest? The government, right? Wrong. The romantic view of bureaucrats coming to the rescue confuses the true relationship between economics and politics. Politicians often cite "market failure" as justification for meddling with the economy, but a group of leading scholars show the shortcomings of this view. In Government Failure, these scholars explain the school of study known as "public choice," which uses the tools of economics to understand and evaluate government activity. Gordon Tullock, one of the founders of public choice, explains how government "cures" often cause more harm than good. Tullock provides an engaging overview of public choice and discusses how interest groups seek favors from government at enormous costs to society. Displaying the steely realism that has marked public choice, Tullock shows the political world as it is, rather than as it should be. Gordon Brady scrutinizes American public policy, looking closely at international trade, efforts at regulating technology, and environmental policy. At every turn Brady points out the ways in which interest groups have manipulated the government to advance their own agendas. Arthur Seldon, a seminal scholar in public choice, provides a comparative perspective from Great Britain. He examines how government interventions in the British economy have led to inefficiency and warns about the political centralization promised by the European Community. Government Failure heralds a new approach to the study of politics and public policy. This book enlightens readers with the basic concepts of public choice in an unusually accessible way to show the folly of excessive faith in the state.

Recent decades have seen the study of politics invaded by economic theories, methods and techniques. This book gives a concise, non- technical account of these 'public choice' theories and examines their influence upon government policies in English-speaking countries. Issues covered include slimming the state, privatising welfare and re- structuring government. Final chapters offer an alternative view of the basis of good government. This book offers a unique survey and critique of the ideas and influence of an important branch of political thought and it links with market theories. It is vital reading for students of both politics and economics.

'Market failure' is a term widely used by politicians, journalists and university and A-level economics students and teachers. However, those who use the term often lack any sense of proportion about the ability of government to correct market failures. This arises partly from the lack of general knowledge -- and lack of coverage in economics syllabuses -- of Public Choice economics. Public Choice economics applies realistic insights about human behaviour to the process of government, and it is extremely helpful for all those who have an interest in -- or work in -- public policy to understand this discipline. If we assume that at least some of those involved in the political process -- whether elected representatives, bureaucrats, regulators, public sector workers or electors -- will act in their own self-interest rather than in the general public interest, it should give us much less confidence that government can 'correct' market failure. This complex area of economics has been summarised in a very clear primer by Eamonn Butler. The author helps the reader to understand the limits of the government's ability to correct market failure and also explains the implications of public choice economics for the design of systems of government -- a topic that is highly relevant in contemporary political debate. This text is an important contribution for all who seek to understand better the role that government should play in economic life.

Jac C. Heckelman, John C. Moorhouse and Robert Whaples The eight chapters of this volume are revised versions of papers originally presented at the "Applications of Public Choice Theory to Economic History" conference held at Wake Forest University, April 9-10, 1999. They all apply the tools of public choice theory to the types of questions which economic historians have traditionally addressed. By adding the insights of public choice economics to the traditional tools used to understand economic actors and institutions, the authors are able to provide fresh insights about many important issues of American history. 1. DEVELOPMENTS IN PUBLIC CHOICE THEORY Economists have historically sought to develop policies to improve social welfare by correcting perceived market failures due to monopoly power, externalities, and other departures from the textbook case of the purely competitive model. An underlying assumption is that the public sector, upon recognizing the market failure, will act to correct it. Applied work often develops the conditions under which these policies will be optimal. The public choice movement has questioned the false dichotomy established by welfare economists. Economists of all persuasions assume traditional private market actors, such as entrepreneurs, managers, and consumers, are self-interested rational maximizers. Why should this not hold for all economic agents? The innovation of public choice analysis is to show what happens when public sector actors, such as politicians, bureaucrats, and voters, also behave as rational self-interested maximizers.

'A long professional and personal association with Francesco Forte accustoms one to the extraordinary breadth of his knowledge, understanding and original thinking not only on economic but also legal and political questions. Principles of Public Economics displays all these estimable qualities to the full, adding for good measure a style and content that must attract both student and savant alike.' - Sir Alan Peacock, Heriot-Watt University, UK