This article examines tort law and the tort reform debate through the lens of public choice. The article uses the tools of public choice to explain the development of tort law over the past few decades and its evolution away from efficient rules. The article identifies a supply and demand dynamic for the evolution of expansive tort liability and damages and complex tort law doctrines. On the demand side, the evolution has been driven by the economic interests of plaintiffs' lawyers seeking to expand tort liability and damages. Defense lawyers share an economic interest in this development. Other interests, including insurers, manufacturers, and consumers, are shown to lack either the incentive to oppose these developments or are plagued by collective action problems from preventing them. On the supply side, the provision of expansive tort liability by judges is seen to be consistent with the self-interest of judges seeking power over society and status within the bar and academia. Finding the judicial process an unlikely avenue for tort reform, the article turns to the question of legislative tort reform. Although plagued by many of the same difficulties, legislative tort reform may hold out the possibility of greater consumer and manufacturer influence to counterbalance the interests of lawyers and judges. The article concludes with a model of how tort reform can succeed in the face of these obstacles. This model relies on the Peltzman-Becker model of regulation and points to Governor George W. Bush's success in enacting tort reform in Texas as consistent with the proffered model.

Using public choice tools, this article examines why tort reform is necessary but also elusive. Identifying the demand-side and supply-side forces that have caused tort law to evolve away from efficient rules, the article shows why the courts are an unlikely venue for meaningful tort reform. Turning to the legislature, the article identifies the necessary conditions for successful tort reform efforts.

'This is a comprehensive set of essays on myriad facets of public choice by many of the leading contributors in the field. The coverage is excellent and the essays are terrific. I highly recommend this book for researchers and students.' – Todd Sandler, University of Texas at Dallas, US The Elgar Companion to Public Choice, Second Edition brings together leading scholars in the field of political economy to introduce readers to the latest research in public choice. The Companion lays out a comprehensive history of the field and, in five additional parts, it explores public choice contributions to the study of the origins of the state, the organization of political activity, the analysis of decision-making in non-market institutions, the examination of tribal governance, and to modeling and predicting the behavior of international organizations and transnational terrorism. With broad and up-to-date coverage, this second edition will appeal to politicians and policymakers, academics and researchers in public and social choice and political science as well as graduate students in economics, political science and public administration.

Major approaches to law and public policy, ranging from law and economics to the fundamental rights approach to constitutional law, are based on the belief that the identification of the correct social goals or values is the key to describing or prescribing law and public policy outcomes. In this book, Neil Komesar argues that this emphasis on goal choice ignores an essential element—institutional choice. Indeed, as important as determining our social goals is deciding which institution is best equipped to implement them—the market, the political process, or the adjucative process. Pointing out that all three institutions are massive, complex, and imperfect, Komesar develops a strategy for comparative institutional analysis that assesses variations in institutional ability. He then powerfully demonstrates the value of this analytical framework by using it to examine important contemporary issues ranging from tort reform to constitution-making.

"Drawing on an unusually rich trove of data, the authors have refuted more politically convenient myths in one book than most academics do in a lifetime." —Nicholas Bagley, professor of law, University of Michigan Law School "Synthesizing decades of their own and others’ research on medical liability, the authors unravel what we know and don’t know about our medical malpractice system, why neither patients nor doctors are being rightly served, and what economics can teach us about the path forward." —Anupam B. Jena, Harvard Medical School Over the past 50 years, the United States experienced three major medical malpractice crises, each marked by dramatic increases in the cost of malpractice liability insurance. These crises fostered a vigorous politicized debate about the causes of the premium spikes, and the impact on access to care and defensive medicine. State legislatures responded to the premium spikes by enacting damages caps on non-economic, punitive, or total damages and Congress has periodically debated the merits of a federal cap on damages. However, the intense political debate has been marked by a shortage of evidence, as well as misstatements and overclaiming. The public is confused about answers to some basic questions. What caused the premium spikes? What effect did tort reform actually have? Did tort reform reduce frivolous litigation? Did tort reform actually improve access to health care or reduce defensive medicine? Both sides in the debate have strong opinions about these matters, but their positions are mostly talking points or are based on anecdotes. Medical Malpractice Litigation provides factual answers to these and other questions about the performance of the med mal system. The authors, all experts in the field and from across the political spectrum, provide an accessible, fact-based response to the questions ordinary Americans and policymakers have about the performance of the med mal litigation system.

This controversial book describes the transformation of modern tort law since the 1960s, and shows how the dramatic increase in liability lawsuits has had an adverse effect on the safety, health, the cost of insurance, and individual rights.

'Market failure' is a term widely used by politicians, journalists and university and A-level economics students and teachers. However, those who use the term often lack any sense of proportion about the ability of government to correct market failures. This arises partly from the lack of general knowledge -- and lack of coverage in economics syllabuses -- of Public Choice economics. Public Choice economics applies realistic insights about human behaviour to the process of government, and it is extremely helpful for all those who have an interest in -- or work in -- public policy to understand this discipline. If we assume that at least some of those involved in the political process -- whether elected representatives, bureaucrats, regulators, public sector workers or electors -- will act in their own self-interest rather than in the general public interest, it should give us much less confidence that government can 'correct' market failure. This complex area of economics has been summarised in a very clear primer by Eamonn Butler. The author helps the reader to understand the limits of the government's ability to correct market failure and also explains the implications of public choice economics for the design of systems of government -- a topic that is highly relevant in contemporary political debate. This text is an important contribution for all who seek to understand better the role that government should play in economic life.