USAF commanders are looking for better ways to use the global information environment to win the hearts and minds of Muslim populations and retain the goodwill of traditional allies. Their efforts occur against a backdrop of individuals who advocate the integration of public affairs and information operations and those who argue for their separation. As the public face of our joint forces, public affairs cannot thrive unless it is integrated with all core operational capabilities, including information operations.

Each and every organization needs to develop a good strategy for public affairs. Public affairs have received such kind of importance in today's world because no organization can survive in isolation. Every institution requires other institutions as well as the public that act as the customer, the decision-maker as well as the employees that can make or break the image of an organization. With the advent of technology, this task has become easier for managers. The information could be disseminated at a very low cost with the use of mass media and socializing websites. Creating a good image for an institution has become relatively much easier, but this comes with the negative fact that the dissolution of the image has also become an easy task. Public affairs have been increasingly given importance in the corporate world as increased competition has resulted in excess marketing and advertising campaigns that are used to create a Goodwill for the company. There are various tools under public affairs that are used by various organizations in order to fulfill their objectives and goals in the long run.

The modern means of communication have turned the world into an information fishbowl and, in terms of foreign policy and national security in post-Cold War power politics, helped transform international power politics. Information operations (IO), in which time zones are as important as national boundaries, is the use of modern technology to deliver critical information and influential content in an effort to shape perceptions, manage opinions, and control behavior. Contemporary IO differs from traditional psychological operations practiced by nation-states, because the availability of low-cost high technology permits nongovernmental organizations and rogue elements, such as terrorist groups, to deliver influential content of their own as well as facilitates damaging cyber-attacks ("hactivism") on computer networks and infrastructure. As current vice president Dick Cheney once said, such technology has turned third-class powers into first-class threats. Conceived as a textbook by instructors at the Joint Command, Control, and Information Warfare School of the U.S. Joint Forces Staff College and involving IO experts from several countries, this book fills an important gap in the literature by analyzing under one cover the military, technological, and psychological aspects of information operations. The general reader will appreciate the examples taken from recent history that reflect the impact of IO on U.S. foreign policy, military operations, and government organization.

Common and destructive, limited wars are significant international events that pose a number of challenges to the states involved beyond simple victory or defeat. Chief among these challenges is the risk of escalation—be it in the scale, scope, cost, or duration of the conflict. In this book, Spencer D. Bakich investigates a crucial and heretofore ignored factor in determining the nature and direction of limited war: information institutions. Traditional assessments of wartime strategy focus on the relationship between the military and civilians, but Bakich argues that we must take into account the information flow patterns among top policy makers and all national security organizations. By examining the fate of American military and diplomatic strategy in four limited wars, Bakich demonstrates how not only the availability and quality of information, but also the ways in which information is gathered, managed, analyzed, and used, shape a state’s ability to wield power effectively in dynamic and complex international systems. Utilizing a range of primary and secondary source materials, Success and Failure in Limited War makes a timely case for the power of information in war, with crucial implications for international relations theory and statecraft.

The authors aim to assist the U.S. Army in understanding "influence operations," capabilities that may allow the United States to effectively influence the attitudes and behavior of particular foreign audiences while minimizing or avoiding combat. The book identifies approaches, methodologies, and tools that may be useful in planning, executing, and assessing influence operations.