Our narrower obligations often blind us to larger social responsibilities. The moral claims arising out of special relationships—family, friends, colleagues, and so on—always seem to take priority. Strangers ordinarily get, and ordinarily are thought to deserve, only what is left over. Robert E. Goodin argues that this is morally mistaken. In Protecting the Vulnerable, he presents a comprehensive theory of responsibility based on the concept of vulnerability. Since the range of people vulnerable to our actions or choices extends beyond those to whom we have made specific commitments (promises, vows, contracts), we must recognize a much more extensive network of obligations and moral claims. State welfare services, for example, are morally on a par with the services we render to family and friends. The same principle widens our international, intergenerational, and interpersonal responsibilities as well as our duties toward animals and natural environments. This book, written with keen intelligence and unfailing common sense, opens up new perspectives on issues central to public policy and of critical concern to philosophers and social scientists as well as to politicians, lawyers and social workers.

The right of adults with sound mind to consent to treatment or risk their own health for the benefit of the community in a clinical trial is unequivocally recognised by the law. But what about those vulnerable by virtue of their age, nature or position in society? Experts from the fields of medicine, philosophy, theology and law, explore the ethical and legal principles which seek to reconcile the individual's right to autonomy with the need to protect vulnerable groups. Discussions refer both to specific groups (premature babies, children, people with mental handicaps) and specific issues (cases of abuse by sterilization of women, suicide, the right to information).

The protection of vulnerable groups varies under international human rights law. Depending on the group at stake, protection may be more or less advanced. In some cases, the international community has deemed it necessary to adopt conventions providing for the rights of certain vulnerable groups and establishing mechanisms to verify State compliance. Other groups have not been the focus of States’ standard-setting endeavours, but their protection still falls within the scope of human rights treaties of general application and the mandate of their respective monitoring bodies. This book takes an innovative approach to the investigation of the international legal protection of vulnerable groups. Rather than examining the situation of a number of vulnerable groups and applicable international or regional conventions, this book reviews the overall scope of the protection of vulnerable groups under International Human Rights Law. This book conceptualizes the protection of vulnerable groups as an underlying and essential component of International Human Rights Law through a systematic and comprehensive analysis of international human rights law instruments and relevant practice of international and regional human rights monitoring bodies. The book illuminates how human rights monitoring bodies foster protection of vulnerable groups and their members at the domestic level, and underscores and assesses vulnerability paradigms these bodies have elaborated. The book also puts forward a legal definition of vulnerable groups. This book will be of great interest to students and scholars of international human rights law.

The concept of vulnerability has not been unequivocally interpreted either in regional or in universal international legal instruments. This book analyses the work of the EU and the Council of Europe in ascertaining a clear framework or a set of criteria suitable to determine those who should be considered vulnerable and disadvantaged. It also explores the measures required to protect their human rights. Key questions can be answered by analysing the different methods used to determine the levels of protection offered by the two European systems. These questions include whether the Convention and the case law of the Strasbourg Court, the monitoring mechanisms of the Council of Europe, EU law and the case law of the European Court of Justice enhance the protection of vulnerable groups and expand the protection of their rights, or, alternatively, whether they are mainly used to fill in relatively minor gaps or occasional lapses in national rights guarantees. The analysis also shows the extent to which these two European systems provide analogous, or indeed divergent, standards and how any such divergence might be problematic in light of the EU accession to the European Convention on Human Rights.

In this powerful and urgently needed call to action, national security expert Stephen Flynn offers a startling portrait of the radical shortcomings in America's plan for homeland security. He describes a frightening scenario of what the next major terrorist attack might look like -- revealing the tragic loss of life and economic havoc it would leave in its wake, as well as the seismic political consequences it would have in Washington. Flynn also shows us how to prepare for such a disaster, outlining a bold yet practical plan for achieving security in a way that is safe and smart, effective and manageable. In this new world of heightened risk and fear, America the Vulnerable delivers a timely, forceful message that cannot be ignored.

Adolescents obviously do not always act in ways that serve their own best interests, even as defined by them. Sometimes their perception of their own risks, even of survival to adulthood, is larger than the reality; in other cases, they underestimate the risks of particular actions or behaviors. It is possible, indeed likely, that some adolescents engage in risky behaviors because of a perception of invulnerabilityâ€"the current conventional wisdom of adults' views of adolescent behavior. Others, however, take risks because they feel vulnerable to a point approaching hopelessness. In either case, these perceptions can prompt adolescents to make poor decisions that can put them at risk and leave them vulnerable to physical or psychological harm that may have a negative impact on their long-term health and viability. A small planning group was formed to develop a workshop on reconceptualizing adolescent risk and vulnerability. With funding from Carnegie Corporation of New York, the Workshop on Adolescent Risk and Vulnerability: Setting Priorities took place on March 13, 2001, in Washington, DC. The workshop's goal was to put into perspective the total burden of vulnerability that adolescents face, taking advantage of the growing societal concern for adolescents, the need to set priorities for meeting adolescents' needs, and the opportunity to apply decision-making perspectives to this critical area. This report summarizes the workshop.

Our narrower obligations often blind us to larger social responsibilities. The moral claims arising out of special relationships—family, friends, colleagues, and so on—always seem to take priority. Strangers ordinarily get, and ordinarily are thought to deserve, only what is left over. Robert E. Goodin argues that this is morally mistaken. In Protecting the Vulnerable, he presents a comprehensive theory of responsibility based on the concept of vulnerability. Since the range of people vulnerable to our actions or choices extends beyond those to whom we have made specific commitments (promises, vows, contracts), we must recognize a much more extensive network of obligations and moral claims. State welfare services, for example, are morally on a par with the services we render to family and friends. The same principle widens our international, intergenerational, and interpersonal responsibilities as well as our duties toward animals and natural environments. This book, written with keen intelligence and unfailing common sense, opens up new perspectives on issues central to public policy and of critical concern to philosophers and social scientists as well as to politicians, lawyers and social workers.