Hurricane Katrina, which struck New Orleans and surrounding areas in August 2005, ranks as one of the nation's most devastating natural disasters. Shortly after the storm, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers established a task force to assess the performance of the levees, floodwalls, and other structures comprising the area's hurricane protection system during Hurricane Katrina. This book provides an independent review of the task force's final draft report and identifies key lessons from the Katrina experience and their implications for future hurricane preparedness and planning in the region.

Natural disasters are having an increasing effect on the lives of people in the United States and throughout the world. Every decade, property damage caused by natural disasters and hazards doubles or triples in the United States. More than half of the U.S. population lives within 50 miles of a coast, and all Americans are at risk from such hazards as fires, earthquakes, floods, and wind. The year 2010 saw 950 natural catastrophes around the world-the second highest annual total ever-with overall losses estimated at $130 billion. The increasing impact of natural disasters and hazards points to increasing importance of resilience, the ability to prepare and plan for, absorb, recover from, or more successfully adapt to actual or potential adverse events, at the individual , local, state, national, and global levels. Assessing National Resilience to Hazards and Disasters reviews the effects of Hurricane Katrina and other natural and human-induced disasters on the Gulf Coast of Louisiana and Mississippi and to learn more about the resilience of those areas to future disasters. Topics explored in the workshop range from insurance, building codes, and critical infrastructure to private-sector issues, public health, nongovernmental organizations and governance. This workshop summary provides a rich foundation of information to help increase the nation's resilience through actionable recommendations and guidance on the best approaches to reduce adverse impacts from hazards and disasters.

Breaches of the floodwalls protecting New Orleans during Hurricane Katrina caused significant flooding in many areas of downtown. Although most of the levee breaches in coastal Louisiana were the result of the storm's surge flowing over levees, preliminary evidence suggests that three major breaches in downtown New Orleans occurred prior to the floodwalls being overtopped; that is, the floodwalls failed before their design was exceeded. The failure of these floodwalls has many stakeholders' speculating about the causes of the failures, the reliability of the system of levees and floodwalls, and future options for protecting the city. One cause of failure being discussed is a poor or inadequate design for protecting the city from a Category 3 hurricane. The original design for the city's hurricane protection infrastructure was to control storm surge flowing into water bodies near downtown by building inlet barriers and canal floodgates. The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers was responsible for designing and building much of the infrastructure as part of its Lake Pontchartrain and Vicinity Hurricane Protection Project to protect New Orleans and the surrounding parishes from a Category 3 hurricane; the local levee districts shared 30% of the construction costs and maintained the infrastructure. During the project's construction which began with authorization in 1965 and was ongoing when Hurricane Katrina made landfall, numerous factors contributed to changing the design of how to protect the city (e.g., including local environmental concerns, changing cost estimates, local flood protection preferences, and litigation); the final design attempted to reduce hurricane related flooding in the city by increasing the height of levees and floodwalls, in lieu of the barriers and floodgates. The findings of ongoing investigations about the causes of the floodwall failures are likely to shape not only the future design of the city's hurricane protection system but also plans for rebuilding sections of the city and perspectives on the federal role and responsibility in the city's rebuilding efforts. This report documents the evolution in the design of the Lake Pontchartrain project, with specific reference to how and by whom design decisions were made. The focus is on two major design developments relevant to the current investigations into floodwall failures in downtown New Orleans: (1) the shift from barriers at Lake Pontchartrain's inlets to higher levees along the lakeshore; and (2) the shift from floodgates at the mouth of the city's stormwater outfall canals that drain into Lake Pontchartrain to higher floodwalls along the length of the canals. The Corps' decision in the mid-1980s to recommend higher levees instead of the inlet barriers it had recommended in 1965 was shaped by multiple factors, including environmental litigation, project economics, and local preferences. The Corps preferred floodgates to floodwalls along the Orleans Avenue and London Avenue canals. The decision to not build floodgates, and instead build floodwalls along the canals, was made by local project sponsors. The original design and the final design were intended to provide the same level of protection, i.e., protection from the rough equivalent of a Category 3 storm surge. This report will be updated as events warrant.

This book serves as a visual record of representative parts and pieces of the Hurricaneand Storm Damage Risk Reduction System, a true flood and surge defense system comprisedof traditional earthen levees and floodwalls as well as state-of-the-art flood-controlcomponents that are viewed as engineering marvels. Many of these unique structures willbe replicated by other cities in the United States and around the world.Although we would have liked to include pictures of all the projects in the HSDRRS,space limitations would not allow us to do so. Featured projects come first in each section,followed by full-page aerials of selected other projects. Last in each section is "At a Glance,"a sampling of pictures from various projects in that area. All data are as of August 1, 2011.All photos are no later than January 2012.

The hurricane protection systems that failed New Orleans when Katrina roared on shore in 2005 were the product of four decades of engineering hubris, excruciating delays, and social conflict. In Perilous Place, Powerful Storms, Craig E. Colten traces the protracted process of erecting massive structures designed to fend off tropical storms and examines how human actions and inactions left the system incomplete on the eve of its greatest challenge. Hurricane Betsy in 1965 provided the impetus for Congress to approve unprecedented hurricane protection for the New Orleans area. Army Engineers swiftly outlined a monumental barrier network that would not only safeguard the city at the time but also provide for substantial growth. Scheduled for completion in 1978, the project encountered a host of frustrating delays. From newly imposed environmental requirements to complex construction challenges, to funding battles, to disputes over proper structures, the buffer envisioned for southeast Louisiana remained incomplete forty years later as Hurricane Katrina bore down on the city. As Colten reveals, the very remedies intended to shield the city ultimately contributed immensely to the residents' vulnerability by encouraging sprawl into flood-prone territory that was already sinking within the ring of levees. Perilous Place, Powerful Storms illuminates the political, social, and engineering lessons of those who built a hurricane protection system that failed and serves as a warning for those guiding the recovery of post-Katrina New Orleans and Louisiana.

The definitive history of Katrina: an epic of citymaking, revealing how engineers and oil executives, politicians and musicians, and neighbors black and white built New Orleans, then watched it sink under the weight of their competing ambitions. Hurricane Katrina made landfall in New Orleans on August 29, 2005, but the decisions that caused the disaster extend across the twentieth century. After the city weathered a major hurricane in 1915, its Sewerage and Water Board believed that developers could safely build housing away from the high ground near the Mississippi. And so New Orleans grew in lowlands that relied on significant government subsidies to stay dry. When the flawed levee system surrounding the city and its suburbs failed, these were the neighborhoods that were devastated. The homes that flooded belonged to Louisianans black and white, rich and poor. Katrina’s flood washed over the twentieth-century city. The flood line tells one important story about Katrina, but it is not the only story that matters. Andy Horowitz investigates the response to the flood, when policymakers reapportioned the challenges the water posed, making it easier for white New Orleanians to return home than it was for African Americans. And he explores how the profits and liabilities created by Louisiana’s oil industry have been distributed unevenly among the state’s citizens for a century, prompting both dreams of abundance—and a catastrophic land loss crisis that continues today. Laying bare the relationship between structural inequality and physical infrastructure—a relationship that has shaped all American cities—Katrina offers a chilling glimpse of the future disasters we are already creating.

Hurricane Katrina was a stunning example of complete civic breakdown. Beginning on August 29, 2005, the world watched in horror as—despite all the warnings and studies—every system that might have protected New Orleans failed. Levees and canals buckled, pouring more than 100 billion gallons of floodwater into the city. Botched communications crippled rescue operations. Buses that might have evacuated thousands never came. Hospitals lost power, and patients lay suffering in darkness and stifling heat. At least 1,400 Louisianans died in Hurricane Katrina, more than half of them from New Orleans, and hundreds of thousands more were displaced, many still wondering if they will ever be able to return. How could all of this have happened in twenty-first-century America? And could it all happen again? To answer these questions, the Center for Public Integrity commissioned seven seasoned journalists to travel to New Orleans and investigate the storm’s aftermath. In City Adrift: New Orleans Before and After Katrina, they present their findings. The stellar roster of contributors includes Pulitzer Prize-winner John McQuaid, whose earlier work predicted the failure of the levees and the impending disaster; longtime Boston Globe newsman Curtis Wilkie, a French Quarter resident for nearly fifteen years; and Katy Reckdahl, an award-winning freelance journalist who gave birth to her son in a New Orleans hospital the day before Katrina hit. They and the rest of the investigative team interviewed homeowners and health officials, first responders and politicians, and evacuees and other ordinary citizens to explore the storm from numerous angles, including health care, social services, housing and insurance, and emergency preparedness. They also identify the political, social, geographical, and technological factors that compounded the tragedy. Comprehensive and balanced, City Adrift provides not only an assessment of what went wrong in the Big Easy during and following Hurricane Katrina, but also, more importantly, a road map of what must be done to ensure that such a devastating tragedy is never repeated.