The last decade of the 20th century saw radical changes in Eastern Europe and the former USSR. Most of these countries made a transition from totalitarianism or authoritarianism to democracy and from central planning to a market economy. Adding to the latter, a number of national entities gained their independence after the disintegration of the federative states of the USSR, Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia. Many recent studies have focused on these double, in some cases triple transitions, and scholars from different fields analyzed the so-called "1989 Revolution" from different perspectives. Rather less scholarly attention has been paid to the future of post-communist constitutions and prospects for constitutionalism in these countries. The main questions dealt with throughout this study can be formulated as follows: Will liberal democratic constitutionalism take root in these countries? Will new constitutions in Eastern Europe and the former USSR perish or survive? This study also aims at contributing to the construction of a general constitutional theory by studying the causes and dynamics of constitutional change in general. Such constitutional change is not only on the East European, but also on the West European agenda. The purpose of this study is not to introduce a general theory about constitutional in/stability, but studying post-communist constitutions will help us to understand the causes and dynamics of constitutional change from a broader perspective.

In the original euphoria that attended the virtually simultaneous demise of so many dictatorships in the late 1980s and early 90s, there was a widespread belief that problems of 'transition' basically involved shedding a known past, and replacing it with an also-known future. This volume surveys and contributes to the prolific debates that occurred in the years between the collapse of communism and the enlargement of the European Union regarding the issues of constitutionalism, dealing with the past, and the rule of law in the post-communist world. Eminent scholars explore the issue of transitional justice, highlighting the distinct roles of legal and constitutional bodies in the post-transition period. The introduction seeks to frame the work as an intervention in the discussion of communism and transition-two stable and separate points-while emphasizing the instability of the post-transition moment.

Offering a single, coherent framework of the political, economic, and social phenomena that characterize post-communist regimes, this is the most comprehensive work on the subject to date. Focusing on Central Europe, the post-Soviet countries and China, the study provides a systematic mapping of possible post-communist trajectories. At exploring the structural foundations of post-communist regime development, the work discusses the types of state, with an emphasis on informality and patronalism; the variety of actors in the political, economic, and communal spheres; the ways autocrats neutralize media, elections, etc. The analysis embraces the color revolutions of civil resistance (as in Georgia and in Ukraine) and the defensive mechanisms of democracy and autocracy; the evolution of corruption and the workings of “relational economy”; an analysis of China as “market-exploiting dictatorship”; the sociology of “clientage society”; and the instrumental use of ideology, with an emphasis on populism. Beyond a cataloguing of phenomena—actors, institutions, and dynamics of post-communist democracies, autocracies, and dictatorships—Magyar and Madlovics also conceptualize everything as building blocks to a larger, coherent structure: a new language for post-communist regimes. While being the most definitive book on the topic, the book is nevertheless written in an accessible style suitable for both beginners who wish to understand the logic of post-communism and scholars who are interested in original contributions to comparative regime theory. The book is equipped with QR codes that link to www.postcommunistregimes.com, which contains interactive, 3D supplementary material for teaching.

In this book, Bogusia Puchalska develops an original theory of democratic constitutionalism and uses it to support the argument that constitution-making and lawmaking in constitutional moments should be politically, and not just constitutionally legitimate. This original and informative book should be read by all curious to understand how the democratic learning and the foundations of grass-root constitutionalism might have been damaged in post-communist countries.

The last decade of the 20th century saw radical changes in Eastern Europe and the former USSR. Most of these countries made a transition from totalitarianism or authoritarianism to democracy and from central planning to a market economy. Adding to the latter, a number of national entities gained their independence after the disintegration of the federative states of the USSR, Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia. Many recent studies have focused on these double, in some cases triple transitions, and scholars from different fields analyzed the so-called "1989 Revolution" from different perspectives. Rather less scholarly attention has been paid to the future of post-communist constitutions and prospects for constitutionalism in these countries. The main questions dealt with throughout this study can be formulated as follows: Will liberal democratic constitutionalism take root in these countries? Will new constitutions in Eastern Europe and the former USSR perish or survive? This study also aims at contributing to the construction of a general constitutional theory by studying the causes and dynamics of constitutional change in general. Such constitutional change is not only on the East European, but also on the West European agenda. The purpose of this study is not to introduce a general theory about constitutional in/stability, but studying post-communist constitutions will help us to understand the causes and dynamics of constitutional change from a broader perspective.

At the end of the "founding" or initial decade, the new parliaments of post-Communist Europe had developed two distinct types: democratic and presidentially-dominated. Whilst in the early years, they had been characterised as "parliaments in adolescence," they have - through the second decade - continued to improvise but also elaborate their working relationships with both their chief executives and electorates. This book examines these adaptations in seven parliaments, comparing both among them and with parliaments of west Europe. Their changes are traced through four distinct sets in context, members, internal structure, and working relationship with the executive. This research develops a common perspective for our understanding of both new and developed legislatures by tracing the steps through which new parliaments begin, adapt and become established. This book was published as a special issue of Journal of Legislative Studies.

This volume focuses on constitutional ratification, the procedure in which a draft constitution is submitted by its creators to the people or their representatives in an up or down vote determining implementation. Ratification is increasingly common and routinely recommended by experts. Nonetheless, it is neither neutral nor inevitable. Constitutions can be made without it and when it is used it has significant effects. This raises the central question of the book: should ratification be recommended? Put another way: is there a reason for treating the procedure as a default for the constitution-making process? Surprisingly, these questions are rarely asked. The procedure's worth is assumed, not demonstrated, while ratification is generally overlooked in the literature. In fact, this is the first sustained study of ratification. To address these oversights, this book defines ratification and its types, explains the procedure's effects, conceptual origins, and history, and then concentrates on finding reasons for its use. Specifically, it builds up and analyzes the three most likely normative justifications. These urge the implementation of ratification because the procedure: enables the constituent power to make its constitution; fosters representation during constitution-making; or helps create a legitimate constitution. Ultimately, these justifications are found wanting, leading to the conclusion that ratification lacks a convincing, context-independent justification. Thus, until new arguments are developed, experts should not give recommendations for ratification as a matter of course, practitioners should not reach for it uncritically, and-more generally-one should avoid the blanket application of concepts from democratic theory to extraordinary contexts such as constitution-making.