Who should police corporate misconduct and how should it be policed? In recent years, the Department of Justice has resolved investigations of dozens of Fortune 500 companies via deferred prosecution agreements and non-prosecution agreements, where, instead of facing criminal charges, these companies become regulated by outside agencies. Increasingly, the threat of prosecution and such prosecution agreements is being used to regulate corporate behavior. This practice has been sharply criticized on numerous fronts: agreements are too lenient, there is too little oversight of these agreements, and, perhaps most important, the criminal prosecutors doing the regulating aren’t subject to the same checks and balances that civil regulatory agencies are. Prosecutors in the Boardroom explores the questions raised by this practice by compiling the insights of the leading lights in the field, including criminal law professors who specialize in the field of corporate criminal liability and criminal law, a top economist at the SEC who studies corporate wrongdoing, and a leading expert on the use of monitors in criminal law. The essays in this volume move beyond criticisms of the practice to closely examine exactly how regulation by prosecutors works. Broadly, the contributors consider who should police corporate misconduct and how it should be policed, and in conclusion offer a policy blueprint of best practices for federal and state prosecution. Contributors: Cindy R. Alexander, Jennifer Arlen, Anthony S. Barkow, Rachel E. Barkow, Sara Sun Beale, Samuel W. Buell, Mark A. Cohen, Mariano-Florentino Cuellar, Richard A. Epstein, Brandon L. Garrett, Lisa Kern Griffin, and Vikramaditya Khanna

Who should police corporate misconduct and how should it be policed? In recent years, the Department of Justice has resolved investigations of dozens of Fortune 500 companies via deferred prosecution agreements and non-prosecution agreements, where, instead of facing criminal charges, these companies become regulated by outside agencies. Increasingly, the threat of prosecution and such prosecution agreements is being used to regulate corporate behavior. This practice has been sharply criticized on numerous fronts: agreements are too lenient, there is too little oversight of these agreements, and, perhaps most important, the criminal prosecutors doing the regulating aren’t subject to the same checks and balances that civil regulatory agencies are. Prosecutors in the Boardroom explores the questions raised by this practice by compiling the insights of the leading lights in the field, including criminal law professors who specialize in the field of corporate criminal liability and criminal law, a top economist at the SEC who studies corporate wrongdoing, and a leading expert on the use of monitors in criminal law. The essays in this volume move beyond criticisms of the practice to closely examine exactly how regulation by prosecutors works. Broadly, the contributors consider who should police corporate misconduct and how it should be policed, and in conclusion offer a policy blueprint of best practices for federal and state prosecution. Contributors: Cindy R. Alexander, Jennifer Arlen, Anthony S. Barkow, Rachel E. Barkow, Sara Sun Beale, Samuel W. Buell, Mark A. Cohen, Mariano-Florentino Cuellar, Richard A. Epstein, Brandon L. Garrett, Lisa Kern Griffin, and Vikramaditya Khanna

The purchase of this ebook edition does not entitle you to receive access to the Connected eBook on CasebookConnect. You will need to purchase a new print book to get access to the full experience including: lifetime access to the online ebook with highlight, annotation, and search capabilities, plus an outline tool and other helpful resources. Geoffrey Miller’s The Law of Governance, Risk Management and Compliance is widely credited for introducing a new field of legal studies. Compliance and its related subjects of governance and risk management are major sources of jobs and also important developments in legal practice. The billions of dollars of fines paid over the past decade and the burgeoning and seemingly never-ending parade of compliance and risk management breakdowns – recently including the Wells Fargo sales practices scandal, the Volkswagen emissions cheat, and the Boeing 737 MAX crisis – all attest to the importance of the issues treated in this readable and timely book. New to the Third Edition: Comprehensive updates on recent developments New treatment of compliance failures: Wells Fargo account opening scandal, Volkswagen emissions cheat, important developments in Catholic Church sex abuse scandal. New treatment of risk management failures: the Boeing 737 MAX scandal. Professors and students will benefit from: Clear, concise definitions Fun and interesting problems Real-world perspective from an author who has been involved both as a scholar and as a member of a corporate board of directors Highly readable and interesting writing Text boxes containing key concepts and definitions Realistic problems for class discussion and analysis

This report addresses the use of criminal sanctions to control corporate behavior—prosecutions both of corporations and of employees for actions taken on corporations’ behalf. The authors describe the current state of the use of criminal sanctions in controlling corporate behavior, describe how the current regime developed, and offer suggestions about how the use of criminal sanctions to control corporate behavior might be improved.

This collection examines critically, and with an eye to reform, conceptions and conditions of corporate blameworthiness in law. It draws on legal, moral, regulatory and psychological theory, as well as historical and comparative perspectives. These insights are applied across the spheres of civil, criminal, and international law. The collection also has a deliberate focus on the 'nuts and bolts' of the law: the legal, equitable and statutory principles and rules that operate to establish corporate states of mind, on which responsibility as a matter of daily legal practice commonly depends.The collection therefore engages strongly with scholarly debates. The book also speaks, clearly and cogently, to the judges, regulators, legislators, law reform commissioners, barristers and practitioners who administer and, through their respective roles, incrementally influence the development of the law at the coalface of legal practice.

In the past few years, criminal justice systems have faced important global challenges in the field of economic and financial crime. The 2008 financial crisis revealed how strongly financial markets and economies are interconnected and illustrated that misconduct in the economic and financial sectors is often of a systemic nature, with wide-spread consequences for a large number of victims. The prevention, control and punishment of such crimes is thus confronted with a strong globalisation. Moreover, continuous technological evolutions and socio-economic developments make the distinction between socially desirable and undesirable behaviour more problematic. Besides, economic and financial misconduct is notoriously difficult to detect and investigate. In light of these challenges, legislators and law enforcers have been searching for adequate responses to combat economic and financial crime by adapting existing policies, norms and practices and by creating new enforcement mechanisms. The purpose of this volume is to analyse those challenges in the field of economic and financial crime from different perspectives, and to examine which particular solutions criminal justice systems across Europe give to those challenges. The volume has four parts. The first part focuses on a number of key questions with respect to substantive criminal law, whereas the second part will address issues affecting the administration of justice and criminal procedure. Part three then explores particular challenges concerning multi-agency cooperation and multi-disciplinary investigations. Finally, part four will concentrate on issues regarding shared or integrated enforcement models.

How to induce corporate compliance with regulations? Harsh punishments will cause companies to disguise violations, and mild punishments will cause companies to report their violations and make weak efforts to avoid them. In this book, Sharon Oded canvasses the history of thinking about corporate compliance, and he proposes his own candidate for the best law. This is a sophisticated account of legal incentives that will repay any reader interested in corporate compliance. Robert Cooter, University of California, Berkeley, US The effective control of corporate misconduct is a vital but elusive task for regulators, given the complexity of organization structures and the need to find the right balance between deterrent- and cooperative-based enforcement policies. In this powerful and comprehensive study, Sharon Oded argues for combining different approaches and boldly advocates, in particular, the use of third-party independent corporate monitoring firms to implement self-policing strategies. This will be essential reading for those involved in the theory or practice of regulatory corporate enforcement. Anthony Ogus, University of Manchester, UK and University of Rotterdam, The Netherlands This book considers how a regulatory enforcement policy should be designed to efficiently induce proactive corporate compliance. It first explores two major schools of thought regarding law enforcement, both the deterrence and cooperative approaches, and shows that neither of these represents an optimal regulatory enforcement paradigm from a social welfare perspective. It provides a critical analysis of recent developments in US Federal corporate liability regimes, and proposes a generic framework that better tailors sanction schemes and monitoring systems to regulatee performance. The proposed framework efficiently induces corporate proactive compliance, while maintaining an optimal level of deterrence. This insightful book will appeal to academics in law and economics, behavioral economics, criminology, and business, as well as to practitioners and policymakers.