Propositional Content
Title | Propositional Content PDF eBook |
Author | Peter Hanks |
Publisher | Context & Content |
Pages | 238 |
Release | 2015 |
Genre | Language Arts & Disciplines |
ISBN | 0199684898 |
Peter Hanks defends a new theory about the nature of propositional content. According to this theory, the basic bearers of representational properties are particular mental or spoken actions. Propositions are types of these actions, which we use to classify and individuate our attitudes and speech acts. Hanks abandons several key features of the traditional Fregean conception of propositional content, including the idea that propositions are the primary bearers of truth-conditions, the distinction between content and force, and the concept of entertainment. The main difficulty for this traditional conception is the problem of the unity of the proposition, the problem of explaining how propositions have truth conditions and other representational properties. The new theory developed here, in its place, explains the unity of propositions and provides new solutions to a long list of puzzles and problems in philosophy of language.
Act-Based Conceptions of Propositional Content
Title | Act-Based Conceptions of Propositional Content PDF eBook |
Author | Friederike Moltmann |
Publisher | Oxford University Press |
Pages | 409 |
Release | 2017-07-03 |
Genre | Philosophy |
ISBN | 0199373582 |
The notion of a propositional content plays a central role in contemporary philosophy of language. Propositional content makes up both the meaning of sentences and the content of propositional attitudes such as belief. One particular view about propositional content has been dominant in analytic philosophy, namely the Fregean conception of propositions as abstract mind-independent objects that come with truth conditions. But propositions in this sense raise a range of issues, which have become a center of debate in current philosophy of language. In particular, how should propositions as abstract objects be understood and how can they represent things and be true or false? A number of philosophers in contemporary analytic philosophy as well as in early analytic philosophy and phenomenology have approached the notion of a propositional content in a different way, not by starting out with an abstract truth berarer, but by focusing on cognitive acts of agents, such as acts of judging. It is in terms of such acts that the notion of a propositional content, on their view, should be understood. The act-based perspective historically goes back to the work of Central European philosophers, in particular that of Husserl, Twardowski, Meinong, and Reinach. However, their work has been unduly neglected and is in fact largely inaccessible to contemporary analytic philosophers. The volume presents a central selection of work of these philosophers that bear on an act-based conception of philosophical content, some of which in new translations (one paper by Reinach), some of which published in English for the very first time (two papers by Twardowski). In addition, the volume presents new work by leading contemporary philosophers of language pursuing or discussing an act-based conception of propositional content. Moreover, the book contains a crosslinguistic study of nominalizations for actions and products, a distinction that plays a central role in the philosophy of language of Twardowski.
Propositional Attitudes
Title | Propositional Attitudes PDF eBook |
Author | C. Anthony Anderson |
Publisher | Stanford Univ Center for the Study |
Pages | 342 |
Release | 1990-01-01 |
Genre | Philosophy |
ISBN | 9780937073506 |
These papers treat those issues involved in formulating a logic of propositional attitudes and consider the relevance of the attitudes to the continuing study of both the philosophy of language and the philosophy of mind. C. Anthony Anderson is professor of philosophy and Joseph Owens is assistant professor of philosophy, both at the University of Minnesota.
Force, Content and the Unity of the Proposition
Title | Force, Content and the Unity of the Proposition PDF eBook |
Author | Gabriele M. Mras |
Publisher | Routledge |
Pages | 278 |
Release | 2021-12-30 |
Genre | Philosophy |
ISBN | 1000517330 |
This volume advances discussion between critics and defenders of the force-content distinction and opens up new ways of thinking about force and speech acts in relation to the unity problem. The force-content dichotomy has shaped the philosophy of language and mind since the time of Frege and Russell. Isn’t it obvious that, for example, the clauses of a conditional are not asserted and must therefore be propositions and propositions the forceless contents of forceful acts? But, others have recently asked in response, how can a proposition be a truth value bearer if it is not unified through the forceful act of a subject that takes a position regarding how things are? Can we not instead think of propositions as being inherently forceful, but of force as being cancelled in certain contexts? And what do assertoric, but also directive and interrogative force indicators mean? Force, Content and the Unity of the Proposition will be of interest to researchers working in philosophy of language, philosophical logic, philosophy of mind and linguistics.
Act-based Conceptions of Propositional Content
Title | Act-based Conceptions of Propositional Content PDF eBook |
Author | Friederike Moltmann |
Publisher | Oxford University Press |
Pages | 409 |
Release | 2017 |
Genre | Mathematics |
ISBN | 0199373574 |
The notion of a propositional content plays a central role in contemporary philosophy of language. Propositional content makes up both the meaning of sentences and the content of propositional attitudes such as belief. One particular view about propositional content has been dominant in analytic philosophy, namely the Fregean conception of propositions as abstract mind-independent objects that come with truth conditions. But propositions in this sense raise a range of issues, which have become a center of debate in current philosophy of language. In particular, how should propositions as abstract objects be understood and how can they represent things and be true or false? A number of philosophers in contemporary analytic philosophy as well as in early analytic philosophy and phenomenology have approached the notion of a propositional content in a different way, not by starting out with an abstract truth berarer, but by focusing on cognitive acts of agents, such as acts of judging. It is in terms of such acts that the notion of a propositional content, on their view, should be understood. The act-based perspective historically goes back to the work of Central European philosophers, in particular that of Husserl, Twardowski, Meinong, and Reinach. However, their work has been unduly neglected and is in fact largely inaccessible to contemporary analytic philosophers. The volume presents a central selection of work of these philosophers that bear on an act-based conception of philosophical content, some of which in new translations (one paper by Reinach), some of which published in English for the very first time (two papers by Twardowski). In addition, the volume presents new work by leading contemporary philosophers of language pursuing or discussing an act-based conception of propositional content. Moreover, the book contains a crosslinguistic study of nominalizations for actions and products, a distinction that plays a central role in the philosophy of language of Twardowski.
The Juridical Act
Title | The Juridical Act PDF eBook |
Author | H. D. S. van der Kaaij |
Publisher | Springer |
Pages | 190 |
Release | 2019-06-13 |
Genre | Law |
ISBN | 3030155927 |
This book puts forward a new theoretical concept of the juridical act, this concept is not described from the perspective of a specific national legal system, but instead represents the commonalities and ideas that stem from the Western legal tradition. Since the concept is system-independent, it does not rely on national or state laws. The book begins by detailing those characteristics that distinguish juridical acts from the general group of acts. It offers clear distinctions between the different aspects of juridical acts, such as the power and the competence needed in order to perform the act, the fact that juridical acts are constitutive speech acts, and the rules that connect the act with its consequences. In the process, the book dispels much of the haziness currently surrounding juridical acts. Developed with a mix of theory and practice, this new concept is better equipped to deal with modern trends and practices. Further, since the author has freed the idea of the juridical act from the bonds of history and geography, it is also more suited to facilitating a better understanding of and explaining changes in the legal landscape, such as the rise of computer technology. Accordingly, it offers scholars and practitioners alike a valuable new tool for explaining and theorizing about the law.
Epistemic Thought Experiments and Intuitions
Title | Epistemic Thought Experiments and Intuitions PDF eBook |
Author | Manhal Hamdo |
Publisher | Springer Nature |
Pages | 192 |
Release | 2023-06-28 |
Genre | Philosophy |
ISBN | 3031334809 |
This work investigates intuitions' nature, demonstrating how philosophers can best use them in epistemology. First, the author considers several paradigmatic thought experiments in epistemology that depict the appeal to intuition. He then argues that the nature of thought experiment-generated intuitions is not best explained by an a priori Platonism. Second, the book instead develops and argues for a thin conception of epistemic intuitions. The account maintains that intuition is neither a priori nor a posteriori but multi-dimensional. It is an intentional but non-propositional mental state that is also non-conceptual and non-phenomenal in nature. Moreover, this state is individuated by its progenitor, namely, the relevant thought experiment. Third, the author provides an argument for the evidential status of intuitions based on the correct account of the nature of epistemic intuition. The suggestion is the fitting-ness approach: intuition alone has no epistemic status. Rather, intuition has evidentiary value as long as it fits well with other pieces into a whole, namely, the pertinent thought experiment. Finally, the book addresses the key challenges raised by supporters of anti-centrality, according to which philosophers do not regard intuition as central evidence in philosophy. To that end, the author responds to them, showing that they fail to affect the account of intuition developed in this book. This text appeals to students and researchers working in epistemology.