In this volume we present some of the papers delivered at FUR-IV - the Fourth International Conference on Founda tions and Applications of Utility, Risk and Decision Theory in Budapest, June 1988. The FUR Conferences have provided an appreciated forum every two years since 1982 within which scientists can report recent issues and prospective applications of decision theory, and exchange ideas about controversial questions of this field. Focal points of the presented papers are: expected utility versus alterna tive utility models, concepts of risk and uncertainty, developments of game theory, and investigations of real decision making behaviour under uncertainty and/or in risky situations. We hope that this sample of papers will appeal to a wide spectrum of readers who are interested in and fami liar with this interesting and exciting issues of decision theory. A wide range of theoretical and practical questions is considered in papers included in this volume, and many of them closely related to economics. In fact, there were two Nobel-Laureates in economics among the participants: I. Herbert A. Simon (1978) and Maurice Allais (1988), who won the prize just after the conference. His paper deals with problems of cardinal utility. After a concise overview of the history and theory of cardinal utility he gives an estimate of the invariant cardinal utility function for its whole domain of variation (i. e.

This handbook in two parts covers key topics of the theory of financial decision making. Some of the papers discuss real applications or case studies as well. There are a number of new papers that have never been published before especially in Part II.Part I is concerned with Decision Making Under Uncertainty. This includes subsections on Arbitrage, Utility Theory, Risk Aversion and Static Portfolio Theory, and Stochastic Dominance. Part II is concerned with Dynamic Modeling that is the transition for static decision making to multiperiod decision making. The analysis starts with Risk Measures and then discusses Dynamic Portfolio Theory, Tactical Asset Allocation and Asset-Liability Management Using Utility and Goal Based Consumption-Investment Decision Models.A comprehensive set of problems both computational and review and mind expanding with many unsolved problems are in an accompanying problems book. The handbook plus the book of problems form a very strong set of materials for PhD and Masters courses both as the main or as supplementary text in finance theory, financial decision making and portfolio theory. For researchers, it is a valuable resource being an up to date treatment of topics in the classic books on these topics by Johnathan Ingersoll in 1988, and William Ziemba and Raymond Vickson in 1975 (updated 2 nd edition published in 2006).

Introduction to Statistical Decision Theory: Utility Theory and Causal Analysis provides the theoretical background to approach decision theory from a statistical perspective. It covers both traditional approaches, in terms of value theory and expected utility theory, and recent developments, in terms of causal inference. The book is specifically designed to appeal to students and researchers that intend to acquire a knowledge of statistical science based on decision theory. Features Covers approaches for making decisions under certainty, risk, and uncertainty Illustrates expected utility theory and its extensions Describes approaches to elicit the utility function Reviews classical and Bayesian approaches to statistical inference based on decision theory Discusses the role of causal analysis in statistical decision theory

This book describes the classical axiomatic theories of decision under uncertainty, as well as critiques thereof and alternative theories. It focuses on the meaning of probability, discussing some definitions and surveying their scope of applicability. The behavioral definition of subjective probability serves as a way to present the classical theories, culminating in Savage's theorem. The limitations of this result as a definition of probability lead to two directions - first, similar behavioral definitions of more general theories, such as non-additive probabilities and multiple priors, and second, cognitive derivations based on case-based techniques.

THE CONCEPTION OF THIS VOLUME This volume, Cardinalism, has been initiated by Ole Hagen, and is now published due to his perseverance and to Kluwer Academic Publishers. Because of various activities and duties, my contribution to the general conception of this volume has only been formal, and all the credit for it is due to Ole Hagen. I should also emphasize that the responsibility for the year's delay in the publishing of this volume is entirely mine, for two reasons. First of all, I have been involved in many works in very different fields. Second, the English translation of my 1943 contribution to the concept of cardinal utility took some time. The points of view the reader will find in this volume are often different and sometimes contradictory, but this can only increase the interest of its reading. In any case, this is not the editors' part to side with or against. Thus contributions to this volume are presented as they have been submit ted to the editors. Of course, this does not mean that they entirely agree with the analyses presented. MAURICE ALLAIS M. Allais and O. Hagen (eds.), Cardinalism, vii INTRODUCTION Everyone's conscious choices are assumed to reflect their preferences in different situations. For some purposes it serves the theorist's preference for simplicity to assume that a person's life style can be described by the values of some concrete variables, such as quantities of goods available.

The Second International Conference on Foundations of Utility and Risk Theory was held in Venice, June 1984. This volume presents some of the papers delivered at FUR-84. (The First International Conference, FUR-82, was held in Oslo and some of the papers presented on that occasion were published by Reidel in the volume Foundations of Utility and Risk Theory with Applications, edited by Bernt P. Stigum and Fred Wenst~p). The theory of choice under uncertainty involves a vast range of controversial issues in many fields like economics, philosophy, psychology, mathematics and statistics. The idea of discussing these problems in international conferences has been successful: two conferences have been held and others will follow. The climate of the debate has changed in the meantime, partly as a result of these conferences. It is no more only a question of attacking or defending the neo-Bernoullian assumptions, but also of proposing wider generalizations and including new elements in the analysis of the decision process. For instance Amartya Sen - comparing the two current notions of rationality, internal consistency and self-interest pursuit introduces the concept of reasoning and considers the irrationality which may result from the failure of a positive correspondence between reasoning and choice or from a limited capacity of reasoning. Rationality is also considered with respect to the controversial axiom of strong independence. John C. Harsanyi introduces the concept of practical certainty, i. e.