This chapter offers an overview of procedural fairness in Chinese antitrust. To a certain extent, issues of procedural fairness are intertwined in China with substantive issues of competition law and economics. Part of the complexity has to do with the newness of the AML and with authorities working through a number of cases, industries, and types of conduct that are issues of first impression. Under such circumstances it takes time to build core competencies on the part of the competition authorities. Sometimes what may seem to be procedural fairness issues (such as delay or requests for information that does not seem directly related to the case at hand) may in fact be a function of authority staff coming up to speed on issues for which there is no institutional knowledge.The level of transparency in the Chinese system, at least on paper, bears a resemblance to the European system of procedural fairness in an antitrust setting. However, in practice, the lack of transparency and due process in China suggests behavior that does not comport with the emerging international norms. Similar to transparency concerns masking public interest factors are due process concerns masking public interest factors. Due to the multiple goals, the Chinese competition authorities are more active in their use of industrial policy on substantive decisions relative to the United States and Europe.

The administrative litigations play an essential role in the Anti-Monopoly Law in China. Empirical research suggests that despite the preliminary development antitrust administrative litigations present the “four lowness” phenomenon, namely low start-up, low total case number, low rate of lawsuits against the competition authorities, and low winning rate for plaintiffs. The most severe problems remain two, namely plaintiffs' grounding and the scope of judicial review. It is both empirically urgent and theoretically necessary to establish special rules for antitrust administrative procedure. In order to promote and improve effective antitrust enforcement, it is proposed to recognize plaintiffs' grounding based on procedural participation, to let justice urge competition authorities to adopt procedural guidelines, and to mildly extend the scope of judicial review.

The book examines the rights of defendants in infringement procedures and those of the notifying parties in merger proceedings before the European Commission and the Chinese competition authorities. The initial chapters offer a general introduction to EU and Chinese competition law respectively, paying particular attention to the substantive rules of competition law. Subsequent chapters present an overview of the procedural rights of the notifying parties in merger cases in both legal systems surveyed, address the procedural rights of defendants in infringement cases, and provide an international perspective on differences in the notification and enforcement procedures between legal systems. The final chapter draws comparative conclusions and includes a number of suggestions for improvement.​

In response to cartel formation, competition lawyers and policymakers in nine Asian jurisdictions have experimented with leniency programmes. This mechanism allows firms to come forward with information in relation to their illegal cartel participation in return for a reduction of or immunity from a sanction. The experimentation plays out across three different dimensions: the revision of early adopted leniency programmes, the introduction of newly written leniency programmes, and the decision – deliberate or otherwise – not to create a leniency programme. This volume is the first to analyse the empirical evidence across a number of countries to determine how effective these measures have been, and how they have been amended in response to problems encountered. In this volume, local experts from key Asian jurisdictions, together with international experts, offer an introduction to this fast-developing field, and explore the theoretical, international and regulatory contexts of leniency programmes.

The Political Economy of Competition Law in China provides a unique perspective of China's competition law that is situated within its legal, institutional, economic, and political contexts. Adopting a framework that focuses on key stakeholders and the relevant governance and policy environment, and drawing upon stakeholder interviews, case studies, and doctrinal analysis, this book examines China's anti-monopoly law in the context of the political economy from which it emerged and in which it is now enforced. It explains the legal and economic reasoning used by Chinese competition authorities in interpreting and applying the anti-monopoly law, and offers valuable and novel insights into the processes and dynamics of law- and decision-making under that law. This book will interest scholars of competition law and professionals advising clients that operate in China, as well as scholars of Chinese law, Asian law, comparative law, and political and social science.

China's Anti-Monopoly Law (AML) is one of the youngest and most influential antitrust laws in the world today. This book aims to provide a better understanding of the evolution of China's AML to the international community through a collection of e

This book is a comparative reference on procedural fairness in global antitrust. It focuses on procedure at each stage of antitrust enforcement and considers how a lack of procedural fairness impairs competition law and policy, the benefits of embracing it, the case for establishing global best practices, and how this might be achieved.