Contents: (1) Intro.; (2) Background: Services Provided by Private Security Contractors (PSC); Number and Profile of PSCs Working in Iraq and Afghanistan; Congressional Focus on PSCs; (3) Private Security Co. Working for the U.S. Gov¿t.: Why the U.S. Gov¿t. Uses PSCs; DoD PSCs; Iraq; Afghanistan; Can the Use of PSCs Undermine U.S. Efforts?; DoD Mgmt. and Oversight of PSCs; (4) Options for Congress: Define the Role that Private Security Contractors Can Play in Support of Mil. Operations in Unsecure Environments; Prohibit armed security contractors from being deployed in combat zones; Restrict armed security contractors to performing static security; Restrict armed security contractors to static security, with an exception for local nationals.

The use of private security contractors (PSCs) to protect personnel and property in Iraq and Afghanistan has been a subject of debate. While PSCs are viewed as being vital to U.S. efforts in the region, many are concerned about transparency, accountability, and legal issues raised by the use of armed civilians to perform security tasks formerly performed by the mil. Contents of this report: Legal Status and Authorities: (a) Internat. Law: Can Contractors be Combatants?; Are They Mercenaries?; (b) Iraqi Law, and Afghan Law, and Status of U.S. Forces; (c) U.S. Law; ¿Inherently Gov¿t. Functions¿ and Other Restrictions on Gov¿t. Contracts; Prosecution of Contractor Personnel in U.S. Fed. or Mil. Courts; Uniform Code of Mil. Justice.

U.S. Government departments and agencies contributing to combat or stability operations overseas are relying on private firms to perform a wider scope of security services than was previously the case. The use of private security contractors (PSCs) to protect personnel and property in Iraq and Afghanistan has been a subject of debate in the press, in Congress, and in the international community. While PSCs are widely viewed as being vital to U.S. efforts in the region, many Members are concerned about transparency, accountability, and legal and symbolic issues raised by the use of armed civilians to perform security tasks formerly performed by military personnel, as well as the adverse impact PSCs may be having on U.S. counterinsurgency efforts. This report discusses the legal framework that applies to PSCs in Iraq and Afghanistan. After presenting a general description of the types of law applicable, including international humanitarian law and relevant status of forces agreements, the report addresses some implications of international law and a multilateral proposal for the adoption of international "best practices" regarding the use of PSCs. The report follows up with a discussion of jurisdiction over PSC personnel in U.S. courts, whether federal or military courts, identifying possible means of prosecuting contractor personnel who are accused of violating the law overseas in the context of U.S. military operations, including a listing of known cases that have occurred or are pending. Finally, the report briefly discusses the possible implication of the roles of private security contractors with respect to inherently governmental functions.

Contents: (1) Background; (2) Managing Contractors during Contingency Contracting; (3) Number and Roles of Contractors in CENTCOM, in Iraq, in Afghanistan; (4) Efforts to Improve Contractor Management and Oversight; (5) Contractors in DoD Strategy and Doctrines: (a) Can Contractors Undermine U.S. Efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan?; (b) DoD Strategy and Doctrine: The National Defense Strategy and Quadrennial Defense Review; Field Manual on Operations; Field Manual on Counterinsurgency; New Doctrine, DoD Instructions, and Other Efforts; (6) Selected Congressional Hearings and Legislation; (7) Contract Management, Oversight, and Coordination: Training Contractors and the Military in Contingency Contracting. Illus.

Private contractors have become an essential but highly problematic element in the U.S. military's total force structure. The Army in particular relies heavily on contractors to perform duties that free up Soldiers for combat roles. The vast majority of these civilian employees provide logistical and technical support. They build facilities, do laundry, and staff dining halls on U.S. bases at home and abroad. While some of these contractors have been involved in issues of waste, fraud, and abuse, these issues do not have a significant effect on the conduct of contingency operations, especially counterinsurgency (COIN) campaigns.The same cannot be said of a small subset of military contractors known as private military security contractors (PMSCs). PMSCs provide armed security personnel to support contingency operations abroad. They provide heavily armed personal security details for the Department of Defense (DoD), the Department of State (DoS), the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), construction contractors, nongovernmental and international organizations (NGOs and IOs), and even private individuals. They also supply static security guards for bases and other facilities, and escort supply convoys in conflict zones. These activities have embroiled them in escalation-of-force and other incidents that have undermined mission goals and objectives. Reigning in security contractors thus presents a major challenge for the U.S. Government in general and the Army in particular.

In Private Military and Security Contractors (PMSCs) a multinational team of scholars and experts address a developing phenomenon: controlling the use of privatized force by states in international politics. Robust analyses of the evolving, multi-layered tapestry of formal and informal mechanisms of control address the microfoundations of the market, such as the social and role identities of contract employees, their acceptance by military personnel, and potential tensions between them. The extent and willingness of key states—South Africa, the United States, Canada, the United Kingdom, and Israel—to monitor and enforce discipline to structure their contractual relations with PMSCs on land and at sea is examined, as is the ability of the industry to regulate itself. Also discussed is the nascent international legal regime to reinforce state and industry efforts to encourage effective practices, punish inappropriate behavior, and shape the market to minimize the hazards of loosening states’ oligopolistic control over the means of legitimate organized violence. The volume presents a theoretically-informed synthesis of micro- and macro-levels of analysis, offering new insights into the challenges of controlling the agents of organized violence used by states for scholars and practitioners alike.

The United States relies on contractors to provide a wide variety of services in Iraq and Afghanistan, including security. Private firms known as private security contractors (PSCs) are hired to protect individuals, transport convoys, forward operating bases, buildings, and other economic infrastructure, as well as train security forces. While DOD has previously contracted for security in Bosnia and elsewhere, it appears that in Iraq and Afghanistan DOD is for the first time relying heavily on armed contractors to provide security during combat or stability operations. As of September 2009, there were almost 22,000 armed private security contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan. This book examines current private security contractor trends in Iraq and Afghanistan and the steps the DOD has taken to improve oversight and management and the role of incorporating security contractors into its doctrine and strategy.