Some say that private law ought to correct wrongs or to protect rights. Others say that private law ought to maximise social welfare or to minimise social cost. In this book, Emmanuel Voyiakis claims that private law ought to make our responsibilities to others depend on the opportunities we have to affect how things will go for us. Drawing on the work of HLA Hart and TM Scanlon, he argues that private law principles that require us to bear certain practical burdens in our relations with others are justified as long as those principles provide us with certain opportunities to choose what will happen to us, and having those opportunities is something we have reason to value. The book contrasts this 'value-of-choice' account with its wrong- and social cost-based rivals, and applies it to familiar problems of contract and tort law, including whether liability should be negligence-based or stricter; whether insurance should matter in the allocation of the burden of repair; how far private law should make allowance for persons of limited capacities; when a contract term counts as 'unconscionable' or 'unfair'; and when tort law should hold a person vicariously liable for another's mistakes.

This book focuses on the subject of choice of law as a whole and provides an analysis of its various rules, principles, doctrines and concepts. It offers a conceptual account of choice of law, called "choice equality foundation" (CEF), which aims to flesh out the normative basis of the subject. The author reveals that, despite the multiplicity of titles and labels within the myriad choice of law rules and practices of the U.S., Canadian, European, Australian, and other systems, many of them effectively confirm and crystallize CEF's vision of the subject. This alignment signifies the necessarily intimate relationship between theory and practice by which the normative underpinnings of CEF are deeply embedded and reflected in actual practical reality. Among other things, this book provides a justification of the nature and limits of such popular principles as party autonomy, most significant relationship, and closest connection. It also discusses such topics as the actual operation of public policy doctrine in domestic courts, and the relation between the notion of international human rights and international commercial dealings, and makes some suggestions about the ability of traditional rules to cope with the advancing challenges of the digital age and the Internet.

The book examines the philosophical foundations of private law, arguing that the foremost preoccupations of the law of obligations are grounded in and pervade the personal lives of individuals.

Voyiakis argues that private law aims to articulate acceptable principles as to when our institutions can hold agents accountable for their choices.

The Choice Theory of Contracts is an engaging landmark that shows, for the first time, how freedom matters to contract.

"Offering a fresh perspective on "nudging", this book uses legal paternalism to explore how legal systems may promote good policies without ignoring personal autonomy. It suggests that the dilemma between inefficient opt-in rules and autonomy restricting opt-out schemes fails to realistically capture the span of options available to the policy maker. There is a third path, namely the 'mandated-choice model'. The book is dedicated to presenting this model and exploring its great potential. Contract law, consumer protection, products safety and regulatory problems such as organ donation or excessive borrowing are the setting for the discussion. Familiarising the reader with a hot debate on paternalism, behavioural economics and private law, this book takes a further step and links this behavioural law and economics discussion with philosophical considerations to shed a light on modern challenges, such as organ donation or consumers protection, by adopting an openly interdisciplinary approach. The book will be of interest to students and scholars of contract law, legal systems, behavioural law and economics, and consumer law"--

This collection contributes to a fundamentally important set of debates about the nature of private law. The essays consider whether private law should be seen as having goals and, if so, whether those goals are particular to private as opposed to public law. They consider the legitimacy of the pursuit of community welfare goals in private law and the place of instrumentalist thinking in private law scholarship. They explore the relationship between the pursuit of policy goals and the other influences that shape private law, such as the formal values of certainty, consistency and coherence and the need to do justice to the parties to particular disputes. The collection analyses the role that particular policy goals do and should play in particular private law doctrines, and contributes to debate about the relationship between community welfare goals and considerations of interpersonal morality arising from the interactions between individuals. The contributors are drawn from across the common law world and offer a diverse range of perspectives on the controversies under consideration.