According to conventional wisdom, government may intervene when private markets fail to provide goods and services that society values. This view has led to the passage of much legislation and the creation of a host of agencies that have attempted, by exquisitely detailed regulations, to compel legislatively defined behavior in a broad range of activities affecting society as a whole—health care, housing, pollution abatement, transportation, to name only a few. Far from achieving the goals of the legislators and regulators, these efforts have been largely ineffective; worse, they have spawned endless litigation and countless administrative proceedings as the individuals and firms on who the regulations fall seek to avoid, or at least soften, their impact. The result has been long delays in determining whether government programs work at all, thwarting of agreed-upon societal aims, and deep skepticism about the power of government to make any difference. Strangely enough in a nation that since its inception has valued both the means and the ends of the private market system, the United States has rarely tried to harness private interests to public goals. Whenever private markets fail to produce some desired good or service (or fail to deter undesirable activity), the remedies proposed have hardly ever involved creating a system of incentives similar to those of the market place so as to make private choice consonant with public virtue. In this revision of the Godkin Lectures presented at Harvard University in November and December 1976, Charles L. Schultze examines the sources of this paradox. He outlines a plan for government intervention that would turn away from the direct "command and control" regulating techniques of the past and rely instead on market-like incentives to encourage people indirectly to take publicly desired actions.

What is the impact of lobbying on the policymaking process? And who benefits? This book argues that most research overlooks the lobbying of regulatory agencies even though it accounts for almost half of all lobbying - even though bureaucratic agencies have considerable leeway in how they choose to implement law.

Draws on interviews with interest groups, lobbyists and government officials to assess private organizations' efforts to influence federal policy in agriculture, energy, health and labour policy. They reveal and explain the absence of any central core of influentials in the policy process.

How can an academic scientist honour knowledge for its own sake, while also using knowledge as a means to generate wealth? This text investigates the trends & effects of modern, commercialised academic science.

This study undertakes a new definition of the 18th-century novel's investment in visual culture, tracing the relationship between the development of the novel and that of the portrait, particularly as represented in the novel itself.

At a time when pollution, urban sprawl, and condo booms are leading municipal governments to adopt prescriptive laws and regulations, this book lays the groundwork for a more informed debate between those trying to preserve private property rights and those trying to assert public interests. Rather than asking whether community interests should prevail over the rights of private property owners, Public Interest, Private Property delves into the heart of the argument to ask key questions. Under what conditions should public interests take precedence? And when they do, in what manner should they be limited? Drawing on case studies from across Canada, the contributors examine the tensions surrounding expropriation, smart growth, tree bylaws, green development, and municipal water provision. They also explore frustrations arising from the perceived loss of procedural rights in urban-planning decision making, the absence of a clear definition of “public interest,” and the ambiguity surrounding the controls property owners have within a public-planning system.