Correctional policies for Islamist violent extremist offenders are often based on the premise that prisons can be hotbeds of radicalization. The perception that inmates are susceptible to violent extremist belief systems has given rise to a fervent international public, political, and scholarly debate and has led to the introduction of drastic, often expensive policies to counter the threat of prison radicalization. But is the introduction of these policies justified? A key question is whether violent extremist offenders should be concentrated in separate high-security prisons, or whether they should be integrated into the mainstream inmate population. Prisoner Radicalization and Terrorism Detention Policy argues that concentration strategies to manage violent extremist offenders are often flawed – based on untested, potentially false assumptions that are rooted in fear rather than in facts. Little academic evidence has been produced that can valuably inform policy making in this area. As a result, policies to detain violent extremist offenders may be inadequately tailored to achieve their objectives, and could even lead to an intensification of the violent extremist threat. This book is the first to present a detailed and systematic case study of the decision-making and implementation process behind terrorism detention policy. It will be essential reading for students, scholars and policymakers researching criminal justice, terrorism and extremism.

Correctional policies for Islamist violent extremist offenders are often based on the premise that prisons can be hotbeds of radicalization. The perception that inmates are susceptible to violent extremist belief systems has given rise to a fervent international public, political, and scholarly debate and has led to the introduction of drastic, often expensive policies to counter the threat of prison radicalization. But is the introduction of these policies justified? A key question is whether violent extremist offenders should be concentrated in separate high-security prisons, or whether they should be integrated into the mainstream inmate population. Prisoner Radicalization and Terrorism Detention Policy argues that concentration strategies to manage violent extremist offenders are often flawed – based on untested, potentially false assumptions that are rooted in fear rather than in facts. Little academic evidence has been produced that can valuably inform policy making in this area. As a result, policies to detain violent extremist offenders may be inadequately tailored to achieve their objectives, and could even lead to an intensification of the violent extremist threat. This book is the first to present a detailed and systematic case study of the decision-making and implementation process behind terrorism detention policy. It will be essential reading for students, scholars and policymakers researching criminal justice, terrorism and extremism.

The appalling images of recent terrorist attacks in Europe and the rest of the world remain in everyone's memory. In the face of such horrendous acts, national governments and international organisations are seeking to identify the root causes of this situation in order to prevent and combat radicalisation, extremism and terrorism.The profiles and motives of radicalised persons vary considerably, but the first steps towards radicalisation are generally a result of sympathies for radical discourse and of meeting an individual, in person or online, who is already radicalised. Prisons are one of the places for such contacts. Radicalised prisoners take advantage of the concentrated population in prisons in order to proselytise and develop extremist and terrorist networks. This publication can help national authorities and professionals answer these questions. It proposes guiding principles, tools and advice based on an approach that emphasises a balance between human rights, security and effective criminal justice.

There are thousands of followers of non-Judeo-Christian faith groups in American correctional institutions. Research suggests that many of these prisoners began their incarceration with little or no religious calling, but converted during their imprisonment. According to the FBI, some of these prisoners may be vulnerable to terrorist recruitment. The purpose of this study is three-fold: (1) to collect baseline information on non-traditional religions in U.S. correctional institutions; (2) to identify the personal and social motivations for prisoners’ conversions to these faith groups; and (3) to assess the prisoners’ potential for terrorist recruitment. The study creates a starting point for more in-depth research on the relationship between prisoners’ conversion to non-traditional religions and extremist violence. Figure. This is a print on demand report.

This new edited volume expands our understanding of the processes by which individuals and groups disengage from terrorism. While there has been a growing awareness of the need to understand and prevent processes of radicalization into terrorism, disengagement and deradicalization from terrorism have long been neglected areas in research on terrorism. This book uses empirical data to explore how and why individuals and groups disengage from terrorism, and what can be done to facilitate it. The work also presents a series of case studies of disengagement programmes, from Colombia, northern Europe, Italy, Yemen, Saudi Arabia, Indonesia, Singapore and Malaysia, comparing and assessing their various strengths and weaknesses. In light of the lessons learned from these cases, this book describes and explains the potential for new developments in counter-terrorism. This book will be of great interest to all students of terrorism studies, war and conflict studies, international security and politics in general, as well as professionals in the field of counter-terrorism.

In the past few years, the MENA region witnessed a rise in jihadist extremism and radicalization, as countries in the area were rocked by a series of deadly terrorist attacks. As authorities responded to the threat, it became clear that in order to effectively counter the phenomenon, traditional repressive measures had to now be accompanied by alternative methods of prevention, rehabilitation and dissuasion. How have different governments around the Mediterranean responded? What sort of alternative measures have been taken? How effective have these policies been? What further steps can be taken to strengthen the response of the authorities? These are just some of the key issues that this ISPI Report seeks to cover. The experts in this volume illustrate the policies of contrast, prevention and de-radicalization that have been adopted by countries in the MENA region, revealing emerging trends, lessons learned and overviews of this security status.

The Prevent strategy, launched in 2007 seeks to stop people becoming terrorists or supporting terrorism both in the UK and overseas. It is the preventative strand of the government's counter-terrorism strategy, CONTEST. Over the past few years Prevent has not been fully effective and it needs to change. This review evaluates work to date and sets out how Prevent will be implemented in the future. Specifically Prevent will aim to: respond to the ideological challenge of terrorism and the threat we face from those who promote it; prevent people from being drawn into terrorism and ensure that they are given appropriate advice and support; and work with sectors and institutions where there are risks of radicalization which need to be addressed