In An Aristotelian Account of Induction Groarke discusses the intellectual process through which we access the "first principles" of human thought - the most basic concepts, the laws of logic, the universal claims of science and metaphysics, and the deepest moral truths. Following Aristotle and others, Groarke situates the first stirrings of human understanding in a creative capacity for discernment that precedes knowledge, even logic. Relying on a new historical study of philosophical theories of inductive reasoning from Aristotle to the twenty-first century, Groarke explains how Aristotle offers a viable solution to the so-called problem of induction, while offering new contributions to contemporary accounts of reasoning and argument and challenging the conventional wisdom about induction.

This encyclopedia, representing one of the most multi-disciplinary areas of research, is a comprehensive examination of the key areas in animal cognition and behavior. It will serve as a complementary resource to the handbooks and journals that have emerged in the last decade on this topic, and will be a useful resource for student and researcher alike. With comprehensive coverage of this field, key concepts will be explored. These include social cognition, prey and predator detection, habitat selection, mating and parenting, development, genetics, physiology, memory, learning and perception. Attention is also given to animal-human co-evolution and interaction, and animal welfare. All entries are under the purview of acknowledged experts in the field.

Concepts and problems; The calculus of inductive probability; Alternative inductive logics and the justification of induction; Probability and action; The pragmatic theory of inductive probability; The logic of causal statements as a formal language; The logic of causal statements as a model of natural language; The dispositional theory of empirical probability; Cause and chance in space - time systems; The presupposition of theory induction; Chance, cause, and reason.

The first comprehensive history of John Venn’s life and work. John Venn (1834–1923) is remembered today as the inventor of the famous Venn diagram. The postmortem fame of the diagram has until now eclipsed Venn’s own status as one of the most accomplished logicians of his day. Praised by John Stuart Mill as a “highly successful thinker” with much “power of original thought,” Venn had a profound influence on nineteenth-century scientists and philosophers, ranging from Mill and Francis Galton to Lewis Carroll and Charles Sanders Peirce. Venn was heir to a clerical Evangelical dynasty, but religious doubts led him to resign Holy Orders and instead focus on an academic career. He wrote influential textbooks on probability theory and logic, became a fellow of the Royal Society, and advocated alongside Henry Sidgwick for educational reform, including that of women’s higher education. Moreover, through his students, a direct line can be traced from Venn to the early analytic philosophy of G. E. Moore and Bertrand Russell, and family ties connect him to the famous Bloomsbury group. This essential book takes readers on Venn’s journey from Evangelical son to Cambridge don to explore his life and work in context. Drawing on Venn’s key writings and correspondence, published and unpublished, Lukas M. Verburgt unearths the legacy of the logician’s wide-ranging thinking while offering perspective on broader themes in religion, science, and the university in Victorian Britain. The rich picture that emerges of Venn, the person, is of a man with many sympathies—sometimes mutually reinforcing and at other times outwardly and inwardly contradictory.

Inductive reasoning is a method of reasoning in which a body of observations is considered to derive a general principle. It consists of making broad generalizations based on specific observations Inductive reasoning is distinct from deductive reasoning. If the premises are correct, the conclusion of a deductive argument is certain; in contrast, the truth of the conclusion of an inductive argument is probable, based upon the evidence given.

By 1916, Dewey had written two volumes on logical theory. Yet, in light of what he would write in his 1938 Logic: The Theory of Inquiry, much remained to be done. Dewey did not yet have an adequate account of experience suitable to explain how our immediate experiencing becomes the material for logical sequences, series, and causal relations. Nor did he have a refined account of judging, propositions, and conceptions. Above all, his theory of continuity—central to all of his logical endeavors—was rudimentary. The years 1916–1937 saw Dewey remedy these deficiencies. We see in his published and unpublished articles, books, lecture notes and correspondence, the pursuit of a line of thinking that would lead to his magnum opus. John Dewey's Later Logical Theory follows Dewey through his path from Essays in Experimental Logic to the publication of Logic: The Theory of Inquiry, and complements James Scott Johnston's earlier volume, John Dewey's Earlier Logical Theory.