"This book takes a fresh look at the place of the Human Rights Act in Britain's constitutional order.

Implied constitutional principles form part of the landscape of the development of fundamental rights in common law jurisdictions, affecting issues ranging from the remuneration of judges to the appropriation of property by the state. Principled Reasoning in Human Rights Adjudication offers thematic analysis of the use of the implied constitutional principles of the rule of law and separation of powers in human rights cases. The book examines the functions played by those principles in rights adjudication in Australia, Canada, the Commonwealth Caribbean, and the United Kingdom. It argues that a complete understanding of implied constitutional principles requires thoroughgoing analysis of the sources and methods of implication and of the specific roles played by such principles in the adjudicative process. By disaggregating particular functions and placing those functions within their respective institutional contexts, this book develops an understanding of the features of cases in which implied constitutional principles are invoked and the work done by those principles.

This study offers a critical account of the reasoning employed by the European Court of Human Rights, particularly its references to European consensus. Based on an in-depth analysis of the Court's case-law against the backdrop of human rights theory, it will be of interest to both practitioners and theorists. While European consensus is often understood as providing an objective benchmark within the Court's reasoning, this study argues to the contrary that it forms part of the very structures of argument that render human rights law indeterminate. It suggests that foregrounding consensus and the Court's legitimacy serves to entrench the status quo and puts forward novel ways of approaching human rights to enable social transformation.

In the absence of a sound conception of the judicial role, judges at present can be said to be 'muddling along'. They disown the declaratory theory of law but continue to behave and think as if it had not been discredited. Much judicial reasoning still exhibits an unquestioning acceptance of positivism and a 'rulish' predisposition. Formalistic thinking continues to exert a perverse influence on the legal process. This 2005 book dismantles these outdated theories and seeks to bridge the gap between legal theory and judicial practice. The author propounds a coherent and comprehensive judicial methodology for modern times. Founded on the truism that the law exists to serve society, and adopting the twin criteria of justice and contemporaneity with the times, a judicial methodology is developed which is realistic and pragmatic and which embraces a revised conception of practical reasoning, including in that conception a critical role for legal principles.

This volume explores how national and international human rights courts interpret and apply human dignity. The book tracks the increasing deployment of the concept of human dignity within national and international courts in recent decades. It identifies how human-dignity-based arguments have expanded to cover larger sets of cases: from the right to life or to integrity or anti-discrimination, the concept has surfaced in disputes about political and social rights and rule of law requirements, such as equality or legal certainty. The core message of the book is that judges understand, interpret, and apply human dignity differently. An inflation in the judicial recourse to human dignity can saturate the legal environment, depriving the concepts as well as human-rights-based narratives of salience, and threaten the predictability of court decisions. The book will appeal to philosophers of law, constitutional theorists and lawyers, legal comparativists, and internal law specialists. Whilst being dedicated specifically to human dignity jurisprudence, the book touches on many aspects of judiciary and as such will also be of interest to researchers studying legal reasoning, interpretation and application of the law and courts, as well as social philosophers, political scientists, and sociologists of law, politics, and religion.

"The jurisprudence of the International Court of Justice generally demonstrates that no rule of international law can be interpreted and applied without regard to its innate values and the basic principles of human rights. Through its case-law the ICJ has made immense contributions to the development of human rights law, and in so doing continues to provide solutions to mounting international problems, such as terrorism and unilateral use of force. Part I of the book argues that the legislative spirit of contemporary international law lies in the doctrine of human rights and that the spirit of human rights doctrine lies in the principle of human dignity. Furthermore it argues that the processes of international legislation and international adjudication are inseparable, and that there is no norm of international law which does not intertwine the fundamental principle of human dignity with human rights doctrine. Hence human rights law is more a school of law than merely a normative branch of international law, and the ICJ's willingness to engage in the development of human rights law depends upon which judicial ideology its judges subscribe to.In order to evaluate how this human rights spirit is manifested, or occasionally not manifested, through the vast jurisprudence of the ICJ, Parts II and III critically examine the Court's principal contentious and advisory cases in which it has treated human rights questions. The legal reasoning of the Court and the opinions appended to its decisions by its individual judges are analysed in light of the principle of human dignity and the doctrine of human rights."--Bloomsbury Publishing.