The controversial Bush doctrine of preemptive war is often described as revolutionary. In fact, as this comparative study of rivalries involving weapons of mass destruction (WMD) shows, notions of preventive and preemptive war have long been closely tied to such weapons. In this study, a wealth of historical data is analyzed to address the fundamental question that WMD proliferation raises for U.S. defense policy: will the projection of U.S. power be deterred by nascent WMD arsenals in the hands of rogue states? This wide-ranging comparison yields the conclusion that small WMD arsenals do not have the deterrent effects often attributed to them by scholars and analysts. These theorists ignore history's close calls, an oversight we share at our peril.

This comprehensive survey of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) rivalries places the Bush Doctrine of preemption in historical context, arguing that instability fueled by first-strike incentives is an inherent byproduct of WMD proliferation.

How do international systems deal with the threat and use of weapons of war? In this sophisticated yet accessible analysis, a leading strategic analyst takes readers deep into twentieth century history to answer this question. Weapons of mass destruction, and the counter threat of retaliation, have been central concerns in strategic decision- making in World War I, the legacy of World War II, and the Cold War era.Few people can traverse issues of global confl ict with more historical insight than George Quester. His writing is lucid, and his information either new or imperfectly understood in the past. Quester details the ways weapons of war have infl uenced the forging of policies in the twenty-fi rst century. He argues for the retention of appropriate weapons systems, but also for care in when they are used. Priorities exist, but they depend on whether a state is dealing with major powers or rogue states. And off ensive weapons may well become an option in response to non-state terrorist groups or for that matter state-sponsored terrorist acts.When aggression has already occurred, the world is less likely to regard military response as a violation of the peace. Quester cites Clausewitz's adage that the aggressor is always willing to exploit the world's preference for peace. The rise of the human rights movement adds more complexities to preemptive war and prevention, since the line between civilian and military casualties becomes increasingly blurred. The risks may be great, the choices are few--but the needs of military policy making remain high on the agenda. As a result, the concerns discussed here will be on the global political agenda for years to come.

In an age of new threats to international security, the old rules of war are rapidly being discarded. The great powers are moving toward norms less restrictive of intervention, preemption, and preventive war. This evolution is taking place not only in the United States but also in many of the world's most powerful nations, including Russia, France, and Japan, among others. As centuries of tradition and law are overturned, will preventive warfare push the world into chaos? Eve of Destruction is a provocative contribution to a growing international debate over the acceptance of preventive military action. In the first work to identify the trends that have led to a coming age of preventive war, Thomas M. Nichols uses historical analysis as well as interviews with military officials from around the world to trace the anticipatory use of force from the early 1990s—when the international community responded to a string of humanitarian crises in Somalia, Bosnia, and Kosovo—to today's current and potential actions against rogue states and terrorists. He makes a case for a bold reform of U.S. foreign policy, and of the United Nations Security Council itself, in order to avert outright anarchy.

The Commission believes that unless the world community acts decisively and with great urgency, it is more likely than not that a weapon of mass destruction will be used in a terrorist attack somewhere in the world by the end of 2013. The Commission further believes that terrorists are more likely to be able to obtain and use a biological weapon than a nuclear weapon. The Commission believes that the U.S. government needs to move more aggressively to limit the proliferation of biological weapons and reduce the prospect of a bioterror attack. Further compounding the nuclear threat is the proliferation of nuclear weapons capabilities to new states and the decision by several existing nuclear states to build up their arsenals. Such proliferation is a concern in its own right because it may increase the prospect of military crises that could lead to war and catastrophic use of these weapons. As former Senator Sam Nunn testified to our Commission: "The risk of a nuclear weapon being used today is growing, not receding." This Commission was chartered by Congress to assess our nation's progress in preventing weapons of mass destruction proliferation and terrorism--and to provide the next President and Congress with concrete, actionable recommendations that can serve as their road map to a safer homeland and world. No mission could be timelier. The simple reality is that the risks that confront us today are evolving faster than our multilayered responses. Many thousands of dedicated people across all agencies of our government are working hard to protect this country, and their efforts have had a positive impact. But the terrorists have been active, too--and in our judgment America's margin of safety is shrinking, not growing.

Following the terrorist attacks against the United States on September 11, 2001, U.S. leaders recast the national security strategy to place greater emphasis on the threats posed by terrorists and by states from which they might acquire weapons of mass destruction, and announced that in the future the United States would take advantage of opportunities to strike at potential adversaries before they attacked. RAND Project Air Force examined the nature and implications of this doctrine of striking first. This study focused on three central questions: First, under what conditions is preemptive or preventive attack worth considering or pursuing as a response to perceived security threats? Second, what role should such strategies be expected to play in future U.S. national security policy? Finally, what implications do these conclusions have for planners and policymakers in the U.S. Air Force and the other armed services as they design military capabilities and strategies to deal with national security threats in the next decade? The study concluded preparing for such operations should not be a key driver for change in U.S. military capabilities because large-scale U.S. first strike will be infrequent and present few unique operational military requirements, although the intelligence requirements for these strategies are highly demanding. Planners should also recognize that this doctrine may affect the types of threats posed against U.S. forces and interests by potential adversaries.

The U.S. war in Iraq was not only an intelligence failure—it was a failure in democratic discourse. Hitting Firstoffers a critical analysis of the political dialogue leading up to the American embrace of preventive war as national policy and as the rationale for the invasion and occupation of Iraq. Taking as its point of departure the important distinction between preemptive and preventive war, the contributors examine how the rhetoric of policy makers conflated these two very different concepts until the public could no longer effectively distinguish between a war of necessity and a war of choice. Although the book focuses on recent events, Hitting First takes into consideration the broader historical, ethical, and legal context of current American policies. Precedents are examined for preventive military action based on conventional as well as nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons threats. The authors also consider recent examples of the rhetoric of "humanitarian intervention," which have tended to undermine traditional notions of national sovereignty, making purportedly "morally justifiable" actions easier to entertain. Intelligence gathering and its use, manipulation, and distortion to suit policy agendas are also analyzed, as are the realities of the application of military force, military requirements to sustain a policy of preventive war, and post-conflict reconstruction.Hitting First presents a timely and essential view of the lessons learned from the failures of the Iraqi conflict, and offers a framework for avoiding future policy breakdowns through a process of deliberative public and governmental debate within a free market of ideas. The critiques and prescriptions offered here provide a unique and valuable perspective on the challenges of formulating and conduct of national security policy while sustaining the principles and institutions of American democracy. This collection will appeal to students and scholars of American foreign policy, international relations, political communication, and ethics.