In this monograph, Aistė Mickonytė examines the compliance of the European anti-cartel enforcement procedure with the presumption of innocence under Article 6(2) of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). The author maintains that the pursuit of manifestly severe punishment with insistence of the European Commission on administrative-level procedural safeguards is inconsistent with the robust standards of protection under the Convention. Arguing that EU anti-cartel procedure is criminal within the meaning of the Convention, this work considers this procedure in light of the core elements of the presumption of innocence such as the burden of proof and the principle of fault. The author zeroes in on the de facto automatic liability of parental companies for offences committed by their subsidiaries.

In enforcing EU competition law, the Commission employs a unique doctrine of parental antitrust liability: it imposes fines on the parent company of an infringing subsidiary in cases where the parent exercises decisive influence over the subsidiary's commercial policy. Critics of this contentious aspect of EU competition law believe that the doctrine is unfair, ineffective, obscure, disproportionate, contrary to due process, and based upon a dubious, if not extremely flimsy, justificatory foundation. Such criticism raises serious and unanswered questions about the legitimacy of the Commission's efforts to enforce competition law. Parental Liability in EU Competition Law: A Legitimacy-Focused Approach is the first monograph to be dedicated to this controversial topic. Written by Professor Peter Whelan, the book contends that, although the general concept of parental liability can be justified in principle, the current EU-level doctrine of parental antitrust liability in fact suffers from a distinct and problematic lack of legitimacy. More specifically, the said doctrine displays significant deficiencies with respect to effectiveness, fairness, and legality. Given this undesirable state of affairs, Parental Liability in EU Competition Law offers a fully-rationalised, reformulated approach to parental antitrust liability for EU competition law violations that is built around the notion of parental fault. That approach provides a solid normative account of how to impose parental antitrust liability in a manner that is theoretically robust, effective in practice, fair in substance, and legally sound.

The most comprehensive resource for students on EU competition law; extracts from key cases, academic works, and legislation are paired with incisive critique and commentary from an expert author team.

There has a been a long-standing debate on the compatibility of EU competition law with fundamental rights protection, particularly as the latter is enshrined in the due process requirements of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). This book, a signal contribution to that debate, assesses two questions of paramount concern: first, whether the current level of fundamental rights protection in cartel enforcement falls within the accepted ECHR standards; and second, how the often conflicting objectives of effectiveness and adequate protection of fundamental rights could optimally be achieved. Following a detailed survey of relevant EU institutional, substantive, and procedural law rules, the author offers a set of persuasive normative responses to both questions. Proceeding from an in-depth analysis of the pertinent rights and legal nature of competition proceedings under EU and ECHR law, the author goes on to examine such elements of the perceived incompatibility as the following: investigatory powers vested in competition authorities; the privilege against self-incrimination; right to privacy; “fair trial” probatory requirements; degree of use of presumptions in EU practice; Article 6 ECHR guarantees pertaining to the presumption of innocence; proving coordination of competitive behaviour; proving restriction of competition; admissibility of evidence before EU Courts and the Commission; assessment of the attribution of liability rules; EU fining rules; judicial review of cartel decisions by EU Courts; and national sanctioning rules. The author’s extraordinarily thorough presentation is rounded off with a remarkably comprehensive bibliography that lists (in addition to books and articles) newspaper articles, EU regulations and directives, soft-law guidelines and “best practices”, EU and ECtHR case law, EU Advocate General opinions, European Commission decisions, and European Ombudsman decisions. General conclusions stress the necessity of introducing further reforms to enhance the effectiveness and legitimacy of fundamental rights in the context of competition proceedings. Few books have taken such a thorough and far-reaching approach to the reconciliation of “effective public enforcement” and “fundamental rights”, or of “effective deterrence” with the principles of legality, non-retroactivity, presumption of innocence, and ne bis in idem. In the depth of its appraisal of the entire spectrum of enforcement components from a fundamental rights perspective, the book is without peers. It will be warmly welcomed by any parties interested in the intersection of competition law and human rights.

This title is a comprehensive textbook of EU constitutional law, setting out the structure, values, procedures, and policies of the European Union. It is a first point of reference for issues of EU constitutional law. The book encompasses six major parts. The first part addresses the formation history of the European Union, the treaties, the accessions, and the withdrawal of the United Kingdom. The second part covers the competences of the European Union. It contains an extensive analysis of the key constitutional principles governing the exercise of competences by the Union and the balance of power between the Union and its Member States, followed by an in-depth anaylsis of EU citizenship and the four freedoms, followed by an overview of the main internal and external policy domains. The third part addresses the role and workings of the various institutions (European Council, Council, European Parliament, Commission, European Court of Justice, and European Central Bank), the position of the Member States of the Union, and various other institutional matters. Part four explores the various decision-making processes, addressing not only the legislative and executive decision-making, but also the budget, CFSP, and external action. The fifth part looks at the legal instruments and the position of EU law in the EU and national legal orders, with an attention to the key principles of primary and direct effect, and the role of fundamental rights and the Charter of Fundamental Rights. The final part sets out the complete and coherent system of judicial protection in the European Union, offering an overview of the various courses of action before the EU courts and in the national legal orders to enforce EU law or to obtain judicial protection.

This book examines the legislative patchwork surrounding access to the European Commission's cartel case files. Recent legislative changes have increased the value of the files and have also highlighted the inherent tension between a number of competing interests affecting their accessibility. The Commission is undoubtedly caught between a rock and a hard place, charged with the task to ensure due process, transparency and effectiveness while at the same time promoting both public and private enforcement of the EU competition rules. The author considers how best to ensure a proper balance between the legitimate, but often diverging interests of parties, third parties and national competition authorities in these cases. The book provides a unique and comprehensive presentation of the EU legislation and case law surrounding access to the Commission's cartel case files. The author examines the question of accessibility from three different perspectives: that of the parties under investigation, cartel victims, and national competition authorities. The author also considers the EU leniency system and whether any legislative changes could make the attractiveness of the system less dependent on the possibilities of cartel victims to access the evidence contained in the Commission's case files.

The European Union (EU) leniency programme is a key weapon in the Commission’s fight against hard-core cartels. Much of the success of EU cartel enforcement depends on the continued effectiveness of the leniency policy and is especially critical in response to the growth of private enforcement. This book offers a comprehensive description of the development of the policy, along with a normative framework that promises to ensure the full legitimacy of the leniency programme: the Commission’s policy should pursue not only effectiveness but also fairness. It is the first work to extensively analyse the effectiveness and fairness in the EU leniency policy. Proceeding systematically from clarifying the concepts of ‘effectiveness’ and ‘fairness’ to addressing the tension between leniency and private actions for damages, the author discusses the nature of, and interrelations among, such aspects as the following: – the theoretical model of the EU fining policy; – the compatibility of the EU enforcement system with fundamental rights protection; – the gathering and evaluation of evidence at the preliminary investigation stage; – the severity and foreseeability of the EU cartel fines; – judicial review by the EU Courts in competition matters; – to what extent the current policy is effective and fair; and – reforms brought about by the 2002 and 2006 Leniency Notices and the leniency-related amendments by the 2014 Antitrust Damages Directive. A key feature is the author’s presentation of a normative framework to test the effectiveness (deterrence) and substantive fairness (retribution) of the EU leniency policy. As a clear demonstration of how to forestall the danger of focusing on effectiveness of leniency at the expense of fairness, both in a substantive and in a procedural sense, this book is a major contribution to the literature of competition law. It will prove to be of great value to competition authorities, antitrust practitioners and interested academics not only in Europe but also throughout the world.