In this newly revised and updated edition of his essential work, John Prados adds his concluding findings on U.S. covert operations in Angola, Afghanistan, Nicaragua, and the Persian Gulf. Acclaimed as a landmark book about U.S. intelligence agencies in the postwar era, Presidents' Secret Wars describes the secret warfare mounted by the president, the CIA, and the Pentagon--operations aimed at altering the destinies of nations and the course of global politics. Mr. Prados uses many newly declassified documents to open a vital window on this most secret aspect of American foreign policy. "A worthy and informative book"--Washington Post. "An important book....Prados's recounting of the often neglected early days of the C.I.A. and its covert activities is especially enlightening."--New York Times Book Review. "For those concerned with the study of intelligence, Presidents' Secret Wars will be highly useful because Dr. Prados has done serious archival research....This volume moves the study of covert operations to a higher and more sophisticated plane"--Intelligence and National Security.

Traces the history of postwar American secret operations, assesses their effectiveness, and discusses the Iran-Contra Affair

Provides an analysis of postwar covert activities by United States intelligence agencies, documenting the early days of the CIA and its operations.

O'Rourke's book offers a onestop shop for understanding foreignimposed regime change. Covert Regime Change is an impressive book and required reading for anyone interested in understanding hidden power in world politics.― Political Science Quarterly States seldom resort to war to overthrow their adversaries. They are more likely to attempt to covertly change the opposing regime, by assassinating a foreign leader, sponsoring a coup d'état, meddling in a democratic election, or secretly aiding foreign dissident groups. In Covert Regime Change, Lindsey A. O'Rourke shows us how states really act when trying to overthrow another state. She argues that conventional focus on overt cases misses the basic causes of regime change. O'Rourke provides substantive evidence of types of security interests that drive states to intervene. Offensive operations aim to overthrow a current military rival or break up a rival alliance. Preventive operations seek to stop a state from taking certain actions, such as joining a rival alliance, that may make them a future security threat. Hegemonic operations try to maintain a hierarchical relationship between the intervening state and the target government. Despite the prevalence of covert attempts at regime change, most operations fail to remain covert and spark blowback in unanticipated ways. Covert Regime Change assembles an original dataset of all American regime change operations during the Cold War. This fund of information shows the United States was ten times more likely to try covert rather than overt regime change during the Cold War. Her dataset allows O'Rourke to address three foundational questions: What motivates states to attempt foreign regime change? Why do states prefer to conduct these operations covertly rather than overtly? How successful are such missions in achieving their foreign policy goals?

From its founding in the aftermath of World War II, the Central Intelligence Agency has been discovered in the midst of some of the most crucial-and most embarrassing-episodes in United States relations with the world. Safe for Democracy for the first time places the story of the CIA's covert operations squarely in the context of America's global quest for democratic values and institutions. National security historian John Prados offers a comprehensive history of the CIA's secret wars that is as close to a definitive account as is possible today.

Based on recently declassified documents, this book provides the first examination of the Truman Administration’s decision to employ covert operations in the Cold War. Although covert operations were an integral part of America’s arsenal during the late 1940s and early 1950s, the majority of these operations were ill conceived, unrealistic and ultimately doomed to failure. In this volume, the author looks at three central questions: Why were these types of operations adopted? Why were they conducted in such a haphazard manner? And, why, once it became clear that they were not working, did the administration fail to abandon them? The book argues that the Truman Administration was unable to reconcile policy, strategy and operations successfully, and to agree on a consistent course of action for waging the Cold War. This ensured that they wasted time and effort, money and manpower on covert operations designed to challenge Soviet hegemony, which had little or no real chance of success. US Covert Operations and Cold War Strategy will be of great interest to students of US foreign policy, Cold War history, intelligence and international history in general.

Explores the life and career of William Egan Colby, one of the most controversial figures of the postwar period: World War II commando, Cold War spy, Saigon CIA station chief, and eventual CIA director under Nixon and Ford, he played a critical role in some of the most pivotal events in 20th-century history.